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“Perhaps one will view the rise of the Alternative for Germany in the foreseeable future as 
inevitable, as a portent for major changes, one that is as necessary as it was predictable. 
 
What is meant here is not only the oncoming economic collapse, or the latency of the Euro crisis, 
but also the gradual questioning of the fraudulent modus vivendi upon which the state doctrine 
of recent decades has been based: Europe and ties to the West as a definitive solution to the 
German Question, the nation-state as an anachronism, checkbook diplomacy and the creation of 
peace without weapons, an existence hemmed in by friends, economy as destiny, the welfare state 
as a matter of course, immigration as an asset, consumerism as a sedative, Auschwitz as a 
founding myth, the Sonderweg [Germany’s “path of uniqueness”] as the cause of all evil on 
Earth. None of this will endure, and in the upcoming struggles for resources, it will be not only 
over material resources, but also and especially intellectual ones.”1 
--Karlheinz Weißmann, New Right author 
 
 
 The turn of the 21st century, now quickly fading into history, was a moment of 
celebration of the “end of history” as global capitalism and liberal democracy triumphed over 
Soviet communism. It was assumed that new social developments and nascent technologies such 
as the internet would be imbedded in and reinforce these trends. Interconnected economy and 
communication would lead to a worldwide homogenization of values, as all people could have 
equal access to the markets of goods and ideas. Yet the conditions were already developing for a 
deviation from this dream; not for the first time, the presumption that mankind had found its 
highest form of organization permitted complacency. Several crises in the global economic and 
political order-- the 2008 financial collapse, the 2009 Eurozone crisis, and the 2013 migrant 
crisis-- as well as the festering of unaddressed inequalities prompted the demand for an 
alternative to the still newly-hegemonic system.  
This vacuum, left unaddressed by mainstream neoliberal and neoconservative parties 
across the Western world, has allowed the radical right to build a momentum that has not been 
                                               
1 Karlheinz Weißmann, “Ruhe bewahren,” JUNGE FREIHEIT, accessed October 18, 2018, 
https://jungefreiheit.de/debatte/kommentar/2014/ruhe-bewahren/.., partially translated in Samuel Salzborn, 
“Renaissance of the New Right in Germany? A Discussion of New Right Elements in German Right-Wing 
Extremism Today,” German Politics and Society 34, no. 2 (January 1, 2016): 55, 
https://doi.org/10.3167/gps.2016.340203.  
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seen since the 1930s. In the Federal Republic of Germany, only a united country for less than 
three decades, the longstanding suspicion of such movements acquired by its guilt from the past 
is waning. Its two main parties, Angela Merkel’s ruling center-conservative Christian 
Democratic Union (CDU) and its wavering coalition partner, the center-left Social Democratic 
Party (SPD) have both seen significant segments of their voters pulled over to the far right 
Alternative for Germany (AfD), which has become the parliamentary voice for nativism, 
xenophobia, and Euroscepticism since its inception in 2013. Other, more democracy-hostile 
social movements have also emerged: Pegida (Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamification of 
the West) seemed to erupt spontaneously on the streets of Dresden, concentrating the anger of up 
to 25,000 participants on Muslim foreigners.2 The Identitarian Movement (IB), a pan-European 
white identity crusade directly influenced by the intellectual New Right, embraces a militant 
postmodern personality and skillfully manipulates digital media. What used to be small, 
underground networks of neo-Nazi punks has grown the face-- and body-- of a respectable 
movement which attracts millions combined. 
 From 1945 until the last few years, Germany was known as a “blank space on the map” 
for far right populism. 3 Commonly held to be “the European country least prone to nationalist 
rhetoric, and one that has consciously sought to refashion its identity within Europe,” the only 
successes of far right parties until recently had been mostly limited to the state level. 4 While it is 
true that Germany has had a strong “societal consensus” against Nazism, 1945 did not sever the 
                                               
2 Jean-Yves Camus and Nicolas Lebourg, Far-Right Politics in Europe, trans. Jane Marie Todd (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2017), 207.  
3 Frank Decker, “The ‘Alternative for Germany:’ Factors Behind Its Emergence and Profile of a New Right-Wing 
Populist Party,” German Politics and Society 34, no. 2 (June 1, 2016): 1, https://doi.org/10.3167/gps.2016.340201. 
4 Liz Fekete, “Flying the Flag for Neoliberalism,” Race & Class 58, no. 3 (January 2017): 8, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0306396816670088. 
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lineage of right-wing authoritarian attitudes in the country. 5 The first far right party in the new 
democracy emerged before the year was even over; the anti-denazification Association for 
Economic Reconstruction (WAV) was joined in the next few years by the German Conservative 
Party--German Right Party (DKP-DRP) and the Action Group/European People’s Movement of 
Germany (SzT/EVD). Combined, these parties with independent ultranatioanlists managed to 
win more than 10% of the votes in the first West German Bundestag (federal parliament) 
elections, running on overtly neo-Nazi platforms. A number of other parties, mostly representing 
individual regions, emerged shortly afterwards. Within a few years, however, the first (and to 
this day only) constitutional ban on a right wing party was imposed on the fledgling Socialist 
Reich Party (SRP), which claimed that Admiral Dönitz, Hitler’s hand-picked successor, was the 
“only legitimate authority.”6  The rest continued to exist, identifying themselves with the 
political and intellectual cousin to Nazism, the “Conservative Revolution” of the Weimar era, 
and calling for “the release of all the war criminals, re-establishment of the historical frontiers of 
Germany, and reconstitution of a new Reich founded upon ‘authentic German culture.’”7 These 
parties fell apart over the next 20 years, in spite of a continued prevalence of Nazi nostalgia and 
apologism among the general population.8  
 In the wake of the prohibition of the SRP, the far right began to organize instead through 
informal subcultural organizations to avoid the weaknesses of public political parties, in effect 
                                               
5 Manuela. Caiani and Linda Parenti, European and American Extreme Right Groups and the Internet (Lanham, 
Maryland: Lexington Books, 2015), 16. 
6 Piero Ignazi, Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe, Comparative Politics (Oxford University Press) (Oxford ; 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 64–65. 
7 Zimmermann, E. and Saalfeld, T. ’The Three waves of West German Right-Wing Extremism’, in Merkel, P.H., 
and Weinberg, L. (eds.), Encounters with the Contemporary Radical Right. (Boulder: Westview, 1993), 53, quoted 
in Ibid., 65.  
8 Ibid., 65–66. 
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circumscribing the powers of the German Constitutional Court.9 It was in this time that the 
“Naumann Affair” surfaced, which indicated that the extreme right had changed strategies; rather 
than building its own parties, it sought to hijack others which had already gained legitimacy. 
Werner Naumann, named successor to Goebbels in Hitler’s testament, evaded capture after the 
war. While working as a manager in a trading company, Naumann began to reestablish contacts 
from the SS and Hitler Youth, intending to build a circle of underground conspirators to infiltrate 
mainstream political parties, especially the Free Democratic Party (FDP). The plot was 
discovered and Neumann was arrested by the occupying British government in 1953, reaching 
national and international news. However, the affair was not a point of heavy research into right-
wing extremism until years later.10 
It was not until 1964 that the next viable far right party was formed. The National 
Democratic Party of Germany (NPD), a still-existing neo-Nazi party, attempted to hide the Nazi 
pasts of many of its leaders through a platform of “Prussian conservatism.”11 Though it obtained 
a presence in seven state parliaments, it ultimately failed to meet the 5% minimum threshold for 
the national parliament in the 1969 elections. This occurred against the backdrop of two 
important moments in the republic’s history: the 1966-67 economic crisis, which marked the first 
time unemployment rose since 1945, and the growing leftist student movement which strongly 
fought the NPD. The first certainly had a positive impact on the NPD’s numbers-- as Pierre 
Ignazi points out, the legitimacy of democracy in Germany could not initially be built on a strong 
national “civic culture,” but stood more on the ‘output legitimacy’ of its economic 
                                               
9 Hans-Gerd Jaschke, “Right-Wing Extremism and Populism in Contemporary Germany and Western Europe,” in 
Right-Wing Radicalism Today: Perspectives from Europe and the US, ed. Sabine Von Mering and Timothy Wyman 
McCarty, Routledge Studies in Extremism and Democracy (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2013), 23. 
10 Beate Baldow, “Episode oder Gefahr? Die Naumann-Affäre” (2012), 2–7, https://refubium.fu-
berlin.de/bitstream/handle/fub188/9139/Dissertation_Baldow.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y. 
11 Jaschke, “Right-Wing Extremism and Populism in Contemporary Germany and Western Europe,” 24.  
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accomplishments.12 This explains the rise of the NPD alongside the 1966 crisis, and could very 
well apply just as well to today. While trust in democratic institutions has certainly grown in 
Germany, the “strictest relationship” of faith between democracy and the German populace 
depends on the health of the economy.13 Nevertheless, the NPD’s failure in 1969 drove it into an 
internal crisis, especially with the younger generation of right wingers. Neo-Nazi militarism rose, 
loosely organized into ‘groupuscules,’ while another more educated group of conservatives set 
itself the task of creating a new intellectual basis for right wing action. 14 Following the French 
intellectuals of the time, the German “New Right” began to adapt the ideas of the postmodern 
left, from Antonio Gramsci’s “cultural hegemony” to Alain Badiou’s “metapolitics,” with the 
goal of covertly injecting right wing worldviews into the mainstream through cultural means.  
Two new far right parties surfaced in the 1980s: the German People’s Union (DVU) and 
the Republicans (Republikaner or simply REP). The former served more as a “collector of 
various ‘action groups’”15 until the 1987 election, in which it cooperated with the NPD. The 
Republikaner took up the ideas of the New Right, as did the NPD with its new “three pillar” 
platform of “fighting for the streets, fighting for the parliament, and fighting for people’s minds.” 
16 With reunification in 1991 the parties broke through to a large electorate of “marginal and 
frustrated” East Germans, whose experiences under the regime of the Socialist Unity Party 
(SED) and their economic disadvantages made them prime targets for völkisch (ethnic-popular) 
radicalization.17 Despite some gains in state parliaments, the parties did not grow through the 
                                               
12 Ignazi, Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe, 63. 
13 Ibid.  
14 Fabian Virchow, “The Groupuscularization of Neo-Nazism in Germany: The Case of the Aktionsbüro 
Norddeutschland,” Patterns of Prejudice 38, no. 1 (March 2004): 56–70, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/0031322032000185587. 
15 Ignazi, Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe, 69.  
16 Roger Woods, Germany’s New Right as Culture and Politics, New Perspectives in German Studies (Houndmills, 
Basingstoke, Hampshire [England] ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 28.  
17 Ignazi, Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe, 70, 73. 
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1990s-- in fact, by the 2000s they had declined. Hans-Gerd Jaschke suggests, however, that this 
was due more to mainstream parties picking up the xenophobic rhetoric that used to be the 
purview of the far right. 
For instance, in 2010 a central bank executive and former Social Democratic minister of 
finance of Berlin named Thilo Sarrazin published a book titled “Deutschland schafft sich ab,” 
“Germany Does Away with Itself”, in which he warned of the German population becoming 
“increasingly stupid” from the lower IQs of non-German ethnic groups, blaming 
multiculturalism and excess tolerance for the supposed gradual death of German culture. His 
focus was on the Turkish population in Germany, who had immigrated in the postwar decades as 
“guest workers.” While it was expected that most would remigrate back to their homeland, they 
became a significant and permanent part of the German demography.18 Sarrazin provoked 
immediate controversy, but his points were received with support from much of German society. 
The well-respected magazine Der Spiegel published an article dubbing him “hero of the people,” 
the second largest weekly magazine Fokus made the “Sarrazin Affair” its cover story, and “all 
relevant political talk shows on television gave the agitator the floor.”19 The SPD’s official 
website declared his ideas “incompatible with social democratic core values,”20 yet upon internal 
arbitration he was allowed to keep his SPD membership, likely because the party had realized 
how much of a popular issue he had tapped into. Franz Greß et. al consider this a success of the 
New Right’s attempt to “cross the cordon sanitaire that had been erected as a supposedly clear 
dividing line between extremist subculture and mainstream public discourse by extending the 
                                               
18 Hartwig Pautz, “The Politics of Identity in Germany: The Leitkultur Debate,” Race & Class 46, no. 4 (April 
2005): 40, https://doi.org/10.1177/0306396805052517. 
19 Jaschke, “Right-Wing Extremism and Populism in Contemporary Germany and Western Europe,” 27. 
20 “Parteiausschlussverfahren Gegen Thilo Sarrazin | Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD),” 
July 25, 2011, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20110725100108/http://www.spd.de/aktuelles/News/666/parteiausschlussver
fahren_gegen_thilo_sarrazin.html#. 
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limits of the discourse.”21 Rohrmoser notes that the now-accepted statements in the CDU about 
the “foreignisation of the German people” used to be a talking point of the Republikaner, 
especially since the further influx of immigrants with the refugee crisis. 
Far from pacifying the far right, however, the mainstream parties’ adoption of its 
discourses enabled it to grow into its own movement. In 2013 the Alternative for Germany (AfD) 
was founded by Bernd Lucke, Konrad Adam, and Alexander Gauland as a Eurosceptic party for 
conservative “economists, academics, publicists, and captains of industry disaffected with 
Merkel’s approach to the Euro crisis.”22 Yet in 2015, the height of the refugee crisis, it was 
overrun by a “younger, more populist, less technocratic leadership” that gained immense success 
on a social platform that followed Thilo Sarrazin, bashing “political correctness” and embracing 
its appeal as a protest party for common discontent-- in the November 2017 elections, it gained 
12.6% of the vote and 94 seats from its previous zero.23 Because of this combination of laissez 
faire economics with conservative nationalist, often outright xenophobic narratives and 
propaganda-- simultaneously promoting the free market and private profit while attempting to 
limit its behavior to within the nation-state--24 scholars have had difficulty agreeing on whether it 
can truly be considered populist. Yet the influence that populist movements such as Pegida have 
                                               
21 Franz Greß, Hans-Gerd Jaschke, Klaus Schönekäs, Neue Rechte und Rechtsextremismus in Europa: 
Bundesrepublik, Frankreich, Großbritannien. (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1990), 9. quoted in Woods, 
Germany’s New Right as Culture and Politics, 30.  
22  Decker, “The “Alternative for Germany,” 3.; Fekete, “Flying the Flag for Neoliberalism,” 9. 
23 Von Paul Blickle et al., “Wahlverhalten: Merkel-Enttäuschte und Nichtwähler machen die AfD stark,” ZEIT 
ONLINE, accessed October 3, 2018, https://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2017-09/wahlverhalten-
bundestagswahl-wahlbeteiligung-waehlerwanderung; “Merkel Zur Flüchtlingskrise: ‘Multikulti Bleibt Eine 
Lebenslüge,’” Spiegel Online, December 14, 2015, sec. Politik, 
http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/fluechtlinge-angela-merkel-spricht-von-historischer-bewaehrungsprobe-
fuer-europa-a-1067685.html; “Integration: Merkel Erklärt Multikulti Für Gescheitert,” Spiegel Online, October 16, 
2010, sec. Politik, http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/integration-merkel-erklaert-multikulti-fuer-gescheitert-
a-723532.html; Fekete, “Flying the Flag for Neoliberalism,” 98; Nicole Berbuir, Marcel Lewandowsky, and Jasmin 
Siri, “The AfD and Its Sympathisers: Finally a Right-Wing Populist Movement in Germany?,” German Politics 24, 
no. 2 (April 3, 2015): 158, https://doi.org/10.1080/09644008.2014.982546.  
24 Salzborn, “Renaissance of the New Right in Germany?,” 53. 
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on the AfD is clear,25 leading some to consider it as a “missing link” between mainstream 
conservatism and xenophobic populism, and some scholars have noticed that the “mix of market 
liberalism and right-wing authoritarianism” is a “winning formula” which bridges the two only 
so long as it is politically convenient.26 The former East German Democratic Republic (GDR) 
has become the hotbed of AfD support, as the AfD has become the voice of the so called “losers 
of modernization”: the unemployed, socially immobile, undereducated, very young or very old, 
and predominantly male strata of society that have found their living standards threatened by the 
social cutbacks of austerity programs in the past few decades. In the east this is particularly true, 
and immigration’s supposed threat to cultural identity is often pointed to as the explanation for 
their material stagnation and decline in the so-called “crisis of multiculturalism.” Merkel herself 
claimed that “Multikulti” has failed in the wake of the Sarrazin controversy and reiterated her 
belief in 2015, calling multiculturalism a “Lebenslüge” (“lifelong lie”), lending further 
legitimacy to that narrative.27  
The contemporary right encompasses a wide range of tendencies, from outright neo-
Nazism to the AfD’s anti-egalitarian capitalism to more populist strands of the ruling CDU/CSU. 
There are two ways of defining the relationship between the mainstream and the extreme 
tendencies: the “bridge” conception and the “gray zone” conception. The former is concerned 
with organizations as the main political actors-- from neo-Nazi subcultural groups to populist 
street movements to political party youth organizations to the parties themselves— and how they 
act as nodes that form “bridges” between one another. These bridges fill the divides that used to 
                                               
25 Camus and Nicolas Lebourg, Far-Right Politics in Europe, 207. 
26 Nicole Berbuir, Lewandowsky, and Siri, “The AfD and Its Sympathisers,” 154.  
Michael Minkenberg, “The Renewal of the Radical Right: Between Modernity and Anti‐modernity,” Government 
and Opposition 35, no. 2 (April 2000): 173–74, https://doi.org/10.1111/1477-7053.00022. 
27Jaschke, “Right-Wing Extremism and Populism in Contemporary Germany and Western Europe,” 24.  
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exist between the mainstream right and right wing extremism (that used to be firmly excluded by 
the center), legitimizing more and more right-leaning political organizations and discourses. The 
“gray zone” conception, on the other hand, is interested in the ideological gradient between 
mainstream and far right, along which individuals and ideas can slide organically from more 
innocuous politics to outright xenophobic nationalism. Naturally, both patterns reinforce one 
another, as far as individuals interact both formally with political organizations and informally 
with social discourses. This provides opportunities for all political actors to try to capture and 
retain supporters, adjusting their rhetoric and issue focus according to what builds the most 
political power. In this way, groups from all areas of the spectrum are able to exert pressures on 
one another, but the far right has been the most successful in shifting the rest of politics towards 
its end of the spectrum.28 
The focus of this paper is on the “new” far right— the groups such as the AfD, 
Identitarian Movement, and Pegida that completely dissociate from Nazism, attempting to be a 
“fresh” conservatism that is not weighed down by the associations of the past. These are far more 
successful than the “old” far right, groups such as the neo-Nazi National Democratic Party 
(NPD) and skinhead gangs, that still openly display nostalgia for National Socialism and use 
Nazi imagery. Yet, as previously mentioned, both the “bridge” and “grey zone” conceptions 
understand that ostracized fringe groups are able to disseminate their ideas into mainstream 
politics, aided by the economic conditions, discursive shifts, and new technologies of the last 
three decades. The intellectual New Right, the subject of chapter three, has been instrumental in 
                                               
28 Helga Druxes, “Manipulating the Media: The German New Right’s Virtual and Violent Identities,” in Digital 
Media Strategies of the Far Right in Europe and the United States, ed. Patricia Anne Simpson and Helga Druxes 
(Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2015), 125; Jessica Sprague-Jones, “Extreme Right-Wing Vote and Support 
for Multiculturalism in Europe,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 34, no. 4 (April 2011): 540, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2010.512665. 
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providing this channel between the old and new far right, repackaging many of the ideas of older 
right-wing extremism into a format which raises less suspicion. 
 This thesis is concerned with the relationship of the far right to the respective economic, 
discursive, epistemic, and technological dimensions of postmodernity, as the contemporary far 
right is strongly shaped by such conditions that differ immensely from those of the 1920s and 
30s. Neoliberalism, the “failure” of multiculturalism, the philosophical issues of meaning and 
truth with which the New Right occupies itself, and the internet as a revolutionary form of 
communication have both enabled the preexisting right wing as well as engendered the growth of 
new movements and their acceptance in the mainstream public sphere. The term 
“postmodernity” is used rather than “late modernity” for a few reasons. First, the intellectual 
right wing is strongly and openly influenced by postmodernism, whose relativism is embraced 
against “modernist claims to universality” (universal principles). Secondly, the processes against 
and out of which the contemporary right wing grows have been described most comprehensively 
by theorists of postmodernism and/or who primarily use the term postmodernism, such as Hans-
Georg Betz, Zygmunt Baumann, and Michael Minkenberg. They use a definition advanced by 
Jean-Francois Lyotard: “simplifying to the extreme, I define postmodern as incredulity towards 
metanarratives.”29 Here, postmodernism refers not to an “after” modernity or an opposite to 
modernity, but “an increasingly reflexive process of modernization and a new, self-critical 
posture towards modernity.”30 In practical terms, Hans-Georg Betz claims that postmodernism 
has entailed 
a new skepticism and ‘incredulity’ towards the grand narratives of enlightenment, 
emancipation, and legitimation; the transformation of the structures of late capitalism into 
                                               
29 Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (U of Minnesota Press, 1984), xxiv. 
30 Minkenberg, “The Renewal of the Radical Right,” 177. 
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a postindustrial, information, and consumer society characterized by increasing 
automation of production and the manipulation of information; the realization that 
modernity has left us with a waste land of ‘detritus, decomposition, and disaccumulation’ 
against ‘the background radiation of parody, kitsch, and burnout,’ a panic scene 
dominated by the simulated spectacle of the hyperreal or the spread of an ‘eclectic and 
amorphous culture exhibiting plurality, mixed lifestyles and new attitudes based on 
immediate gratification, fantasy, novelty, play, hedonism, consumption and affluence.’31 
Betz argues that postmodernism emerged primarily as a “new wave of philosophical thinking” in 
France, while emerging first in architecture and art in the United States. In Germany, however, it 
manifested as a “‘diffuse feeling towards life’ (Lebensgefühl) which quickly began to influence 
political action.”32 The erosion of trust in universal narratives of progress and truth alongside 
perceived threats towards traditional forms of collective belonging (nation, class, family, etc.) 
prompted a response from the right, ranging from internet-savvy xenophobic populism that 
targets the disillusioned working class to the intellectual New Right, which accepts 
postmodernism’s concentration on the subjective “lived and particular” over objective fact.33  
As an abundance of literature on inter-party politics and statistical analyses of far right 
voting patterns already exists, this paper is more concerned with the greater structural 
developments which Betz characterizes as “postmodern.” 34 Atomizing capitalism, the discursive 
turn to culture, and the rise of the internet, for instance, have weakened the democratic consensus 
in various ways. This arises from a concern with the true relationship between far right wing 
                                               
31 Hans-Georg Betz, Postmodern Politics in Germany (New York: StMartin’s Press, 1991), 5.  
32 Türk, H. J.  ‘Zeitenwende in der Philosophie? Aufklärung, Postmoderne und New Age’ Stimmen der Zeit 113 
(March 1988), 155. quoted in Ibid., 3. 
33 Michael. O’Meara, New Culture, New Right: Anti-Liberalism in Postmodern Europe (Bloomington, IN: 1stBooks, 
2004), 71.  
34 List them 
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resurgences and mainstream liberal-democratic society. The statistical analyses analyzed here 
tend to treat the far right as an external phenomenon, the resurgence of a virus that occurs under 
the right conditions in a society that has become unhealthy. It takes a common conception of the 
rise of the Nazis-- that economic crisis (unemployment, etc.). was the main factor driving voters 
into the arms of political “outsiders” such as the Nazis-- and attempts to identify the factors that 
cause deviation from the normal functioning of a modern European society.  
 While it is undoubtedly true that times of hardship incite desperate and radical politics, 
other scholars, such as Stanley Payne, George Mosse, and Zeev Sternhell have put increasing 
emphasis on a different conception of fascism (and by implication, contemporary right wing 
extremism) in their work. George Mosse, for instance, argues that fascism cannot be understood 
“as an anti-phenomenon defined in terms of what it opposed, but in terms of its specific 
ideological and cultural values.”35 If we understand it as the latter, we find that fascism’s lineage 
is just as natural to European culture as Enlightenment democracy. It was and is not an outburst 
of resistance, an interruption to European culture, but a natural part of it. This also means that it 
is not simply a deviation from the “normal functioning” of society, but it has rather arisen from 
the status quo itself in many ways, through the same ideas of nation and culture which uphold 
modern European societies.36 Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, two German social 
theorists who lived through the rise of Nazism, contended that Nazism constituted the fulfillment 
of a “Dialectic of Enlightenment,” in which the Enlightenment project of reason had 
metamorphosed into a regime of domination through its failure to cast off the myths against 
which it attempted to arise. Turning reason into an instrument of domination of man over nature 
                                               
35 Alberto Spektorowski, “The New Right: Ethno-Regionalism, Ethno-Pluralism and the Emergence of a Neo-
Fascist ‘Third Way,’” Journal of Political Ideologies 8, no. 1 (February 2003): 113, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13569310306084. 
36 Ibid. 
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(and man over other men), Enlightenment’s logical conclusion was a system which attempted to 
“reason” total control over society.37 
 Similarly, Jeffrey Herf contended that fascism represented a synthesis of conservative 
dreams and modern technological and political means of achieving them: a “reactionary 
modernism,” seeking to establish a “third way” between the traditions of left and right, 
reconciling the contradictions of European civilization.38 Zeev Sternhell documents how fascism 
took populism, solidarity, mass mobilization, and revolutionary politics from the Marxist left 
while rejecting democratic participation for a conception of “the people” that was rooted in 
supposedly organic, natural identities and hierarchies that had some greater continuity with the 
past. The fascist utopia is one in which all of the benefits of modernity are kept while its 
drawbacks and contradictions are ascribed to an “Other”-- to the Nazis it was Jews, while today 
it is primarily Muslims (though anti-Semitism still plays a part of anti-globalist conspiracy 
theory).39 I argue that the contemporary far right is best understood as a reactionary 
postmodernism which, unlike traditional conservatism, does not look to the past for solutions but 
rather to impose its own form of postmodernity on the future. While fetishizing traditional 
hierarchies and cultural/racial divisions, it embraces postmodern politics, discourses, philosophy, 
and technology and philosophy in order to reify romantic myths. The tools of postmodernism 
were primarily developed by the “New Left” associated with the 1960s and 70s with 
emancipatory politics in mind, attempting to grasp and overcome the exclusion of women and 
                                               
37 Max Horkheimer and author Theodor W. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments, ed. 
Gunzelin Schmid Noerr editor, trans. E. F. N. Jephcott translator, Cultural Memory in the Present (Stanford, 
California: Stanford University Press, 2002). 
38 Jeffrey Herf, Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture, and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). 
39 Ruth Wodak, “‘Anything Goes!’ - The Haiderization of Europe,” in Right Wing Populism in Europe: Politics and 
Discourse, ed. Ruth Wodak, Majid KhosraviNik, and Brigitte Mral (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013), 26. 
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minorities in society, but the far right has found no difficulty in appropriating these ideas for 
their own ends.40 
 In examining the relationship between the contemporary far right and mainstream 
society, the thesis is less interested in the most extreme, violent subgroups such as the NSU 
terrorist cell than in the broader movements that exert direct influence over democratic politics. 
The Federal Office for Constitutional Protection draws a distinction between extremism and 
radicalism along this line. Right wing extremism is closer to what one thinks of historical 
fascism. It opposes the democratic state on principle, shows outright disdain and hatred of 
minorities, and usually operates more in the criminal underground than in politics.41 On the other 
hand, radicalism does not aim at ending Germany’s constitutional democracy but sits on the 
outer limits of what it allows, attempting to push those limits further to the right or left.42 Of 
course, there is often not a clear line between the two; many radical organizations harbor 
individuals who make statements far outside acceptability, or have ties to extremist 
organizations. This has often impeded the German government’s attempts to crack down on 
extremists that do not directly violate the constitutional laws against Nazi symbols and Holocaust 
denial.43   
 The thesis will explore right wing radicalism in Germany: right wing politics that is 
organized in legal, (nominally) pro-democracy groups and attempt to gain political influence in 
the public sphere rather than through vigilante violence. The four chapters correspond to a few 
major aspects of postmodernity, some aspects of which the contemporary right wing arises 
                                               
40 Spektorowski, “The New Right,” 126. 
41 Woods, Germany’s New Right as Culture and Politics, 13; Minkenberg, “The Renewal of the Radical Right,” 
172. 
42 Woods, Germany’s New Right as Culture and Politics, 13. 
43 Manuela. Caiani and Parenti, European and American Extreme Right Groups and the Internet, 34, 41, 636. 
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against and other aspects which it accepts and grows out of. The first chapter takes a materialist 
point of view, combining comparative statistical research on factors such as unemployment with 
systemic analyses of globalized neoliberal capitalism. In many ways, right wing politics are a 
response to the erosion of old identities stemming from the “growing disorganization of 
capitalism”-- the “extensive international division of ownership and production, the separation of 
financial and industrial capital, the decline of regional economic centers, and the growth of the 
service sector.”44 The second chapter will explore discursive developments of the last three 
decades, in which neoliberalism’s atomizing effects motivated reconstitutions of identity along 
the lines of culture, directly drawing from postmodernism’s turn to subjectivity. In Germany, 
culture discourses have taken over by way of the Leitkultur (leading culture) debate and 
preoccupations with “failed integration,” the proper place of Islamic headscarves, and so on. The 
third chapter focuses on the ideology of the New Right. What is the philosophical basis of the far 
right worldview? What are the underlying ontologies and epistemologies that form the logic of 
the current right wing, and how do the intellectuals of the New Right mediate their ambivalent 
relationship to postmodernity? Finally, the fourth chapter will examine the far right’s 
relationship to the new world of the internet. As a cheap, accessible, and increasingly ubiquitous 
form of media, it makes reproducing propaganda and building radicalized communities much 
easier. It has also fostered the creation of a distinct “Erlebniswelt Rechtsextremismus” (right 
wing extremist life-world) which, through aestheticizing political sentiments, allows group 
identities to form in online communities that have their own symbols, merchandising, music, 
memes, and lexicons.45 
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 The sources utilized come from a wide range of perspectives. Statistical, comparative 
research is used predominantly in the first and fourth chapters, on far right voting patterns and on 
the organization of the far right’s online networks, respectively. Other sources include political-
economic theory, historical accounts of debates such as the Leitkultur debate and how they have 
changed and gradually become more prominent, intellectual history, and my own firsthand 
research on far right internet communities, which was carried out over a year on a variety of sites 
from Facebook to far-right online merchandise outlets to anonymous forums. The variety of 
sources and methods employed here is meant to illustrate the interrelatedness of the economy, 
discourses, epistemology, and technology of the postmodern world and their relationships to the 
modern far right. These relationships also demonstrate that the far right is a movement very 
much within postmodernity, though many of its members decry it, that grows out of and reflects 
contemporary conditions just as much as it seems to be a reaction against them. Altogether, this 
project attempts to characterize the contemporary radical right as a movement which cannot be 
so easily pathologized as a group of frustrated outsiders, but as a growth that mobilizes and 
radicalizes pre-existing forces and sentiments from the mainstream. We cannot discount it as 
pure reaction, but rather must look deeply into German society for the elements that spawned and 
stimulate it, to understand the true threat that it poses from within.  
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Chapter One: Neoliberalism and Xenophobia 
 One of the predominant explanations for the resurgence of the far right draws from what 
is known as the “modernisation losers thesis.” The theory focuses on “macro-structurally 
influenced” grievances in sections of the population that feel economically deprived and socially 
disaffected by crises, perceived or real, driven by changes in society. 46 The “profound 
transformation of the socioeconomic and sociocultural structure of advanced Western European 
democracies,”47 as articulated by the theory’s creator Hans-Georg Betz, has led to frustrations 
that drive the “losers” of these transformations towards the far right. Though widely used to 
explain the rise of Hitler’s Nazi party in the interwar period as well as in the contemporary 
situation, the modernisation losers thesis still leaves many questions unanswered. Why do some 
countries in such periods of economic crisis see right-wing extremism grow (the present-day 
United States, Great Britain, and to a lesser extent Germany) while the “losers” of other nations 
also significantly turn to the left, illustrated by the (albeit precarious) successes of Podemos in 
Spain and SYRIZA in Greece? Do unemployment and/or class status directly correlate to right-
wing sympathy, and if not, what material indicators do? And can this theory be read in a strictly 
materialist manner, in which culture is overdetermined by economics, or are cultural anxieties 
deserving of their own attention? To explore the role of the globalized, postindustrial neoliberal 
economy in the political climate, one must examine the specifics of the model. 
 Ironically, though many far right groups stand on anti-materialist philosophical 
foundations, much of the scholarly analysis of the resurgence of such trends of thought concerns 
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itself with materialist explanations.48 Studies which concern themselves with economic interest 
and the “losers of modernization” use comparative research, quantifying factors such as 
unemployment, social welfare benefits, immigration levels, and similar metrics across Western 
European countries. These materialist studies attempt to identify direct causal relationships 
between the aforementioned factors and right wing support. Daphne Halikiopoulou and Tim 
Vlandas, for example, examine the relevant question: “what is the effect of the economy on far-
right party support?”49  
They argue that most of the studies which have claimed that national identity is more 
important to potential right wing voters than economic interest are either too small scale or too 
generalized and turn their attention instead to the cross-national impact of economic factors. 
They notice that, across the 2014 European Parliamentary elections, the most economically 
disadvantaged countries had quite a wide variation in far right success. In fact, the countries with 
the lowest unemployment had the most significant rise in far right party support, while real GDP 
growth, debt, and deficits had no statistically significant impact at the national level. The true 
determining factor according to their analysis seemed to be the strength of labor market 
institutions, which influence the risks and costs of unemployment for individuals:  
where unemployment benefits and dismissal regulations are high, unemployment has no 
effect [on far right wing voting], but where either one of them is low, unemployment 
leads to higher far-right party support. Unemployment benefits – but not dismissal 
regulations – have a statistically significant negative relationship with far-right support.50 
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These statistics show that where individuals feel more economically secure, whether employed 
or not, they are less likely to seek out far right wing alternatives. As of the most recent statistics 
in 2013, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) ranked 
Germany third in the world for the most stringent dismissal regulations of permanent workers, 
behind only Venezuela and China and tied with Belgium.51 Germany’s 2015 unemployment 
benefit generosity, as measured by average net replacement rates (NRR) over five years (the 
percentage of unemployment benefits as compared to previous income over the 6 months after 
the loss of one’s job) ranks at 15th in the world and 13th in Europe; the average unemployed 
person receives 62% of their previous income from unemployment benefits.52 Since 2009, the 
German net replacement rate has declined from 73% (7th in Europe) while other nations such as 
Austria, Finland, and Luxembourg have either raised their rates or kept them more constant. 
Relating to the findings of the Halikiopoulou and Vlandas study, Germany seems to have 
one of the criteria which would limit far right support but lacks in unemployment benefits (which 
negatively impact far right voting) compared to many other European countries. The study 
claims that a drop in the NRR of about 14% correlates with a 3.6 to 6.8% increase in the voting 
share of the far right. Given this, it is possible that the 11% drop in the German NRR has 
contributed to the recent growth of far right extremism by decreasing the sense of economic 
security in the population—though the increase in AfD votes was 12.6% over this time, two to 
four times higher than would be predicted by this model. 
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To further explore the role of the economy, a number of studies have compared 
unemployment with other factors. Finding that unemployment on its own actually (very slightly) 
decreases support for the far right and increases it for social democratic parties, Jesuit et al 
follows with another question. 53 What are the effects of income inequality and the general state 
of social welfare institutions on social capital? Robert Putnam describes social capital as the 
characteristic of “social organization such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate 
coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit”—in other words, the mutual support and trust 
that one feels in one’s community.54 Through statistical analysis across Western Europe, they 
find a rather surprising result. Fiscal redistribution, the measure of social welfare programs of 
reducing income inequality, actually increases support for far right wing parties. The study offers 
a few possible explanations: 1) more social welfare spending requires higher taxes, which 
contributes to feelings of economic squeeze and consequently increases anxieties related to 
foreign competition; 2) voters who are accustomed to generous social programs have greater 
fears of losing them to heightened government spending on immigrants, and 3) benefit 
generosity on its own does not account for the varying “universality” of these social 
institutions.55 Relating to the last hypothesis, a Swank and Betz study finds that welfare states 
with more “comprehensive coverage of citizens within risk categories, a generous social wage, 
and well developed active labor market programs” significantly depress far right wing support 
compared to “corporatist” welfare states which, though usually imposing similar tax burdens, 
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tend to privilege the long-term employed (usually meaning economically privileged) in their 
social benefit programs. 56 The OECD statistics mentioned above suggest that Germany mostly 
belongs to the latter, as while Germany ranks third for protections of permanent workers, it ranks 
44th for protections of temporary workers (though the long- and short-term NRRs are close to 
equal).57 In addition, Rottmann and Ferree characterize Germany as on the corporatist side based 
on political qualities such as the “institutionalization of strong parties [...] and positive law.”58 
Jesuit et al. turn their attention, then, to the state of social capital in Western Europe. 
Their study, along with Kyung Joon Han’s study, finds that the actual efficacy of social safety 
nets largely depends on the state of social unity. More income inequality can actually increase 
class identification rather than cultural/ethnic identification, the former benefitting the SPD and 
the latter increasing the appeal of right-wing answers.59 The lack of social capital and the 
absence of strong social norms, what Emile Durkheim called “anomie,” seems to be the effectual 
component in that economic circumstances produce different senses of group belonging. 
Likewise, on its own, the presence of higher numbers of immigrants as a factor does not seem to 
automatically increase support for the far right60--in fact, many of the most right wing areas in 
Germany have the fewest immigrants, like Saxony and Mecklenburg-West Pomerania in ex-East 
Germany61. Some research even suggests that higher contact with immigrants begets more 
positive perceptions of them.62 When high immigration and high unemployment coincide, 
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however, far right support increases as cultural awareness and identification are heightened and 
immigration can be exploited as a scapegoat by the far right, offering an ostensible solution to 
voters who would otherwise tend to choose the SPD.63 It can be inferred from this that status 
anxiety is more closely related to far right support than the state of deprivation itself. 
The limit of the strict comparative approach is the impossibility of addressing the endless 
number of interrelated factors that simultaneously influence different countries; the same factor 
could even have different effects within specific cultural and historical contexts.64 Indeed, Jesuit 
et al. points out that Swank and Betz (2003), Veugelers and Magnan (2005), and Kitschelt 
(1997), all of which identify criteria across European countries, compress them into quantified 
generalized factors, and extract patterns from the relationships between them, nevertheless  
contradict each other depending on variations in their analytical approaches. Comparing 
Germany’s score of welfare universalism to that of the UK, or the varying prominence of 
xenophobia in the policies of the AfD and the pro-Brexit UK Independence Party can give us 
statistics to grasp, but it does not give us the broader context explaining why the far right is 
returning across the board. Richard Saull contends,   
Consequently, a discussion of the impact of trade relations, unemployment, immigration 
 and supranational (European Union (EU)) forms of regulation as evidence of materialist 
 factors shaping the far-right need to be contextualised within a wider international or 
 global political economy rather than in comparisons between different states as 
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 exemplified by the plethora of comparative studies of far-right parties and electoral 
 systems.65 
One of the fundamental differences between the conditions of the interwar period and the 
contemporary situation is the penetration of global affairs into national life. More so than ever 
before, the economic circumstances in Germany or any other country are dependent on the 
global flow of labor and capital, determined greatly by inter- and supranational institutions as 
well as complex economic patterns that cannot easily be ascribed to a defined group of actors. 
Consequently, a materialist analysis of sources of economic discontent should attempt to situate 
Germany within the greater international economic processes which have shaped politics in 
domestic locales everywhere: the context of neoliberalism. 
 Richard Saull claims that, although the far right  “cannot be reduced to the playing out of 
a global logic of capitalist development,” it is also reductive to read it simply as “a crisis of 
domestic political institutions and party competition.”66 Considering the arguments of Antonio 
Gramsci and others, he suggests that studying the “uneven” character of capitalist development-- 
the construction of core and periphery, debtor and creditor nations-- provides us with a model 
that relates “structural socio-economic developments at the international level to domestic 
dynamics” such as the specifics of far right support, class relations, and political institutions in 
the national context. 67 Alongside Saull, Ray Kiely and Neil Davidson attempt to explain 
neoliberalism’s relationship to the far right through neoliberalism’s macro-structural 
characteristics. 
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The term “neoliberalism” can be used to describe three things: first, the ideology of the 
Chicago school of economics in the 1930s to 50s, which opposed Keynesianism and other forms 
of state intervention into the free market. Second, the strategy adopted in the 1970s by politicians 
and employers to transfer power from labor to management and the market, as a practical 
rejection of Keynesian state capitalism. And third, the era which began as this strategy began to 
be applied, “a new settlement weighted in favour of [the free flow of] capital” which was 
achieved by the late 1980s and consolidated its hegemony after the collapse of the communist 
bloc.68 Neoliberalism became the consensus in the 1990s and began through its mass media 
machine to organically control the “image-world” of individuals: 
[it] limited not only the forms of possible resistance but even the conceptualization of 
experience. In mainstream society now, neoliberalism was not discussed, let alone 
politicized or contested: its benefits were simply too obvious. The longstanding definition 
of ideology was fully realized: “They do not know it, but they are doing it.”69 
What began as “‘vanguard’ regimes of reorientation,” the targeting of labor organizations and the 
weakening of social democratic institutions, became “‘social’ regimes of consolidation,” as new 
areas of social life became commodified and new neoliberal institutions were created.70 Though 
this pattern is markedly more pronounced in the Anglosphere than in Germany, this has left the 
German working class in particular-- though this holds across class lines-- “fragmented and 
disorganized” with neither the former strength of the social democratic consensus nor with the 
systemic alternative to capitalism which collapsed in 1991.71 In seeking to reclaim forms of 
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collectivity which have been weakened under neoliberalism, many with economic anxieties and 
nostalgia for the past have turned to nationalism, ascribing the breakdown of the old order to 
cultural and ethnic outsiders while employing a whitewashed revisionism to the 20th century 
social democratic consensus. Through racializing the social, political, and economic changes of 
the past three decades, the economically disaffected have turned their labor market grievances 
into a narrative of “insider” and “outsider,” and the right wing answer to this is reserving social 
programs for the cultural/ethnic/racial insider.72 
The relatively stable global order of post-1945 limited the political spaces available to the 
far right, as domestic social classes integrated into an international “historical bloc” under US 
hegemony which “made the international co-ordination and management of economic crises 
more effective”.73 Western Europe’s old geopolitical rivalries were kept in check by this liberal 
form of international organization, and the sections of society which were once much more 
economically marginalized were integrated into European social welfare structures and 
institutions.74 
The fall of the Soviet bloc, however, opened that half of the world to globalization, and 
the vacuum left by communism was filled by a neoliberalism without the constraints of 
hegemonic bipolarity. This development triggered a new era of mass migration as global markets 
absorbed countries with large sources of potential labor. The now less-hindered flow of capital 
triggered economically-driven movements of people (and masses of goods) across borders, 
encouraged by new supranational neoliberal institutions such as the EU.75 At the same time the 
“mutually binding social contract between elites and unfortunate” began to erode, and this “de-
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solidarization” negatively impacted previously secure economic factors such as male 
employment security (especially in unskilled and semi-skilled workers).76 Subsequently, Saull 
outlines three characteristics that describe globalization’s relationship to far right acceptance 
since the early 1990s. First, immigration, trade liberalization, and globalization have become a 
more important political preoccupation for voters. Second, the far right has tended to do well “in 
those geographical locales noticeably affected by perceived patterns of globalisation (most 
notably immigration and labour market restructuring/ job insecurity).” And third, far right 
propaganda and campaigning have increasingly concentrated on international processes as the 
primary causes of national problems, “requiring a reconstitution of the national–international 
relationship.”77 
In Germany, globalization has prompted what is known as the Standortpolitik (locational 
politics) discourse. Before the 1990s, German capitalism rested on the “Rhine model,” defined 
by “high wages,” “strong export orientation,” an “elaborate system of social welfare” and an 
“intricate system of corporatist collective bargaining.”78 Facing globalized investment flows, the 
costs of reunification, economic stagnation, and a decreasingly-competitive manufacturing 
sector, however, Germany attempted to make itself more competitive through aligning itself with 
the “cost-cutting, neoliberal politics” taking place elsewhere in the EU at the time.79 Moving 
from quality-competitive to cost-competitive production, the German economy under Kohl 
(CDU) and then Schröder (SPD) reduced social services and protections while re-spatializing the 
                                               
76 Druxes, “Manipulating the Media: The German New Right’s Virtual and Violent Identities,” 125.  
Saull, “Capitalism, Crisis and the Far-Right in the Neoliberal Era,” 37. 
77 Saull, “Capitalism, Crisis and the Far-Right in the Neoliberal Era,” 37–38; Davidson and Saull, “Neoliberalism 
and the Far-Right,” 711.  
78 Neil Brenner, “Building ‘Euro-Regions’: Locational Politics and the Political Geography of Neoliberalism in 
Post-Unification Germany,” European Urban and Regional Studies 7, no. 4 (October 1, 2000): 320, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/096977640000700403. 
79 Ibid., 320, 327. 
27 
 
national and subnational economies; while the Rhine model featured the federal government in a 
strong and active role in the economy, the Standort conception relied on competition between the 
sixteen federal states while the national government retreated from direct regulation of labor, 
taxes, and social services. Angela Merkel left this in place and further consolidated the scheme 
of decreased federal spending and regulation with a constitutional amendment requiring a 
balanced budget, making public policy “ever more inflexible and out-of-joint with changing 
social needs and problems.”80 The economy of social solidarity and common good is thus giving 
way to “fierce competition [and] stoic acceptance of rising uncertainty.”81 
The development of neoliberalism has relied significantly on the opening up of labor 
markets, which puts “competitive pressures on the social wage”82 in two ways: firstly, by 
outsourcing production sources to areas with low wages (i.e. China), and secondly by 
encouraging migrants to enter labor markets which exert downward pressure on wages in high-
wage areas (i.e. Poles or North Africans migrating to Germany). Simultaneously, structural 
adjustment policies through neoliberal institutions-- the IMF, World Bank, and European 
Commission-- have compounded economic insecurities and inequalities within developing 
countries, driving the migration of people from the “developing” periphery to the wealthier 
core.83 In the mass movement of labor, poor migrant-sending countries lose their own 
workforces, including members of their educated middle and upper classes, which in turn makes 
them further dependent economically on rich countries.84 Crowley and Hickman claim that this 
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migration is largely forced; “Europe’s changing and expanding requirements for economic 
migrants are being met in part through the persistence of gross inequalities that generate 
mobility” to serve the needs of core countries’ increasing service sector needs. They claim, using 
the British context, that the rise of far right support is partially due to these significant changes in 
the composition of the economy; as previously-stable manufacturing jobs (those worked by 
native Britons) have disappeared, migrants have filled the structural unemployment created by 
the opening of service sector jobs.85 
Germany’s position differs from other countries such as the UK or the US, however, in 
that globalization has not shifted employment demographics as significantly from manufacturing 
work to the service industry. From 1997 to 2014 manufacturing jobs shrank by approximately 
10%, while the UK lost around 40% and the US lost 38%.86 Though the process of 
deindustrialization certainly began earlier, and was especially pronounced when the East was 
integrated into the more advanced West German economy, this could be another potential reason 
for the far right’s limited success in Germany compared to the other two countries.87 Crowley 
and Hickman’s “transition to postindustrialism” thesis, it could be called, must therefore examine 
another dimension of the changed labor world.  
The exponential development of technology has promoted a significant rise in the 
importance of education for economic mobility. A job that once required only a high school 
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degree, if such a job still exists, now often requires at least a university education. Two strata of 
society have consequently arisen in what some have dubbed a “two-thirds society.” The top two 
thirds, whose access to education has allowed it to retain employment and social mobility and 
receive many of the benefits of technological progress, is relatively secure. On the other hand, 
the other third has found its security waning as it has neither the training to keep up with the 
decline of unskilled labor nor the financial wherewithal and mobility needed to maintain a career 
in the global economy.88 This segment is particularly concentrated in the old GDR, where far 
right groups have attempted to “proletarianize” to take advantage of the “family break-ups,... 
consumerist lifestyles… new rules in the job market, and…. globalization” that have 
disproportionately affected the East and urban centers.89 The unlucky third in the contemporary 
“risk society”90, dubbed the Deklassierte (“underprivileged”), is primarily made up of male blue-
collar workers, low-level employees, pensioners, and unemployed people.91 As the 2017 
parliamentary election showed, the AfD was strongest with voters with only vocational high 
school or intermediate-level high school certificates and the working class (Image 1).  
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Image 1: Voting share by occupation92 
The election numbers, however, find that only 34% of defectors-- people who left the 
parties they chose in 2013 for the AfD-- were former left-party voters (SPD, Die Linke, and 
Grüne), and a comparable 36% were former conservative CDU/CSU voters.93 Of the six main 
parties, Die Linke lost the highest percentage of its former voters to the AfD (11%), though the 
CDU/CSU was next (5.7%). Die Linke, however, is not the left party which represents the 
working class the most; its share of votes is relatively even across workers, white-collar workers, 
and self-employed. Another difference between Die Linke and the AfD is that higher education 
levels positively correlate to Die Linke voting.94 Table 2 shows that voters who had abstained 
from the 2013 election were the highest contributors to the AfD compared to the existing parties. 
Table 3 breaks down the composition of the AfD’s voters in the 2017 election. 
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Party Share of total 
votes (%) 
Votes lost to 
AfD 
% of 2013 voters 
defecting to AfD  
% of total shift 
to AfD of all 
parties 
CDU/CSU 32.9 1,040,000 5.7 36.2 
SPD 20.5 510,000 4.5 17.8 
Die Linke 9.2 420,000 11 14.6 
Grüne 8.9 50,000 1.4 1.74 
Other parties 5.0 730,000 27 25.4 
FDP 8.9 120,000 5.8 4.2 
AfD 12.6 n/a n/a n/a 
First time voters n/a 130,000 4.4* 4.5 
Non-voters from 
2013 
n/a 1,470,000 8.1* 51.2 
Table 1: Electoral shifts from other parties to the AfD.95 *these figures are naturally not defectors, but  
percent of that category voting for the AfD 
Former party % of 2017 AfD voters 
AfD 24 
CDU/CSU 18 
SPD 8.6 
Die Linke 7.1 
Grüne .84 
Other Parties 12 
FDP 2 
First time voters 2 
Non-voters from 2013 25 
Table 2: Composition of the AfD, by the share of its 2017 voters’ previous parties96 
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Through these statistics we find that in the 2017 election, a sizable plurality of new AfD 
votes came from voters who did not have a party affiliation four years earlier-- though 18% of 
working-class voters chose the AfD, it does not seem that most of them had been left-wing 
voters in the previous election. Compare this to the 1994 election, however, and one finds that 
the SPD has drastically lost its blue-collar support. In both the 1987 and 1994 elections, the SPD 
carried around 52% of this socioeconomic group compared to its current 23%.97 Seeing as the 
non-voters group in the above statistic does not include first time voters, it can be suspected that 
many of the working class voters whom the SPD lost over two decades no longer voted until 
they were recaptured by the AfD. This possibility is supported by the statistics on voter 
participation, which dropped sharply from 1998 to 2013 before rising again in 2017.98 
 The breakdown of the “social contract between capital and labour mediated by the social 
democratic state” has increased competition for access to employment and social services, and 
the influx of migrants has consequently become a central focus point on which to displace the 
resulting anxieties. 99 The “so-called ‘white working class’” has emerged as a “key political 
constituency” through this, as social insecurity has become a permanent fixture of life for many. 
The neoliberal project has involved the retreat of the state from social programs while also de-
unionizing labor, especially in the East, which had high union membership before the fall of its 
manufacturing sector.100 As this process has unfolded over the last few decades, the native (and 
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predominantly male) workers who once had the security of a social safety net have been 
disenfranchised, and their response has been assembled with xenophobic imaginaries.101 
These imaginaries include a belief in welfare chauvinism, the idea that those who 
conform to the cultural values supposedly rooted in a nation are more deserving of economic, 
social, and political resources than “culturally deficient” outsiders who “refuse” to assimilate. 
This fuels a revisionism of the 20th century welfare state that places migrants (and 
multiculturalism as their vehicle) as the “other” who disrupted the previous social democratic 
consensus. The implication of this, of course, is that this previous consensus relied on cultural 
homogeneity, with the influx of foreigners having disrupted this cultural settlement and left 
natives as the disadvantaged group. 102 Anyone old enough to remember the days of relative 
social welfare stability will likely also remember the much more ethnically-German composition 
of society back then and can easily ascribe social and economic changes to the concomitant 
demographic changes. Though the media and popular conversations place a specific emphasis on 
refugees (presumably because of fears of terrorism), asylum seekers have still remained a 
minority of total immigration. Likewise, the segment of foreign-born German residents who 
comes from the war-torn middle east, a group particularly feared in the current political climate, 
is only about 11%, and irregular migration into the Eurozone has dropped a sharp 96% since 
2015 (Tables 4 and 5).103 
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Year Immigrant arrivals to 
Germany 
Arrivals of asylum 
seekers 
Percentage of asylum 
seekers to total arrivals 
2016 1,720,190 722,370 41.99% 
2015 2,016,241 441,899 22.07% 
2014 1,342,529 173,072 12.89% 
2013 1,108,068 109,580 09.89% 
Table 3: Immigration to Germany104  
Total population of foreign-born people living in Germany; (as a 
percentage of total population of Germany) 
10,039,080 (12.14%) 
Population of Syrians, Afghans, and Iraqis; (as a percentage of total 
foreign-born population) 
1,118,525; (11.14%) 
Table 4105 
 Migrants are not the only target of xenophobia, however. As noticeable since the 2009 
Eurozone crisis, anti-outsider rhetoric has had a dimension within the EU itself. Germany, which 
has always had a central role in the Eurozone economy, has been responsible for much of the 
economic bailouts of Greece, Spain, and other debtor nations. The perception that outsiders were 
taking economic opportunity away from Germans extended to stereotypes of lazy, “greedy 
Greeks”106 who were receiving resources which rightfully belonged to Germany (this, despite the 
fact that Germany actually profited to the tune of €1.34 billion in the crisis, though the money 
presumably went to banking elites rather than the working class).107 The confidence that these 
economic policies afforded to nationalist rhetoric stems, Davidson and Saull argue, from a class-
                                               
104 https://www.destatis.de/EN/FactsFigures/SocietyState/Population/Migration/Tables/MigrationForeignCitizensBe 
tweenGermanyForeignCountries.html 
105 “Foreign Population by Sex and Selected Citizenships - Federal Statistical Office (Destatis),” accessed October 
18, 2018, 
https://www.destatis.de/EN/FactsFigures/SocietyState/Population/MigrationIntegration/Tables_ForeignPopulation/
Gender.html. 
106 Fekete, “Flying the Flag for Neoliberalism,” 9. 
107 Daniel Brössler, “Deutschland macht mit Hilfen für Griechenland Milliardengewinn,” sueddeutsche.de, July 11, 
2017, sec. wirtschaft, https://www.sueddeutsche.de/wirtschaft/griechenland-deutschland-macht-mit-hilfen-fuer-
griechenland-milliardengewinn-1.3582710#redirectedFromLandingpage. 
35 
 
denying conception of Europe as made up of homogenous nation-states-- each acting as distinct 
single entities competing in global markets rather than being made up of a plurality of 
interests.108 
 Neoliberalism did not enable xenophobia through labor market grievances alone, 
however. On the contrary, against claims that our age is a post-racial one based on individual 
consumer citizens “stripped of culturalized identities pursuing competitive market behaviour,” 
Davidson and Saull respond that “the pathology of racism continues to be reproduced out of the 
social regime of neoliberal capitalism”109. They claim that neoliberalism’s state of perpetual 
“collective socio-economic insecurity,” in which unions and social democracy are weakened 
forms of collective belonging, has facilitated cultural and racial identification as the remaining 
one. Not only has this form of identity arisen to replace economic collectivity, but “nationalist 
ideological tropes have been utilized by political parties committed to implementing neoliberal 
policies as a way of mobilizing a ‘democratic’ constituency.”110 In other words, proponents of 
neoliberalism have relied on nationalist language, constructing insiders and outsiders, to garner 
legitimacy for their programs. Austerity in particular, as a “collective socio-economic 
insecurity,” has necessitated the resurgence of a national group identity that easily takes on racial 
connotations. Davidson and Saull’s argument, then, is that the anomie needed for neoliberalism 
to function economically have not only left a vacuum for far-right nationalist populism, but have 
directly aided it and legitimized its narratives by producing a specific conception of identity. 
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The attack on welfare dependency pursued largely beginning in the 1970s and 80s bred 
stereotypes of welfare abusers while also disproportionately hitting ethnic minorities. 111 
Simultaneously, categories of “acceptable” and “unacceptable” immigrants and refugees have 
risen through the language of the management of migration, further exacerbated by heightened 
national security concerns. These policies and the conceptions upon which they are based have 
played into the hands of far-right rhetoric, as the language of “cultural difference” employed by 
the needs of neoliberalism are easily paired with popular notions of insider and outsider 
identities. The language of neoliberalism is not explicitly racial, Davidson and Saull claim, but 
causal explanations for problems such as economic marginalization are increasingly reliant on 
culture as the “explanatory residue” for problems that do not seem to conform to the 
“meritocratic neoliberal subjectivity” of the post-racial consumer citizen. By this they mean the 
tendency of neoliberalism to individuate financial success and failure as personal 
responsibilities.112 For instance, the economic disadvantages of migrant communities (even of 
descendants of migrants) are explained as being due to a failure on the part of the communities to 
integrate culturally. As “identities around class, gender and politics have been erased as 
explanations for social patterns and pathologies,” defining the culture of outsiders is easily 
capitalized upon by the far right as standing in opposition to “Germanness,” whatever that means 
to them.113 These discursive developments will be discussed in depth in the next chapter. 
 Neoliberalism’s formula for efficiency and competition drives demand for economic 
migration and insecure labor, but Davidson and Saull argue that the exclusionary social 
imaginaries needed to maintain this economy enable the growth of a right-wing element 
                                               
111 Mary Fulbrook, A History of Germany 1918 - 2008: The Divided Nation, 3 edition (Chichester, West Sussex, 
U.K. ; Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2008), 180. 
112 Davidson and Saull, “Neoliberalism and the Far-Right,” 715. 
113 Ibid., 716. 
37 
 
incompatible with globalization at its core.114 This is underscored by what David Goldberg terms 
the “privatization of race.” In the process of reconfiguring the welfare state, governments have 
withdrawn from the social institutions and programs which once provided democratic and public 
oversight to managing inequality and preventing racial discrimination.115 
The neoliberal welfare state, in removing democratic or legal attention to racial equality, 
begins to rely on a “racialized spectre of citizenship rights that neoliberalism exposes through the 
underlying racist assumptions that welfare is no longer a universal right of citizenship but is, 
instead, for those who actively demonstrate that they deserve it through mimicking neoliberal 
subjectivities.” Non-assimilation, welfare dependence, and crime are all explained as results of 
these cultural differences, and as “Germanness” counterposes the stereotypes of foreigners, it 
becomes the indicator of the native in-group deserving of social welfare benefits. To review, 
neoliberalism has not only created spaces for the far right by causing economic grievances, but 
its “epistemological and ontological dimensions [...] as a social regime” have also configured an 
understanding of social and economic rights as requiring restrictions based on cultural 
identity.116  
After the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the resulting “fracturing and 
disorientation of the left, the era of mass democratic politics appears to be in terminal 
decline.”117 Neoliberalism has since redrawn the political sphere because of its disinclinations 
against allowing democratic institutions to intervene in the market economy, and the far right is 
attempting to close in on the growing vacuum by positioning itself as populists against the 
establishment pro-EU, pro-bureaucratic consensus. Especially since the Eurozone crisis, the far 
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right in Germany (as elsewhere) has had strong opportunities to capitalize on the perceived 
democratic deficit of the EU and the role of supranational economic decisions that operate 
largely above democratic oversight.  
Davidson and Saull claim that the far right has an advantage here over the left in that it 
has the ability to exert pressure on the traditional right parties. Though it opposes economic 
globalization, it doesn’t in theory threaten the core economic capitalist principles like property 
rights within the national context. It can operate, at least economically, as an “internal 
opposition,” pressuring the CDU to move right on fiscal and social issues. 118 The AfD, though 
now more strongly controlled by its young populist currents, originally began as the party of 
academics and “captains of industry” who simply opposed the fiscal programs of the EU, 
advocating (among other things) the restoration of the Deutschmark.119 In 2013, the year of the 
AfD’s founding, Germany was still known in Europe as being the country least prone to 
nationalism as well as “one that consciously sought to refashion its identity within Europe.”120 
The splintering of the traditional party topography in that year began within the CDU over 
ordoliberalism-- the German economic orthodoxy of strong state oversight of economic 
institutions without direct intervention in boom/bust cycles, somewhat of a compromise between 
neoliberalism and state control-- and the German role in European economic regulation. The 
AfD formed on the right flank of this debate and has only since then become the party of right 
wing populism after an internal power struggle in 2015.121 The nationalist wing, led by Frauke 
Petry, Marcus Pretzell, Alexander Gauland, and others ousted founder Bernd Lucke with a more 
nationalist program, adopting more radical terms like “Volk” (“people,” though it has a 
                                               
118 Ibid., 717.  
119 Fekete, “Flying the Flag for Neoliberalism,” 9.  
120 Ibid., 8. 
121 Ibid. 
39 
 
chauvinist historical connotation) and moving closer to the xenophobic populist movement 
Pegida.122 This power struggle represents a larger debate within the right wing between 
neoliberal economics (e.g. privatization) and the desire to bring back the 20th century welfare 
state, and the AfD does not seemto have reached a consistent position yet. Its most recent (2017) 
party program, for instance, demands both the deregulation of labor and a universal basic income 
and state compensation for having children. What is clear is that the nation-state is the locus of 
these politics, and the boundary drawn for making these programs exclusive to ethnic German 
insiders.123 
Since as early as the 1980s, new right wing populist movements have largely operated on 
platforms of economic neoliberalism, as the frictions of “postindustrial individualized 
capitalism” have been explained away as due to the two sides of internationalism: 
multiculturalism and supranational institutions. “Its rejection of social policy is a consequence of 
its faith in the market,” Luci Ricolfi claims; “its lack of trust in the state a consequence of its 
belief in civil society.”124 This anti-statism and exaltation of individual freedom (though limited 
to cultural insiders) is also one of the fundamental differences between new right populism and 
1930s fascism. At least one similarity does nevertheless exist here. As fascists claimed that the 
contradictions and anxieties of industrialization were due to the Jewish “other,” which was both 
an external and internal threat, the new far right ascribes the chaos and confusion of late 
capitalism to the “others” of (primarily Muslim) cultural foreigners and internal politically-
correct cosmopolitans, who have supposedly threatened a previously-stable sense of national 
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identity. The image of the Muslim is used as the personification of the fluid, constantly shifting 
economic and cultural landscape of globalization which is responsible for economic and cultural 
anxieties.125 
Samuel Salzborn highlights the neoliberal aspects of the AfD’s platform, finding a rather 
strange relationship between neoliberalism and anti-egalitarianism. On one hand, it presents 
itself as other neoliberal voices do-- as the proponent of “neutral,” “non-ideological” economic 
fact (David Bebnowski contends that this is illusory in general) and advocates for a technocracy 
by economic experts. Yet where this technocracy is challenged as undemocratic, the AfD’s 
counter is none of the usual responses from neoliberals-- that the market itself is democratic, not 
based on hegemony-- but rather that this system is the natural expression of the “‘true’ will of the 
people,” requiring rootedness in the nation. This notion of consensus based not on voting but on 
the unity of the Volk and Volksgemeinschaft (people’s community), both terms which the AfD 
has tried to rehabilitate, assumes that all true Germans would inherently support this state on the 
basis of cultural oneness. This terminology can be directly traced back to the Conservative 
Revolutionary Carl Schmitt and was the Nazi regime’s fundamental claim to legitimacy.126 
The far right’s issue with neoliberalism is, then, rooted in neoliberalism’s moves towards 
“international technocratic regimes” managing complex global networks of economic relations, 
which are held less and less accountable to the national-level democracies with which citizens 
feel more closely involved. “The political-legal and institutional framework that upholds private 
property and market rules is determined at the supranational levels,” they point out, “while 
democratic oversight is still substantively rooted in the nation-state. (718)” This perception of a 
lack of democratic oversight among supranational organizations and networks such as the 
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European Commission or the Eurozone as a whole reifies the nation-state as the only proper 
“ontological space for deliberation and authority,"127 and further affirms the nativism associated 
with reasserting nationality, of “taking one’s country back”.  
While Davidson and Saull argue that today’s far right should be seen as a result of 
neoliberalism’s crisis in the same way that fascism was a reaction to the crisis in the Weimar 
Republic’s nation-state capitalism, they also recognize the difference in class dynamics that sets 
the modern far right apart from its 1930s counterparts. The elite classes that represent the 
bureaucracy of the European Union do not rely on right wing “political mobilizations from 
below” for legitimacy or for insurance against the left, which posed a far greater threat to 
stability in the Weimar Republic than today. The thorough success of the far right would be 
disastrous for the mainstream neoliberal parties as well as for the international system as a 
whole, but Davidson and Saull contend that neoliberalism’s demand for cheap, insecure labor is 
nonetheless aided by far-right hostility to migrants.128 Conversely, the neoliberal need to manage 
migration-- the attempt to ‘open and close the door’ by the needs of the market-- relies on 
restrictive immigration laws which justify themselves on narratives that lend credibility to 
images of foreigners as economic threats. 
The “double relation of dependency,” the push-pull dynamics of migration described by 
Crowley and Hickman which are fundamental to the global economy, places the plight of 
migrants in perspective.129 The choice for individuals and families is either to stay in economic 
deprivation (not to mention war, environmental destruction, and/or political oppression) or to 
seek opportunities for advancement in countries where they will be ostracized simply for being 
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cultural outsiders. The introduction of this “other,” some scholars argue, has been essential in 
“native” attempts at the reconstitution of identity in European countries, playing an important 
role in sustaining the status quo. As Demmers and Mehendale write: “neoliberalism may be 
technically agnostic on matters of culture and race, but the neoliberal project is well served by 
the permanent construction of an enemy (either within or without) who can satisfy the otherwise 
alienated consumer-citizen's need for inclusion and belonging.”130 
In their 1972 book Anti-Oedipus, French philosophers Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari 
described a trend in global cultural capitalism that they dubbed “deterritorialization.” The 
historical trend towards individualist capitalism and the decreased importance of geographically-
rooted authority, deterritorialization claims, has resulted in the erosion of old identities (both real 
and retrospectively imagined), replacing them with the individual consumer citizen.131 Demmers 
and Mehendale argue similarly that “the rise of xenophobia [is] part of a larger process of a 
mostly market-controlled reclaiming of symbolic forms of collectiveness in an increasingly 
atomized society,” against what Bourdieu called the “methodical destruction of collectives.”132 
National governments, they claim, have been sidelined to the “global regime of competing 
states” while global economic tides are left to market actors and supranationals. Labor 
organizations have lost membership precipitously as labor and wages have been “individuated” 
to supposedly reflect “individual competences.” The pursuit of romantic and sexual relationships 
is less organized by social networks of parents and friends, and more by faceless companies 
which advertise their services as if selling any other commodity.133 Even the family is threatened 
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as a social unit as age groups have been separated as advertising targets as well as following the 
longstanding trend towards individual financial independence. 134   
As other spheres of life are increasingly subsumed under “the economic” (a pattern which 
was presciently described by Carl Schmitt in 1932), more “liquid” forms of belonging have 
emerged.135 These are much less satisfying to many, however. Nation, race, ethnicity, and family 
have been fundamental identifiers for individuals for hundreds of years at the least. The 
reduction of the individual to a participant in the ubiquitous flow of capital, though it has in some 
senses emancipated the individual from old burdens of duty to family, nation, community, etc., 
has also cultivated alienation. 
Deterritorialization provoked “reterritorializations.” For instance, fear mongering tabloid-
style media competing for viewership with sensationalist nationalism and xenophobia, selling 
reassuring worldviews and scapegoats for profit. According to Demmers and Mehendale, in 
Dutch society at least, the mid-1990s saw a rise in “silent marches” and “popular ceremonies” 
around ‘easy’ issues like crime, serving as “instant satisfiers for the atomized citizen’s need to 
belong” to broader social organizations. This failed, however, to reconstitute clear or durable 
identities. They elaborate: 
[the loss of] even the illusion of a national economy left the cultural field as the main 
battleground for political constituency-building and opened a "market" for ethnos- based 
politics. Minorities soon became the flashpoint for heated public discourse that marked 
the invasion of "others" [...] into sites of contestation.136 
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Davidson and Saull claim that the media has responded to this opening by elevating three 
archetypes: the criminal taking what isn’t theirs, the incompetent (e.g. politician) who is ruled by 
political correctness, and the intruder (immigrant) who acts as the former but is invited and 
housed by the latter. 137 Controversial SPD member Thilo Sarrazin’s 2010 book Germany Does 
Away with Itself demonstrates that these narratives of national degeneration have been met with 
tacit approval even from the center-left-- the SPD retained him during and after the controversy, 
likely because they knew how much of an important political issue immigration is for many 
Germans.138 
 The ‘economic competition’ theory posits that immigrants are feared as threats to 
socioeconomic security. Yet this is not the only anxiety affixed to them. National identity, now 
more sensitive and abstract, is easily perceived as threatened by cultural outsiders: 
In the context of societal atomization and the loss of collective standards, the  
consumer-citizen has become increasingly sensitive to the drawing and maintaining of  
identity boundaries. And since "we" can exist only in relation to "what we are not," there  
is a now-flourishing market for the ritualization and eviction of the "other.”139 
The Italian sociologist Umberto Melotti claims that the globalization of capitalism has flooded 
the world with new configurations of multi-racial, ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious social 
formations that represent increasingly interdependent pluralisms (e.g. sexual pluralism, cultural 
pluralism, etc.).140 Hans-Georg Betz believes that this is fundamental to the resurgence of the far 
right. As old forms of identification decline in relevance and are replaced by “a culture based on 
informal networks and individual promotion,” those who see themselves as having little “cultural 
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and social capital” have little to lose and much to gain by turning to the far right. These are 
people who are less educated, less networked socially and professionally, and overall less fitting 
to the ever-changing image of the ‘successful member of society’ venerated by mass consumerist 
media.141  
This raises the important debate noted earlier, over whether actual material disadvantages 
or other perceived sociocultural insecurities more closely correlate to right wing sympathy. The 
“reverse post-material thesis,” as it is called, claims that far-right support, especially in Germany, 
stems from a resistance to a perceived shift in societal values from “traditional class and 
economic interests” to social and environmental justice. Post-materialism appeals to the young 
and college-educated, but unskilled males find that this agenda neglects their interests, as do the 
traditional left parties that have followed this trend. Die Zeit claims that the SPD campaigned 
“squarely” on social justice, but 80% of German citizens responded that the party failed to 
communicate exactly what this meant for its actual policy intentions.142 These “politics of 
recognition” represent a convenience for many political actors. It is almost just as easy to draw 
cosmopolitan voters with lip-service to minority equality while ignoring (even perpetuating) the 
forces that preserve inequality as it is to draw consumers with an LGBT-themed rainbow 
Oreo.143 One can easily deduce the supply-side implications of an underclass of alienated white 
male workers facing economic squeeze and a center and left unfocused on them. When 
established parties are perceived as of out of touch, carrying platforms which are not relatable, a 
vacuum is created. This vacuum was and continues to be filled by the AfD. 
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 Together, many of these factors—reactions to post-materialism, reduced national 
belonging, fear of immigrants as cultural threats, etc.-- help explain the unique aspect of 
Germany’s position in Europe as having both a (fairly) longstanding tradition of capitalist 
democracy in the West, like France or Great Britain, and an eastern portion which has only 
recently begun the transition from authoritarianism like Hungary and Poland. As of 2015, 
xenophobic violence in the old GDR was twice as prevalent as in the West; in the mid-1990s, 
this ratio was eight to one. The infamous NSU terrorist cell, responsible for the killings of nine 
immigrants and one policewoman between 2000 and 2006, was composed of East Germans from 
Jena. In 1992, the largest xenophobic attack since 1945 took place in Rostock, where several 
hundred right-wing militants outnumbering police firebombed a dormitory for Vietnamese 
workers to the cheers of about 3,000 onlookers. In 1991, a group of twelve young racist thugs 
beat up a Sudanese man on a train and threw him out of the train car. He found sympathy neither 
from a group of girls on the train, nor from the conductor herself, nor even the police. 144 The 
electoral situation is not much better. The AfD received nearly twice as much support in the east 
(an average of 21.5%) than in the west (11%) in the 2017 election.145 
 Freya Klier, formerly a GDR citizen and activist under the Communist regime, asks why 
the most xenophobic part of Germany today is the part with the fewest foreigners. Could it 
simply be that closer proximity exposes the irrationality of such a fear? Klier examines the 
history of East Germany as a regime which she claims was a “right-wing extremist state” posing 
under the name of socialism, directly inheriting the “behavioral patterns acquired and inculcated 
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during the Nazi period.”146 The Communist regime, though claiming “solidarity with the peoples 
of the world,” kept guest workers heavily segregated.147 Vietnamese and Moroccans who were 
brought in as workers were rotated back home every three years, during which they were housed 
only among themselves, not allowed to leave the city or go to the “regular pubs”, discouraged 
from learning German, and were even--by treaty with the Vietnamese government-- obligated to 
leave on their own dime if they became pregnant and refused an abortion. Jews were few and far 
between, their communities were ignored just as they had been before 1933, and the Nazi crimes 
were blamed on the West. It is no stretch to imagine why Franz Schönhuber, former member of 
the NSDAP and the Waffen-SS, and later founder of the far right wing populist Republikaner 
party, bemoans the collapse of the GDR: “The GDR was much more German than the Federal 
Republic. There they still had family values and not this society of every man for himself.”148 
Almost immediately after the wall fell, Schönhuber began recruiting in the former socialist 
republic. 
 Another aspect of the east German situation is the economic lag felt across the eastern 
states. In 1996 the unemployment rate skyrocketed to 20% due to reunification and remained 
there until 2005. As discussed earlier, unemployment rates on their own do not seem to cause far 
right voting, but Gerhard Schröder’s Third Way neoliberal reforms (similar to those of Tony 
Blair and Bill Clinton) cut back the social welfare institutions that could have been critical to the 
economic security of the east German populace.149 The ex-GDR saw the first appearance of the 
“new urban under-class” of young males, overcome by disenchantment with politics 
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(Politikverdrossenheit), who flocked to the right-wing DVU in the 1998 election. This marked 
the first time since the Nazi period that any demographic other than elderly undereducated males 
were overrepresented in the radical right in Germany.150 The old East Germany seems a perfect 
illustration of the relationship between economic insecurity and the acceptance of xenophobic 
imaginaries; nearly 30 years since the celebrated reunification, GDP per capita is €10,000 higher 
in former West Germany than in the old east. A graphic from The Guardian illustrates a 
correlation between average income and AfD votes as well as that between ethnic homogeneity 
and AfD vote share in each of the constituencies in Germany (Image 2):151  
Image 2 
These points demonstrate that even areas with lower average income and lower percentages of 
foreign nationals in the West do not choose the AfD nearly as much as areas in the East, 
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suggesting some extent of cultural difference between the two—recall the GDR’s attitude toward 
Vietnamese “immigrants”. At the same time, the East is overwhelmingly stuck in the low income 
and low diversity brackets compared to the West. The combination of these two factors, 
economic status and ethnic homogeneity, with the legacy of cultural isolation helps explain the 
AfD’s popularity in the ex-GDR. 
Although the pattern appears clear, most of the studies cited in this chapter urge caution 
against boiling causation down to a few material factors-- as we have seen, the same factor can 
cause far right support to go up or down or have no effect at all depending on the countless 
additional factors that make up a nation of millions of people and the global forces beyond them. 
Though AfD votes tend to correlate to low incomes and low diversity, some areas with high 
levels of immigration also have significant AfD support, and as Jesuit et al, Veugelers and 
Magnan, and Han all demonstrate, causality is extremely difficult to establish among the 
complexities of the interactions among labor market institutions, immigration, postindustrial 
transitions, political systems, historical particularities, and social capital. 152 Individual studies 
with their own particular scope and methodology can find patterns, but often contradict one 
another depending on how their foci and methodologies differ. The next chapter explores how 
material conditions have produced discourses-- the language, imaginaries, and leitmotifs through 
which mainstream society and the right wing alike assemble systems of meaning to make sense 
of the material world’s relation to subjective experience. 
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 A 2012 study by Lucassen and Lubbers suggests that the concepts of scarcity and 
competition can be expanded to cultural identities and values, and that perceived cultural/ethnic 
threats actually more strongly predict far-right voting patterns than economic insecurities do. 
Finding that lower GDPs result in stronger perceptions of cultural threats, they also notice that 
the same countries surprisingly have lower levels of far right wing voting. Cross-nationally, it is 
those who are the most well-off that tend to vote far right.153  Likewise, Piero Ignazi’s study of 
right-wing support in Germany shows that attitudinal and subjective elements have a “stronger 
explanatory power than the structural factors (economic crisis, unemployment).”154 This 
suggests that we must also look more closely at how neoliberalism as an economic regime relates 
to the discursive regime of contemporary Europe. We must explore how xenophobic discourses-- 
the expressions of perceived “cultural” threats-- are “configured to the needs of the ‘neoliberal 
state’” and arise through declarations of the “crisis of multiculturalism.” 155 As Lentin and Titley 
claim, the narrative that the social “experiment” of multiculturalism has failed has developed  
since the 1970s as a focus for concentrating anxieties of disempowerment stemming from 
the socio-economic impacts of neoliberal restructuring and the general implosion of 
class-based politics, the transfer of powers and borders incrementally involved in 
membership of the European Union, and the multiplicity of formal and informal 
adjustments and dilutions of state autonomy and sovereignty associated with international 
structures and systemic globalization.156 
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Neoliberalism’s alienating effects drove the production of discourses attempting to identify 
“what went wrong” with neoliberalism—why social cohesion has broken down, why there are 
still ghettos of immigrants, etc.--without attributing it to the economic regime which has often 
been accepted as the only possibility in this supposed “end of history.”157 The discursive 
approach is more systemic/synthetic than analytic in nature-- less quantifiable by breaking the 
whole down into statistical parts, and more about how narratives act as, in Foucault’s 
formulation, “practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak.”158 Simply put, 
the symbolic world we create through our particular speech about a subject becomes our 
functional relationship to that subject. Michael Minkenberg claims that a strictly “objectifying” 
materialist interpretation, postulating a “direct relationship between social and economic change 
and individual political behavior”, warrants skepticism. Borrowing from Ernst Bloch’s concept 
of “dis-simultaneousness,” he claims that there is always a chasm between objective and 
subjective dimensions of politics which are mediated by a social and political construction of 
reality.159 This implores a study of the “losers of modernization” defined in a subjective sense, 
through the discourses which produce such individuals’ perceptions of themselves as losers and 
immigrants as privileged over them. 
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Chapter Two: Multiculturalism and Cultural Identity 
 The western world, it seems, is beginning the transition to post-multiculturalism. What 
“multiculturalism” ever meant before the 21st century is unclear. Neither a coherent state-led 
plan nor even a consensus of cultural acceptance, the term has been used to describe the failings, 
both real and perceived, of every aspect of the liberal 20th century welfare state order.160 From 
left to right, from Slavoj Žižek to Angela Merkel, from Antifa to the Identitarian Movement, 
“multiculturalism,” under one meaning or another, has been understood as the cornerstone of the 
centrist social-democratic consensus of the last few generations in Europe as well as the source 
of its decline. It has been deemed at best a noble but idealistic experiment which was doomed to 
fail against the realities of globalization and cultural difference, and at worst an elite (even 
Jewish) conspiracy against the purity of Europe.161  
The left has attacked multiculturalism defined as centrist liberal “block-thinking” about 
minorities, racial paternalizing based on privileged conceptions of “tolerance”, and objectifying 
cultural outsiders, while the far right has attacked multiculturalism as an unnatural prioritization 
of difference over similarity as well as the imposition of “equality” where none truly exists. On 
the post-Marxist left, Slovenian philosopher Slavoj Žižek has attacked the “progressive liberal” 
center as commodifying diversity into a form of cultural capital-- in other words, virtue 
signaling-- which, while nominally praising tolerance and cultural equality, also keeps the 
cultural Other at a distance through imposing expectations of assimilation as well as tightening 
immigration under the guise of “reasonable” balance.162 Meanwhile, right wing radicals have 
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accused mainstream parties of kowtowing to political correctness, in the process bringing in 
harmful outsiders associated with terrorism and rape. 
Criticisms of modern “Multikulti” society have not only come from the fringes, however. 
Lentin and Titley argue that positioning “the center” as the bastion of multiculturalism facing 
siege from both sides fails to account for the way in which centrist politics themselves have 
picked up the “failed multiculturalism” narrative, mainstreaming the right wing position to 
protect votes from far-right parties but in the process lending more legitimacy to xenophobia.163 
The CDU’s Angela Merkel, Chancellor of Germany, declared that “the approach of 
multiculturalism has failed, absolutely failed” in 2010 after the publication of SPD politician 
Thilo Sarrazin’s Germany Does Away with Itself.164 She reiterated this point in 2015, calling 
multiculturalism “still a lifelong lie.”165 To see such agreement among the two long-standing 
mainstream parties on the “end” of multiculturalism (or at least tolerance of the narrative) 
certainly indicates that this has become a recited truth even in the center. Lentin and Titley and 
others contend that this had made the center extremely vulnerable to influence from the 
xenophobic right wing through refocusing “anxieties of disempowerment”, engendered by 
neoliberalism’s economic restructuring and the “implosion of class-based politics” onto culture 
and cultural outsiders. 166 
German playwright Roland Schimmelpfennig’s timely production Wintersonnenwende 
(Winter Solstice) demonstrates the insidiousness of extremism. In the play, a polite old man 
shows up on the doorstep of an educated, cultured, modern family on Christmas Eve and is 
invited to stay. The old man turns out to be a Nazi sympathizer, and one by one the entire liberal 
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bourgeois family is drawn in by his rhetoric about a fractured world which needs to be brought 
back together. Just as the Nazis only made gains once they eschewed the hardline anti-Semitic 
line and made themselves presentable to the average voter, Schimmelpfennig argues that the 
modern far right is adept at identifying sentiments that can be exploited to draw the center closer 
to the right.167 For instance, fears of terrorism and rapes like the 2015/16 New Year’s Eve 
incident, perceptions of the failure of multicultural integration, and even mainstream conceptions 
of cultural identity have been used to aid the far right wing’s resurgence.  
“Failed integration” became a buzzword for both right and left as early as 2000. In that 
year an essay from a Dutch socialist titled “The Multicultural Drama” (also translatable as “The 
Multicultural Disaster”) argued that the cultural and economic integration of immigrants had 
failed and that multiculturalism as a policy had “locked up migrants in their inward-looking 
communities, creating an apathetic, isolated underclass.”168 The essay demanded assimilation 
(distinct from integration) through coerced learning of Dutch history and language. The key 
difference between integration and assimilation involves the new culture’s relationship to the 
native one. Integration expects a new culture to fuse into the native ones, not losing its 
distinctiveness but becoming a functional community within the greater society, contributing to 
the local culture as a whole; assimilation demands that new cultures adopt the native culture 
rather than contribute to it.169 The same kind of rhetoric has swept Germany since the beginning 
of the millennium, a “culturalist regime of truth” which places cultural differences between hosts 
                                               
167 Eric Dorn Brose, A History of Europe in the Twentieth Century, 1 edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2004); Matt Trueman, “Nazism Comes Knocking: German Playwright Probes the Lure of Fascism,” The Guardian, 
January 9, 2017, sec. Stage, https://www.theguardian.com/stage/2017/jan/09/nazism-play-fascism-roland-
schimmelpfennig-winter-solstice-orange-tree-richmond. 
168 Demmers and Mehendale, “Neoliberal Xenophobia: The Dutch Case,” 67. 
169 “Assimilation vs Integration,” Centre for the Study of Islam in the UK (blog), December 4, 2015, 
http://sites.cardiff.ac.uk/islamukcentre/rera/online-teaching-resources/muslims-in-britain-online-course/module-4-
contemporary-debates/assimilation-vs-integration/. 
55 
 
and migrants at the center of the shortcomings of integration. This chapter will examine the 
discursive developments of the last three decades through which “failed integration” became a 
recited truth and out of which contemporary assimilationist xenophobia has arisen. 
Whether multiculturalism ever was one “thing” or whether it really has failed is not the 
focus of this chapter. The recited narrative is that whatever it was has failed, and groups across 
the ideological spectrum have begun to cohere to new models of social (dis)integration. The 
subsequent discourses of culture, national security, and assimilation have created an atmosphere 
in which xenophobia, one-sided conceptions of “tolerance”, and “identity liberalism”-- the idea 
that liberal tolerance is vulnerable to Islamic extremism so Europe must be illiberal to protect its 
foundations-- have found increasing justification.170 These mainstream justifications, such as 
cultural essentialism and the placement of the burden of integration onto minority groups, have 
in many ways provided the foundations for the new right as well as setting up an easy discursive 
slope from moderate xeno-skepticism to explicit nationalist or white chauvinism.  
The Leitkultur (leading or dominant culture) debate illustrates the pushes and pushbacks 
in Germany’s shifting cultural landscape since the concept’s introduction by sociologist Bassam 
Tibi in 1998. The term proposes a variant of cultural pluralism (Tibi viewed Multikulti as the 
result of a European guilt complex) which permits all cultures so long as they agree to a set of 
core values which overarch the society as a whole. Leitkultur was specifically intended to 
describe a model of identity as primarily European rather than connected to specifically-German 
traditions, and “oriented toward the values of democracy, secularity, individual human rights, 
secular tolerance, pluralism and civil society rather than toward concepts such as 'Volk' and ‘our 
customs’.” This arose out of a specific political moment in Germany, as the new SPD-Greens 
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coalition of 1998 attempted to detach citizenship from blood descent and pursue more 
globalization-responsive immigration and integration laws.171 The longstanding platitude that 
‘Germany is not a country of immigration’ like the United States but rather a homogenous 
cultural and political entity came under heavy fire, as immigrants were up to this point often 
colloquially referred to as “guest workers”-- a term which evoked more of a temporary quality. 
The SPD-Green coalition wanted to acknowledge that the Turkish and other diasporas were there 
to stay-- no longer “guests”-- and assert that they deserved social and political rights which 
reflected their status as an equal part of modern German society.172  
In 2000 the CDU/CSU highlighted Ausländerpolitik (policy on foreigners) as a focal 
point in the upcoming elections and accused the SPD-Green government of threatening “German 
cultural identity.”173 It was in this context that Leitkultur began to be referred to as German 
Leitkultur rather than European Leitkultur. The debate has faded and reemerged a number of 
times since the turn of the millennium, but Tibi’s concept has significantly shaped German 
discourses about multiculturalism, preserving native culture, and imposing cultural education 
onto migrants as a condition for equal rights while “[reconstructing] the national state’s authority 
by drawing new boundary lines between nationals and immigrants.”174 Hartwig Pautz claims that 
the attempt to define a German Leitkultur has even coincided with contemporary 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung (coming to terms with Germany’s past) debates. Some forces in 
German society have pursued a “normalization” of German identity through first historicizing 
the Holocaust as a “closed chapter,” no longer relevant to today’s republic, and second by 
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characterizing it as no more unique than any other genocide. This stems, he claims, from a desire 
on the part of conservatives to have a “normal” national consciousness like that of other 
European nations which have not had to consciously and constantly revisit their pasts and 
reshape their images.175 This identity revisionism as well as Leitkultur’s insinuation that 
immigrants are threats to ‘native culture’ have thus “problematised immigration and integration 
policies in a way that is hardly distinguishable from the positions of the extreme right,” Pautz 
claims.176 
The mainstreaming of right wing sentiments in Germany has been underway for over a 
decade, as former conservative journalists with well-respected news outlets began to assert a 
hardline stance on immigration and German homogeneity. Udo Ulfkotte, formerly a writer for 
the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (Germany’s second most-circulated newspaper), became a 
conspiracy theorist after 9/11. In 2003 he wrote an “incendiary tract” titled The War in Our 
Cities: How Radical Islamists Undermine Germany, in which he railed against a supposed 
Islamist conspiracy against Germany.177 This cost him his job, but he subsequently founded the 
right populist group Bürgerbewegung Pax Europa and worked with Pegida until his death in 
January 2017.178 Eva Herman was fired from her job on Channel One in 2007 after praising 
Hitler’s support payments for mothers and Nazi labor policies in a conversation about 
Germany’s low birth rates. She had also published a book, “The Eva Principle: For a New 
Womanhood”, which aimed to encourage middle-class women to stay in the home and have 
                                               
175 Ibid., Fekete, “Flying the Flag for Neoliberalism,” 8. 
176 Pautz, “The Politics of Identity in Germany,” 50. 
177 Druxes, “Manipulating the Media: The German New Right’s Virtual and Violent Identities,” 125; Tahir Abbas, 
Islamic Political Radicalism: A European Perspective: A European Perspective (Edinburgh University Press, 2007), 
103. 
178 “Publizist Udo Ulfkotte gestorben,” pro Medienmagazin - Das Christliche Medienmagazin pro informiert aus 
einer anderen Perspektive., accessed October 18, 2018, https://www.pro-
medienmagazin.de/gesellschaft/menschen/publizist-udo-ulfkotte-gestorben/. 
58 
 
more children through a return to traditional gender roles and “re-mythologized motherhood.”179 
Though these people faced strong repercussions from their employers, they had given voice to 
the xenophobia and revisionism that had not been acceptable in public for decades after 1945, 
but that many sympathized with. Ulfkotte went on to organize the thousands of people whose 
taboo sentiments he had touched upon, and Herman put together a pseudo-news channel on 
Youtube which receives hundreds of thousands of views. Like Sarrazin, their status as outcasts 
from the very mainstream that brought them to prominence has helped them establish a wide 
following.180 Established tabloid newspapers such as Bild (which has the highest readership of 
any paper in Germany) also played a role in bringing right wing talking points to the mainstream, 
overtly expressing support for Thilo Sarrazin and printing sensationalist fearmongering 
headlines.181 Simpson and Druxes claim that this rightward move is not only occurring within the 
traditional conservatives; every party except for the Greens is shifting their rhetoric to the 
right.182 Even Der Spiegel, one of Europe’s most respected (and arguably left-leaning) 
magazines, published a front page featured article titled “Mecca Germany” about the “silent 
Islamicization” of the German nation.183 
This demonstrates the supply side of right wing growth. Both to reflect the new 
discourses and capture voters taken in by them, the mainstream parties and media have aided the 
proliferation of xenophobic and chauvinistic narratives. “The new right has become adept,” 
Simpson and Druxes observe, “at promoting a more acceptable form of casual racism via 
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nationalist language couched in terms more acceptable to the mainstream.”184 To view the 
rightward shift as simply the result of influence from the right onto a malleable center, however, 
fails to ask how the mainstream consensus has formed this way in a specific historical moment as 
“something associated with the exercise of various forms of power and knowledge production, 
with the arbitrary production of categorizations, with the kinds of majority-population 
subjectivities produced in the context of contemporary economic restructuring.”185 In other 
words, how have the mainstream discourses (which are shaped by state and corporate power), 
such as the constructions of group identity based on culture--the fundament of multi-cultural-
ism-- or the collective subjectivity of native Germans (e.g. seeing themselves as tolerant hosts) 
undergirded the specific logic which the right wing now uses? Is the right wing an outsider with 
its own discourses and logic, attempting to impose them onto the center, or has the far right 
found an opportunity in the language of the center and repurposed it for its own goals? Both are 
to some extent true. In some ways the modern far right is avowedly anti-postmodern, but it is 
also true that it has taken to the language of cultural difference, identity, and even diversity with 
ease.  
One of the dominant responses to “failed multiculturalism” is a loosely-defined thought 
system known as “identity politics” or identitarianism. Though “idpol” first grew out of and is 
widely associated with currents that consider themselves on the political left (an American 
example would be Black Lives Matter), focusing on minority identities, identity politics have 
been co-opted by right wing groups such as the transnational Identitarian Movement through 
shifting attention to majority identities. Commonly ascribed to postmodernism, identitarianism 
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eschews materialist explanations (e.g. class conflict), coherent belief systems (e.g. Marxism or 
liberalism), or party affiliations in favor of an emphasis on power relations as well as a politics of 
recognition and advancement of people predicated on racial, sexual, or gender groupings (to 
name a few).186 In 2005 Austrian cultural studies expert Peter Stachel observed “a more and 
more inflationary use of notions of ‘identity’ in social and cultural studies’ as well as a 
willingness to “speak of identity without specifying who or what was identical with whom.”187  
One of his contemporaries, Hans-Ulrich Wehler, characterizes the current use of the term 
“identity” as an “amorphous, always-applicable word with an unclear meaning.”188 He and 
Stachel make the oft-levied accusation that identity politics embodies a distancing of social 
sciences from clear and precise empirically-supported concepts in favor of flexible language.189 
Identity is usually treated in identitarian politics as a “largely stable nucleus” made up of 
essential differences (race, sexuality), in contrast to other theories which consider the self as less 
hermetic.190 Relational theory and symbolic interactionism, for instance, suggest that individual 
identity is a fluid process which depends on social contexts; Fabian Virchow understands 
identity as “the result of a psychosocial formation process that operates throughout our lives as 
we participate in social practices,” to which labels are more difficult to assign.191 Nevertheless, 
the predominant conception of identity in supposedly “post-multicultural” politics-- in its left 
and right wing incarnations-- is essentialist, intentionally or unintentionally defining identities by 
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essential, irreducible qualities. According to Stachel, essentialization is problematic because 
concepts of identity develop relationally-- Germanness for example, only forms in relation to 
something else-- and because this results in a postulation of “collective identity as a given and 
uniform ‘totality.’”192 In defining identities as fixed and total, identitarianism falls short of its 
own project. It posits itself as recognizing some vast multiplicity of relations known vaguely as 
“identity” but uses essential groupings in its political rhetoric which do not differ from the 
groupings known by multiculturalism. It simply unleashes the former aspect as a weapon 
because it cannot be pinned down by precise language; it is more difficult to hit a moving target. 
Sexual, racial, and ethnic “identities,” whatever they may be, are the focal point of 
contemporary emancipatory politics and arguably the nucleus of new consumerism. Eschewing 
the economic solutions of the traditional left in favor of solutions categorized by clearly-
demarcated identity groups, identity politics tends to accept neoliberalism’s privatized politics 
and attempts to further minority status within it.193 The ease of expressing solidarity with 
consumerist politics, Jodi Dean argues, has made solidarity-signaling into a product: “Antiracist? 
Wear a Malcolm X t-shirt. Gay friendly? Fly a rainbow flag. The ease of political expression, the 
quick availability of the affective thrill of radicality, could let more people feel that they were 
politically engaged…”, and ‘big corporate’ has caught on with McDonalds and Coke both 
experimenting with LGBT marketing campaigns.194 Even the individualism central to 
neoliberalism plays a part, as “group differences are conceived categorically and not relationally, 
as distinct entities rather than interconnected structures or systems” created artificially through 
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the social repetition of concepts such as whiteness or blackness. The focal point of identity 
politics in action is consequently the individual “[taking] on the mantle of the victim,” and the 
identitarian responses to intolerance have distinctly focused on the “protection of individuals 
from abuse by other individuals.”195 Scott points out that this has caused a disconnect between 
minority and majority individuals. If the abused minority individual can be a victim, why can’t a 
white male who has been harassed be equally victimized?196 As Chandra Mohanty acutely puts 
it, “the 1960s and 70s slogan ‘the personal is political’ [was] recrafted in the 1980s as ‘the 
political is personal.’”197 Individualized, commodified identity can then not only coexist with, 
but also complement the neoliberal ideology of autonomy of choice and personal responsibility 
for failure.  
In a similar vein, Lentin and Titley claim that identity politics is a form of 
depoliticization of real socio-political problems-- a deflection of sorts-- which arose in response 
to the criticism of welfare-based integration programs in the 1980s that they were not producing 
sufficient “labour market integration.” Beginning in the early 90s, 
a mainstream rhetoric of implacable differentialism [focus on differences] was 
progressively suffused with a moralized assessment of migrant failure to integrate. This 
discursive shift is congruent with a demonstrable ‘ideological shift [in the early 1990s] 
from support for group needs to promoting individual identity.’198 
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The consistent exclusion of migrants from equality in labor markets (and the continuing 
economic inequality this entailed) was, in other words, displaced onto the cultural 
incompatibility of the migrants. The failure of the neoliberal political economy to show results 
consistent with its nominal program of post-racial inclusiveness was blamed on the migrants 
themselves. Lentin and Titley argue that the germination of identity politics from this condition 
is justified with the same logic imposed onto the migrants since the 1990s. Identity politics is a 
reaction to perceived “cultural problems” with “cultural solutions,” while attempts at 
structurally-focused anti-racism-- aiming at the economy, labor market exclusion, and migrants’ 
status as culturally-unwanted but economically-exploited “guests”-- are pacified.199  
 This pacification, in which migrant socio-economic frustration is easily painted over as 
cultural friction, has limited the efficacy of grassroots organizations by migrants unified around 
political-economic demands and instead fostered a “politics of communal identity” in which 
communities are reduced to one dimension-- their cultural identity-- and are only capable of 
lobbying for change “through the promotion of their own inward-looking sense of 
victimization.”200 This has a number of consequences. First, by focusing on difference rather 
than commonality, it coerces minority communities into the “language and logics of cultural 
difference, [...] forcing them into forms of collective self-formation that are [fictive], by driving 
them into the cul-de-sac of (racialized) identity politics” which imposes an artificial and 
intransgressible identity onto minorities. 201 Second, by heightening perceptions of “community 
competition and white disadvantage” as native Germans perceive these (coerced) inward-looking 
communities as isolationist and unwilling to integrate. Finally, by marginalizing those within 
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such communities who decry these politics out of frustration, especially those second- and third-
generation members who have been raised in Germany yet still not been accepted as cultural 
Germans.202 It is quite widely discussed that second-generation “immigrants” are 
disproportionately likely to be engaged in crime in Germany and elsewhere, and it is not difficult 
to imagine that the kind of frustration described could be one influencing factor. 203 This has all 
functioned to solidify the “construction of an enemy (either within or without)” to serve 
neoliberalism’s need for depoliticized subjects and to position culture as the only remaining 
“explanatory residue for apparent behavioral traits that do not conform to a ‘meritocratic’ 
neoliberal subjectivity”.204 Lisa Duggan drives the point home: 
Neoliberalism was constructed in and through cultural and identity politics and cannot be 
undone by a movement without the constituencies and analyses that respond directly to 
that fact. Nor will it be possible to build a new social movement that might be strong, 
creative, and diverse enough to engage the work of reinventing global politics for the new 
millennium as long as cultural identity issues are separated, analytically and 
organizationally, from the political economy in which they are embedded.205 
The notable demographic changes in Germany created a situation in which the identity and 
cultural discourses tied to integration of minorities has raised a question in the minds of sections 
of the majority: “what about me?”206 As they anxiously perceive the decline of their dominance, 
new cultural “competition” over the identity of their homeland, as well as economic and social 
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resources, they begin to look inwards with the rhetoric of pluralism. The racial and ethnic 
categories highlighted by identitarian social justice politics-- Turkish, Arabic, African people, 
etc.-- are juxtaposed with what “native” people think of themselves as: Germans. The supposed 
failure of integration or multiculturalism served as the spark for animosity’s justification: ‘we 
Germans brought these groups into Germany, granting them use of our institutions, and they still 
refuse to adopt our values.’ The group label “we Germans” attempts to reify the homogeneity of 
Germany, ignoring its long history of migration, changing identity (it was not even one state 
until 1871), and integration.207 This becomes either implicitly or explicitly associated with 
Germanness-- as Demmers says, “‘we’ can exist only in relation to ‘what we are not’”-- and 
while only the very far right openly refers to race, the more moderate xenophobic currents refer 
to “culture” (though in practice, the same groups are stereotyped as inferior or uncivilized).208 
Likewise, both radical rightists and moderate xenophobes make claims to German identity and 
counterpose it to foreign identities through the Leitkultur debate.  
Here identity has become a powerful tool for the right wing, for capturing those who 
simultaneously feel the de-solidarizing social breakdown, the loss of economic security, and 
political alienation. Ijoma Mangold of Die Zeit warns of the danger: although it can obviously 
also be used for emancipatory purposes, “the appeal to identity is a powerful instrument of 
exclusion and anti-individualism.”209 Recognition of minority subjectivities is vital to giving 
equal opportunities to underprivileged groups, but the turn away from politics of tangible 
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solutions has left large segments of the population feeling abandoned and picking up the 
surrounding language of identity as the means of understanding their own plight. 
It is no surprise then that one of the newest and most transnational xenophobic groups is 
the Identitarian Movement (Identitäre Bewegung, IB), an international activist organization 
which stages high-profile actions to condemn multiculturalism and declare themselves defenders 
of European civilization. The first issue of its magazine “Identitäre Generation” explicitly 
addresses its namesake: “being born French, Italian, German alone does not define” identity, it 
says. Identity was “dynamic and capable of change” before the modern nation-state, but lost this 
quality once peoples formed a collective “inner being and (ethno-cultural) identity” that 
“markedly determines the awareness and actions of an individual” and gives “all the diverse 
peoples of the world their own singular uniqueness.” The unofficial manifesto of the 
Identitarians, a 103-page tract written by an Austrian millennial named Markus Willinger, claims 
that the multiculturalism forced upon society by the “68ers” (akin to the American baby boomer 
generation) has ignored the fundamental human pursuit of identity: “If there were no women, 
masculine identity would play no role for men. If Europe was alone in the world, the European 
identity would be meaningless. He who says ‘Europe’ must also say ‘Asia’ and ‘Africa’ in order 
to define its boundaries.”210 
 Conversely, the “losers of modernization” feel that discursive attention is only being 
given to the identity of “Asians” and “Africans”-- or Muslims and Jews, or Arabs and Turks-- 
and respond to the identity-drawing of the “outside” with a reification of the identity of the 
“inside.” The difficulty with constructing hermetic identities, however, is that “German” identity 
never was one thing in the first place. Lentin and Titley argue that the cultural narrative which is 
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now commonplace in the mainstream-- that the shortcomings of integration are due to 
differences in essential cultural identities of immigrants and their German hosts-- should be read 
as a distinctly conservative myth.211 As political issues become subsumed under cultural identity 
politics, the operative identity of Europe is dominated by its omission of the segments of 
European societies which have always fought the conservative language of “threats to national 
identity” in the name of egalitarianism and internationalism. Other political groups have 
throughout European history expressed solidarity with “outsiders” like Jews, Turks, and now 
Syrians, welcomed these peoples as part of their own idea of “European culture” that is 
progressive in nature, and been hostile to their state’s domestic discrimination and international 
military and political interventions. The “them vs. us” mentality of “insider and outsider” culture 
is arguably just a dilution of the “clash of civilizations” narrative which European liberal and left 
universalism has historically opposed. A narrative that identifies “German culture” as an 
essential entity which has inherently always conflicted with other cultural entities is to 
whitewash the history of so many Germans who have resisted racism while simultaneously 
rejecting radical conservative Islamism; it defines Germany only by its more conservative 
constituents.212  
 The Identitarian Movement, “confined with the impossibility of being precise about what 
might constitute ‘Volk’ with specific characteristics,” betrays its namesake when it is asked to 
concretely define what it means to be German: “every German (who is not a German citizen in 
name only) knows deep down who or what is German and who or what is not,” one 
representative of IB replied.213 It is not clear whether the IB actually finds this description 
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satisfying. Willinger’s manifesto does not provide clear answers either. It comes perhaps a little 
closer to a definition in its claim that Germanness is “derived from the ‘narrative of the nation’, 
in which ‘the nation itself is the narrative, the master plan, that conjoins everything.”214 
However, as discussed in the previous paragraph, this “narrative of the nation” tends to be a 
rather specific romantic, nostalgic narrative that excludes the presence of progressive elements, 
diversity, and changes in German identity throughout history. The right wing’s attempted 
monopoly on “continuity” with the past assumes a linear, conservative national history that has 
supposedly only recently been disrupted by Others. Any study of history will show the naivety of 
this worldview, but the more important point is that “identity” functions as a social unifier for 
Identitarians regardless. Though it may not be a concrete, stable, self-contained aspect of an 
individual like name, skin color, or family background, identity is a fundamental part of one’s 
self-formation in contemporary identity-focused society. The prevailing trend of identity politics 
makes one instantly and constantly aware of one’s identity, especially as it relates to the 
highlighted minority groups in contemporary discourse, and the right wing has succeeded in 
infiltrating politics focused on Muslim/black/etc. identity by applying the same logic to 
“white/German identity.” In other words, the politics of identity of outsiders/minorities left a 
vacuum— it offered nothing for the rest of the population—and the right has filled that vacuum 
with a politics of the identity of insiders/majorities. 
 The appropriation of identity politics by the right wing has been facilitated by another 
important aspect of late modern discourses: the “culturalization” of race, which has veiled racial 
politics under seemingly-innocuous language which bypasses the offensiveness and suspicions 
raised by speaking directly of “race” itself. As mentioned earlier, hard far-right groups such as 
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neo-Nazis still openly refer to “blood and soil”, but the vast majority of xenophobic discourse 
circumscribes this political suicide by referring to the culture of outsiders as tainting Germany 
rather than their genes. “The culturalist defense that ‘people are equal, cultures are not’ or ‘we 
are not against Muslims, we are against Islam’ did not have any of the emotionally charged and 
messy connotations that associated racism with Holland's traumatic, Nazi-occupied past,” 
Demmers and Mehendale observe; German right-wingers would obviously have even greater 
incentive to avoid stirring up the specters of 20th century racial politics.215 The weightiness of an 
accusation of racism in the 21st century has driven many (often those complacent with habitual 
prejudice) to speak as if we now live in a post-racial society-- liberals, leftists, and right-wingers 
alike. Charges of racism by groups that claim it still exists are now also perceived as alarmist, 
using the “trump card” in an overbearing political correctness.216 The “failure of 
multiculturalism” as neoliberalism’s explanation for the failures of economic integration has 
become imbricated with a “culturalization of race” which reduces migrant communities’ 
relationship to the rest of society to the one dimension of culture, ignoring their own internal 
complexities.217 This has occurred at the expense of not only socio-political-economic 
considerations, but also considerations of the ways in which race “remains deeply ingrained in 
the political imaginaries, structures, and practices of ‘the West’.”218 Lentin and Titley expound 
on the contemporary attitude: 
For any act of violence or exclusion to be considered ‘racist’, it must be provable that the 
victim was passive, and did not possess any attribute nor be open to any ascribed 
difference beyond a dark(er) skin colour. As soon as the victim can be found to be 
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involved in practices or possessed of cultural attributes that set her apart from dominant 
society, or that she was in any way not passive, the violence and exclusion are something 
other than racism.219 
Because of the taboo of referring to “race,” they claim, the definition of the term itself has been 
narrowed to only count skin color and other biological phenotypes, relegating any other 
discrimination to “non-racial” discrimination. Racism has, however, always functioned on social 
imaginaries and cultural attributes-- as “race” itself has never simply referred to biology, but 
rather as a combination of “nature” and “culture.”220 Charles W. Mills claims that the concept of 
race has always rested on assigning certain cultural tropes to groups of people deemed “capable 
of mastering nature, and [to groups deemed] incapable of emerging from a state of nature.”221 
Claims of post-racialism are consequently only evaluated on a revised and lenient definition of 
race which never existed to begin with, tacitly opening up spaces for a veiled xenophobia. This 
more comfortable, palatable language no doubt allowed groups like the AfD to sound more 
reasonable and to appeal to common sensibilities. 
 “Culturalism” is now the primary medium for understanding different groups of people, 
operating on the basis that every culture is defined by one essence “and then explains politics as 
a consequence of that essence’” --a concept referred to as “cultural essentialism.” 222 Even 
without considering its inherent elision of race, the cultural essentialist narrative is problematic 
in the unequal applications which emerge from it. Majority German culture and minority outsider 
cultures naturally hold different places in German society. Differences in power inherently 
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coincide with differences in position, and so power relations must be accounted for. Though 
nominally discussed through the rhetoric of cultural relativism, the principle that all cultures are 
fundamentally equal as variations of social formations (also meaning that no universal values can 
be imposed upon them), foreigners are viewed as subjects of culture, ruled by it, while 
Europeans rule themselves and “enjoy culture fruitfully” as only one aspect of their lives.223 Just 
as the narrative of waning German culture proceeds on the basis of omitting the historical 
cultural (and political) diversity of Germans themselves, the essentialist cultural relativist 
paradigm proceeds on the basis that migrants are somehow first and foremost “cultural beings” 
reduced to one dimension which is supposedly responsible for the difficulties of integration, 
throwing economics, psychology, education, and all other aspects of their lives aside. 
Essentialism has further precipitated the replacement of “race” with “culture” through strictly 
defining peoples by a static component rather than a fluid one like economic status; 
consequently, “culture” as it is referred to in the contemporary discourse is “able to perform the 
same exclusionary function as race” had before.224  
 It has also allowed the new right’s attempt to monopolize Enlightenment values-- 
democracy, human rights, etc.-- as distinctly European, despite the cross-cultural applications of 
these concepts. ‘All cultures are equal,’ they strategically concede to relativism, ‘but our culture 
is democratic and theirs is not; to maintain our values, we must keep our culture here and their 
culture there.’225 This “differentialism” of the new far right fits surprisingly well into the 
mainstream anxieties involved in the Leitkultur debate-- the acceptance of ‘separate but equal’ 
between cultures-- which first essentializes outsiders as hosts of a cultural virus and then 
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contrasts their culture with a “German” one which must be preserved above the others, lest the 
culture of democracy and free speech succumb to the culture of a stereotyped authoritarian 
Islam. Kultipluralismus (cultural pluralism)—a “heterogeneous world of homogenous 
communities”226 --is suggested as the alternative to multiculturalism, recognizing the supposed 
need for the imposition of cultural education on migrants. As CDU politician Jörg Schönbohm 
expressed it, “we will have a pluralism of cultures in Germany but German culture must be its 
basis. That is what it is all about.”227  
A focus on culture inherently begets a focus on cultural difference. If the issues in 
contemporary Germany were viewed as economic or political ones, class or political inequality 
would form the explanations for the same woes. Instead, the (exaggerated) differences between 
“German” and “Islamic” culture are used to “[interpret] social facts in the daily lives of majority 
and minority populations in Germany, so as to make sense of social, political and economic 
differences in a way that would legitimate the exploitation and exclusion of foreigners.”228 Pautz 
also points out that the “exclusionary mechanism of cultural racism is an extremely flexible 
one,” in that the state has the power to decide who is “culturally integrated” enough and who is 
not, selectively granting German legal rights to the former and denying them to the latter.229 
Likewise, the discursive focus on cultural difference inherently eclipses the political differences 
within Islamic cultures. Many in Muslim countries are pro-democracy and many are against, but 
when the problem is made one of culture rather than ideas, the dichotomy is no longer a 
universal “democracy vs. anti-democracy” but a relativist “German vs. Islamic”.  
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In this discourse Islam is often contrasted from the “Christian values” out of which the 
modern German state arose, and to which many also credit the Enlightenment concept of 
religious tolerance—“a strong imprint of Christianity remains in German liberalism,” Coury 
contends.230 The founder of Pegida, Lutz Bachmann, created the group with preserving “Judeo-
Christian Western culture” in mind, which is supposedly threatened by Muslims who do not 
accept tolerance or gender equality and support fundamentalism. The symbol of the Church vs. 
Mosque has become an important image in this debate, which is highly charged in the context of 
the German state’s hesitance to give the same “public corporation” status to Islamic groups that 
Christian and Jewish groups have. This formal recognition allows religious groups to “receive 
Church taxes collected by the government, organize religious education (RE) in public schools, 
and provide social welfare services.”231 
 Judith Butler, the prominent American feminist theorist, made a rather poignant 
observation about the implications of the Leitkultur approach: “a certain paradox ensues in which 
the coerced adoption of certain cultural norms becomes a requisite for entry into a polity that 
defines itself as the avatar of freedom.”232 In other words, “tolerance” itself becomes a form of 
social capital that is given selectively. Sometimes, the claim goes, one must be intolerant to 
protect tolerance. Of course, this argument isn’t necessarily paradoxical by pure logic alone; 
limitations on freedom of speech (such as against Nazi protests) could be accused of 
“intolerance,” but any system of rights requires limits to sustain itself. What Butler is describing, 
though, is that discourses focused on tolerance alone obfuscate the power involved in who gets to 
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decide the objects and extent of tolerance, as which actions are “deserving” of it and which 
actions are not. It further reaffirms the pattern of insiders and outsiders, civilized makers of 
culture and uncivilized subjects of culture: “good” diversity, which is to be tolerated, and “bad” 
diversity, which is to be excluded. The difference between the two is assembled through the 
same cultural relativism as Leitkultur, which logically necessitates a clean division that can only 
be sustained through a culturalized myth of the homogenous insider. The empowered insider 
creates an “impossible subject” who is ostensibly supposed to behave completely within the 
bounds determined by the sensibilities of the native Germans. 233 Any transgression against the 
conditions of tolerance, though it may be completely natural or justified-- a community not 
dropping a certain unpopular aspect of the subject’s home culture, expressing anger over 
discrimination or economic inequality, never “doing enough” to distance itself from terrorist 
attacks perpetrated by people it has no real relation to-- permits the insider to blame migrants for 
stepping out of line and being “intolerant” to their hosts, warranting intolerance in return.234 The 
accompanying contrivance of “good” and “bad” (or “too much”) diversity, respectively 
embodied by cultural pluralism and failed multiculturalism, supposedly cherishes cultural 
recognition but conflates it with an acknowledgement of equality. It desires a “‘detoxified’, 
unproblematic Other” -- categories of groups which meet selective expectations--while ignoring 
the power relations that cause “problematic” Others like asylum seekers and refugees as well as 
economic and social inequality. 235 
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 The images of “good” diversity and “bad” diversity-- idealized, successful cultural 
integration versus the unregulated “excess” of cultural tolerance that doomed multiculturalism-- 
have been elevated in the context of national security concerns in the age of terrorism, referred to 
as the “securitization” of the immigration discourse.236 Lentin and Titley argue that 9/11 is an 
“arbitrary point of historical transformation”237 in the beginnings of anti-Muslim xenophobia, as 
fears of “Islamic Fascism” had been stoked as early as 1995 in the Yugoslav wars.238 Yet its 
importance as a discursive tool for rebuilding the mythos of ‘threats to Western civilization’ 
informs a broader picture of how 9/11 became a justification for a “before” and “after” modality 
used to impose “new rules of the game” in immigration policy.239 The “war on terror” opened up 
opportunities for states to expand powers and redefine themselves in many ways: international 
intervention, surveillance, discretion on immigration, and suspicion of (especially Muslim) 
minorities, creating what Didier Bigo termed the “governmentality of unease.”240 Every terrorist 
attack in the West, from Theo van Gogh’s murder in 2004 to the 2015 Paris attacks to the 2016 
Berlin truck incident, “have been framed as ‘I told you so’ moments that strip political 
developments of their complexity, and instead normalize the need for restorative action against 
the excesses of multiculture.”241 Multiculturalism is blamed for being too lenient on the 
prerequisites for inclusion and consequently allowing foreign groups now associated with the 
war on terror to enter Germany.242 What began as the depoliticization of the failures of 
integration became a displacement onto essentialized cultures, and securitization discourses 
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easily absorbed the distinction between homogenous insider and ominous outsider into “object of 
security” and “threats to security.” The simplified monolithic “Islamic community” was easily 
indexed to terror. 
The war on terror necessitates a defined cross-national enemy that encompasses both 
hostile regimes in the Middle East and their agents within Europe; thus the focus on Islam both 
1) offers a pretext to securitization as a “political technology” to assert a state-private security 
complex which relies on fear for popular acceptance (directly contributing to the propaganda of 
the far right) and 2) provides a justification for excluding immigrants, new or settled, as not only 
insufficiently integrated but also as an object of suspicion.243  Right wing populists then have an 
incredibly strong rhetorical platform, as any political opponent who supports refugees or 
attempts to close the distance between the feared migrant communities and the majority 
population is blamed for the penetration of Germany by terrorists. Attempts to attenuate the 
economic, social, etc. exclusion of migrants are consequently disabled by fear-based politics that 
have raised the stakes of “bad” diversity-- give “them” too much tolerance, and they may cut 
your head off. The depoliticization of minority issues reaches its ultimate conclusion in the 
construction of a universalist “good vs. evil” fiction that justifies nativist domestic and 
international policies. 
Another advantage the far right has had in discourses focused on threats from intolerant 
outsiders is the opportunity to become accepted political insiders, as the defenders of values in 
which everyone believes but which have been threatened by illiberal migrants-- socially 
progressive values, even, such as LGBT rights. All across the new populist right-- from the 
Dutch Pim Fortuyn to the (now politically dead) Milo Yiannopoulos to Alice Weidel, a lesbian 
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and the current leader of the AfD in the Bundestag-- homosexuality seems well-accepted in the 
parties themselves (though many of their more reactionary voters likely do not share this social 
progressivism).244 As of 2016, the AfD polled at a surprising 17% for gay men, only a negligible 
1% difference from the national average for men.245 The cause, fears of migrant homophobia 
(physical attacks on LGBT people have indeed risen with increased migration), is certainly 
difficult to navigate without falling into the discursive trap of essentializing and stereotyping 
Muslims. 246 A Spiegel article on “gay hate crime” makes two points in response to this. First, 
Germany already has native homophobes, but are less feared because they are more familiar. 
Second, Russians make up the other most homophobic group in Germany, and are obviously not 
Muslim. The real problem is one of “machismo,” claims a Berlin social worker interviewed in 
the article.247 Homosexual acceptance has been strategically incorporated into right wing 
rhetoric, allowing the undeniable homophobia among right wing native Germans to be smoke-
screened by indexing homophobia to migrants. This has arguably even been assisted by groups 
such as the Lesbian and Gay Federation in Germany (LSVD), which attempted to make itself an 
‘integration expert’ by targeting migrants for reeducation, blatantly drawing the line between 
German LGBT and heterosexual foreigners in particular. GLADT, the “Gays and Lesbians from 
Turkey” group, has publicly disassociated itself from LSVD for this reason.248 
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Feminism, or at least a strategic lip service to it, has also become an odd staple of the 
German populist right, and anti-Islam rhetoric has also found acceptance with some mainstream 
feminists. Prominent Bild writer and publisher of the populist feminist magazine Emma Alice 
Schwarzer, for instance, raised controversy by comparing the hijab worn by Muslim women to 
the yellow star forced on Jews by the Nazi regime, and equated wearing such garb to forced 
marriage.249 Additionally, right-wing rhetoric consistently plays up fears about reports of 
refugees raping German women, further “proving” the threat of illiberal outsiders who do not 
share European values of respect for women. A Der Spiegel investigation of the accusations 
found that about 20% of sex crimes in the first half of 2017 were committed by individuals in 
refugee housing (compared to the ~11% of the population made up of refugees).250 However, 
those individuals are also disproportionately young, male, and poor, three of the criteria most 
closely correlated to criminal behavior (much more so than being a Muslim), as well as being 
more likely to have PTSD.251 Nevertheless, reports of foreign-looking men sexually assaulting 
women leave a strong mark on the German national consciousness and add a strong emotional 
charge. Most notably were the spontaneous mass sexual assaults in Cologne on New Year’s Eve 
2015/16, during which hundreds of sexual crimes took place alongside a much larger number of 
thefts and other crimes, mostly perpetrated by asylum seekers and illegal immigrants.252 
It is, of course, a fact that many Muslim countries are more patriarchal than most Western 
countries. One cannot deny that feminists have very good reason to be critical of conservative 
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Islam. Likewise, it is beyond the scope of this paper whether western feminism has a right to 
universalism (which, as Rottmann and Ferree remind us, has long been used as a justification for 
colonial power for “liberating” Muslim women-- including as recently as the invasion of 
Afghanistan), or whether cultural relativism is enough to justify a “live and let live” approach to 
regimes which still execute women for witchcraft.253 The importance of this discourse is, rather, 
the imaginaries reinforced in how it plays out in German society as a medium for other issues.  
 Victims are the “spiritual food of Leftists,”254 Lentin and Titley proclaim. The effect of 
this in the context of the veil debate (Kopftuchstreit) is, following the logic of culturalist 
narratives, reducing both the agency of the veil-wearer and the nuances of feminist debates 
within Islam to the “insider vs. outsider” formulation. 255 The obsession with veil-wearing 
Muslim women as inherently victims is pervasive (the Federal Parliament has even passed a ban 
on the burqa and niqab), and is easily conflated with an image of the “free woman” as one who 
cannot be Muslim.256 These associations of a simplified “the West” vs. a simplified “Islam” are 
prime propaganda for the radical right, which infuses its own obsession with sexuality and 
ostensibly “cultural” purity. 
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From left to right: “’Burkas?’ Bikinis turn us on.”/ “Islam does not belong to Germany. The freedom of women is 
non-negotiable.”/ “For family-friendly politics. Kids! Are! Fun!”/ “’New Germans?’ We make them ourselves.”257 
 Rottmann and Ferree contend that Germany is a rather special example of the headscarf 
debate across Europe, as both pro-headscarf and anti-headscarf positions figure prominently in 
contemporary German feminism.258 The “double engagement with the politics of modernity,” 
formed on one side by the transnational qualities of feminism (defining and comparing Europe 
with the Islamic world), and on the other side by the interpersonal politics of how individual 
women decide which “local and global identities” to embrace, is in many ways a perfect 
illustration of the broader discursive developments of the debate. 259 The authors highlight the 
2004 SPD-Green attempt to introduce a law banning discrimination in housing, credit, or public 
facilities on the basis of ethnicity, race, sexuality, age, religion, worldview, physical ability, or 
gender.260 The ADG, as it was called, failed to pass as it was even attacked by prominent 
members of the SPD-Green government-- including the Minister of the Interior, the Economic 
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Minister, and the Finance Minister, as a “bureaucratic monster.”261 Yet contemporary feminists 
were rather silent on the ADG, already more interested in the “otherness” of Muslim women’s 
clothing and the regulation thereof.262 “Inclusive intersectionality,” which prioritizes women's 
advocacy around “multiple axes of difference” such as class, ethnicity, and religion, was already 
passed over in favor of an exclusive intersectionality.263 Exclusive intersectionality is interested 
only in a universal “free vs. unfree woman” dichotomy, arguing that ethnic or class-based 
oppression obscures the visibility of universal gender oppression. Both pro- and anti- headscarf 
positions had thus given way to the same politics of difference that characterize the mainstream 
culturalist narrative as a whole, implicitly affirming insider/outsider notions of freedom and 
unfreedom, affixing patriarchy to the cultural outsider while taking the cultural inside for granted 
as already enlightened and sexually modernized. Forming a comprehensive model of women’s 
liberation in a world full of intersecting “dominant/ subordinate hierarchies of nation, race, and 
religion” as well as “the public/private politics of gender” is naturally extremely difficult, but 
neither side of the contemporary debate seems to make this a priority over debates about specific 
symbols such as the burka.264  
Pro-headscarf positions are less interested in “individual free choice”-- this is much more 
rare in German feminism than in America-- and more interested in permissiveness as a possible 
means for integrating Muslim women into a German society of tolerance, where Muslim 
communities will self-’modernize’ their gender relations.265 Anti-headscarf positions see a burka 
ban as state intervention against the oppression of Muslim women in their communities. Both 
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perceive the Muslim woman as needing liberation, to be brought into the “German public sphere 
as a realm of freedom.”266 In this way, they are simply different versions of Leitkultur, one of 
which sees a Leitkultur based on negative rights and another which prioritizes positive rights, 
both displacing the problem of sexism onto cultural outsiders-- just as problems with social 
capital, economic welfare, and national security are displaced onto Muslim communities as a 
whole.267 
This chapter has focused primarily on the origin of narratives and identity politics in the 
mainstream, arising out of the material solidification of neoliberalism. It has examined their 
implicit associations-- the Muslim with outsider-ness, for example-- and how these casually 
xenophobic talking points drew many Germans rightward, legitimizing more radical political 
rhetoric that would not have been accepted just a few decades ago. “Leftist” identity politics, 
focused on and privileging minority culture, have opened a space for right-wing identitarianism 
for members of the majority who also feel disenfranchised, and who pick up the language of 
identity rather than the economic and social grievances such as their diminishing social welfare 
institutions. This returns us, however, to a question raised earlier. To what extent is the right 
wing simply reflecting pre-existing language, and to what extent are contemporary rightist 
politics built on their own basis? The difference seems to be between the political wing of the 
new far right-- parties, mainstream movements and voters, and the more intellectual wing known 
as the New Right, informed by Heidegger and other 20th century thinkers, who pioneered the 
right wing use of neo-Marxists such as Antonio Gramsci as a response to the leftism of the 
1960s. 
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The next chapter explores this second category, tracing the new far right’s origins in the 
Nouvelle Droite, Neue Rechte, and other variants of the New Right which developed across 
Europe since 1968. It will examine how this movement of well-educated Europeans began, the 
ideas it created, and then, in the last chapter, how those ideas have become employed rather 
recently in large-scale right-wing politics that have transcended academic circles. Of particular 
interest are the distinctly modern (and postmodern) aspects of the New Right and its 
descendants, such as its use of leftist and postmodernist theory alongside a revival of interwar 
Conservative Revolutionary thought, and its expansion from nationalism to pan-Europeanism. It 
hopes to show a different side of the far right-- one which cannot be pathologized as the product 
of economic and political contingencies, but as having philosophy of its own that must also be 
taken seriously. 
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Chapter Three: The Philosophy of the New Right 
A full half century after the cultural, moral, and political “awakening” of 1968, many of 
that year’s impacts are now taken for granted. Diversity, sexual freedom, and individuality have 
since become norms of their own and staples of everyday life (though not wholly uncontested). 
Another movement also arose from the liberalization of the 1960s and 70s, however. The 
German New Right (Neue Rechte) emerged from the ranks of both intellectual conservatives, 
disquieted by the breakdown of traditional behavior, and some of the leftists who became 
disillusioned with their generation. This latter group, defectors from the “68ers,” believed that 
the cultural revolution of the time had collapsed into American consumerism and lost its 
emancipatory potential. Together, these academics and fringe political leaders began to attack 
problems in German society from a new angle, aiming at the intellectualization and revitalization 
of the right and a “synthesis of revolutionary right wing and New Left ideals.”268 
This chapter is concerned mainly with the theoretical underpinnings and influences of the 
intellectual New Right, incubated in academies in France and developed further in Germany. 
Similar to the way right-wing chauvinism decries “identity politics” while using their own form 
of it, its supposed hatred of postmodernism signals less of an unambiguous opposition to its 
ontology and epistemology, and more of a rejection of its leftist excesses. Rather than attempting 
to return us to a state before postmodernism, the certainty of 20th century universalist narratives, 
it seeks to use that trend of thought to reassert traditional imaginaries-- in effect, to impose its 
own right-wing version of postmodernity.269 To explain what this means, we must first 
understand the history of the New Right. 
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In 1968, before the backdrop of mass student protests, a then 24 year old Alain de 
Benoist founded GRECE, the Research and Study Group for European Civilization, with a 
specific frustration in mind: how could the “de-Europeanizing forces of Americanization, 
consumerism, and the liberal capitalist regimes” introduced in the post-1945 restructuring of the 
country be dissolved while the culture itself was still overwhelmingly liberal?270 The anti-liberal 
fight, then, must be waged on-- and with-- culture and identity. This concept was invented on the 
political left-- it was the Italian neo-Marxist Antonio Gramsci who first claimed that (class) 
struggle had to fight against the “cultural hegemony” of the state capitalist system, a war for 
minds, before the material conditions of socialism could be brought about. Benoist, well 
acquainted with this term’s adoption by the 68ers, repurposed it for the goal of establishing a 
new European identity. 271According to Michael O’Meara, the New Right author credited by the 
right-wing’s alt-Wikipedia “Metapedia” as having brought the thoughts of the European New 
Right to the Anglosphere, GRECE perceived the roots of “European identity” as “pagan rather 
than Catholic, postmodern rather than anti-modern, European rather than Western.”272 Soon this 
militant attitude was disseminated to Italy, Belgium, and Germany, and by the time of its 
discovery by the mainstream media ten years later, the “Gramscians of the Right” and its allies 
had a strong foothold on the intellectual right of much of Europe.273 
The ideas of Benoist and the French “Nouvelle Droite” were carried over to Germany in 
the 1980s by an adviser to Franz Schönhuber, then leader of the far right Republikaner party and 
former voluntary member of the Waffen-SS. He asked his “old friend” Armin Mohler (who had 
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applied for the SS but was rejected), now widely considered the intellectual father of the German 
Neue Rechte, to take a more active role in the German right after the electoral failure of the NPD 
in 1968, and attempted to create a new “philosophy of action” which would bring the discourses 
of the New Right “onto the streets.”274 Mohler, who criticized the German right wing of his day 
for being outdated, sought to reinvigorate the German right through a return to the ideas of the 
Conservative Revolution as contained in the 1920s and 30s works of authors such as Ernst 
Jünger, Oswald Spengler, Carl Schmitt, and Edgar Julius Jung, who grappled with the 
meaninglessness and despair of the post-WWI world as well as that of modernity as a whole. The 
writers of the Conservative Revolution, some more closely related to the Nazi movement than 
others, attempted to overcome these existential problems in a variety of ways-- united mainly by 
a rejection of liberalism, cosmopolitanism, and democracy as well as socialism and communism 
-- and hoped to inspire a new kind of “organic society” that did not rely on a simple return to the 
past.275 In Mohler’s words,  
The Conservative Revolution is a counter-revolution in the sense that it primarily attacks 
a liberal ideology that has totally destroyed society. But it is also revolutionary because it 
does not believe in the possibility of restoring the past. In other respects, it in fact attacks 
modernity with the weapons of modernity, even post-modernity.276 
The Conservative Revolution wanted to violently shift technology “out of the sphere of 
civilization and into that of culture,” taking the technology produced by modernity but throwing 
away its decadent social ‘byproducts’ such as democracy.277 Mohler and the German New Right 
took aim less at democracy (and are more interested in an inward-facing Europe than 
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warmongering) than at a newer, post-1945 aspect of modernity: Vergangenheitsbewältigung, the 
German “coming to terms with the past,” which has figured prominently in its national 
consciousness. The New Right claims that the 68ers in particular attempted to shackle Germany 
to a guilt complex which has prevented the German people from being in touch with their natural 
cultural identity-- from having a “normal” national consciousness like most other nations, who 
have moved on from their dark periods, instead of a reflective or “self-flagellating” national 
consciousness.278 The postwar generation, they assert, moved past simply confronting  Nazi 
crimes and the collaboration of their parents into forming a “culture of contrition in which every 
conceivable political issue is viewed through the prism of the Nazi past.”279 This was perceived 
especially during the Historikerstreit (historian’s controversy) of 1986, a sudden explosion of 
debate around whether the Holocaust was a unique, unprecedented phenomenon that needed to 
remain at the center of German identity or if it should be relativized and treated as a closed 
chapter of history.280 The Historikerstreit, German reunification, and the 1996 firebombing of a 
refugee housing quarters in Lubeck all ignited national conversations during which many 
intellectuals who had previously been associated with the political left began to blame the rise of 
neo-Nazism on the suppression of a “normalized historical understanding.”281 Botho Strauss, 
Ernst Nolte, even Klaus Rainer Röhl, founder of the underground communist newspaper konkret 
and former husband of journalist-turned-terrorist Ulrike Meinhof of the Red Army Faction, and 
the widow of former SPD Chancellor Willy Brandt, Brigitte Seebacher-Brandt, all associated 
with this line of argument.282 In this time, new “think tanks” and journals began to emerge out of 
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the fledgling New Right, such as the Thule Seminar, Criticon, Junge Freiheit, and Elemente, 
with the dual purpose of providing future far right political movements with an intellectual guide 
as well as legitimizing the right wing and building cultural hegemony in the mainstream.283 
The intellectual New Right, unlike many of the extremists it inspires, roundly condemns 
the National Socialist period. It does, however, “remain preoccupied with Nazism” in a number 
of ways. In its attempt to find an unstigmatized cultural identity, it has had to first relativize the 
Nazi period as no worse than Stalinism or British or American Imperialism and secondly search 
for a lineage of conservative values separate from National Socialism. It has particular trouble 
with the latter. Many of the authors of the New Right seem all too aware that the “absolute 
values” for which they long could never be more than contrivances-- a trouble with which the 
Conservative Revolution itself struggled -- and the alternative conservatism which they attempt 
to find in that movement is perpetually undermined by the philosophical closeness between the 
Conservative Revolution and the Third Reich, despite the political distance taken by many 
associated with the former against the latter. 
 The distinctly “new” aspect of the New Right, as briefly mentioned, is its admission of 
the postmodern turn towards the “metapolitical” factor of culture over material explanations of 
politics as a self-justified category. Benoist found his footing in the works of postmodern leftists 
such as Althusser and Badiou, which placed an emphasis on what could be called the “pre-
political sphere”-- the ways in which ideology, defined as the subjective, unconscious structure 
of reality constructed by an individual finding reference points in the world, overdetermines 
politics.284 As Robert Darnton explains, historians are moving towards a focus on “how thought 
organized experience and conveyed meaning among the general citizenry” in any given epoch. 
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Thought itself is “denoting, referring, assuming, alluding, implying, and performing a variety of 
functions” which convey meaning through language. Language, as one of the “paradigms which 
order ‘reality,” John Pocock claims, “are part of the reality they order… we are studying an 
aspect of reality when we study the ways in which it appeared real to the persons to whom it was 
more real than to anyone else.”285 To the New Right, culture is the concept that most captures 
this quality of pre-political thought, the subconscious foundation which ultimately informs the 
political structure of a society. The New Right magazine Junge Freiheit defines culture as 
The complex network of behavior patterns that acts as a guide for people and enables 
them to shape their world. Cultural identity involves rules of behavior and provides 
common goals for life. Identity is therefore the rootedness of the conscious self in a 
culture. It is a feeling that is hard to describe in rational terms, a feeling of being at one 
with oneself and of existing in harmony and sympathy with shared traditions, experiences 
and knowledge, of being part of a system of values and norms that is greater than the 
individual. 
Before they were further developed by postmodern leftists, these ideas first emerged in the work 
of Martin Heidegger, the German philosopher famous for Being and Time as well as for his 
political affiliation with the Nazi Party. Heidegger asserted that philosophy up to his time had 
ignored an essential aspect of understanding the world: being there (Da-sein). In other words, 
any ontology of the world presupposes an “ontic standpoint”—a certain conception of how one 
exists, how one initially simply is in the world.286 His interest in the question of Being lent well 
to the right wing conception of “timeless essential structures of human existence” that ground the 
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individual in his historical-cultural community (though it can be interpreted in other ways), and 
his idea of the “authentic” life that resisted reason was easily heroized. 287 
New Right author and ex-Bundestag member Alfred Mechtersheimer grounds culture in a 
national context (otherwise, a universalist culture could just as easily fit this definition) by 
emphasizing the nation as the natural expression of the “political will” of “a people” held 
together by culture, language, religion, or history. The nation “manifests itself properly in a 
political consciousness of common values, intentions, and a wish to prevail,” asserting its right to 
difference.288 The “right to difference” is of particular importance because it implies that culture 
cannot be simply a “collection of values,” but must be a “sphere in which the individual has a 
fixed place” that excludes other spheres.289 Nominally, the New Right claims that all cultures are 
equal in their right to exist. However, it also claims that European culture is the culture of 
technology.290 All other cultures should be allowed to seek their own versions of modernity, but 
Europe is still expected to reign supreme in terms of actual global power.291  
The New Right’s emphasis on culture is, as we have seen, not specific to the right wing. 
Culture has become the “explanatory residue” to make sense of what remains in a world with 
disappearing forms of belonging, an attempt to locate all of the aspects of life experience that do 
not reduce themselves easily to economic or political explanation.292 Though the French New 
Right and many German neo-conservatives move directly from culture to a battle plan for 
cultural hegemony, the German New Right is much less convinced. At times, it is even outright 
hostile to political action.293 The intellectuals of the German New Right are in the ideal position 
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to push a right-wing Gramscian metapolitics, yet it often cannot bring itself to do so.294 This is 
because it is torn between two conceptions of culture: what it wants culture to be, what Roger 
Woods terms “feelgood” culture, and the insufficient category which culture turns out to be once 
one tries to find absolute values in its depths. Feelgood culture wants culture to be a “source of 
reassuring certainty and the foundation for political values in the midst of uncertainty.” Finding 
none of this inherent spiritual guidance in cultural identity, however, the New Right is also 
forced to view culture as “a medium for reflecting on chaotic human experience which renders 
politics irrelevant.” Woods continues: “…whatever certainty the New Right aims to provide has 
to coexist with doubt and despair.”295 He urges caution against viewing this contradiction as 
inherently discrediting, however. The playwright Botho Strauss, one prominent New Right 
intellectual, claims that the right wing does not exist to compete with the left’s hopes for 
salvation in some future world order. To him the right is a “profound remembering,” an 
“imagination bound up with loss and not with (earthly) promises.”296  
On the more intellectual side of the contemporary right wing, then, Woods claims that 
Habermas’s usual characterization of neoconservatism as bound up in the need for an 
“affirmative past” is largely irrelevant.297 The less militant members of the New Right know that 
no past will affirm them. Their goal is, rather, to find a process rather than a solid position that 
can come to terms with the constant state of loss which Strauss describes. Yet the orientations of 
specific writers between feelgood culture and cultural pessimism still differ across the New 
Right. The more political than philosophical wing, such as that of the magazine Junge Freiheit 
and members such as Pierre Krebs, Karlheinz Weissman, and Alfred Mechtersheimer, tend to be 
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more hopeful. They find motivation in Ernst Jünger’s conceptualization of national identity: 
when one is forced to confront the powerlessness of the individual (a feeling he became well 
acquainted with under the artillery fire of World War One) and the “collapse of the belief in 
progress”, he said, one can either give in to nihilism or one can elevate nationalism to an 
absolute value that overwhelms all else and comes to provide existential meaning.298 
Others, such as Strauss and Hartmut Lange, notice Jünger’s more pessimistic side: 
“ultimately the nightmare gains supremacy: dread, the anxiety of living dominate everything.”299 
Strauss emphasizes that the “central metaphors of mankind” in which the right wing hopes to 
find solace are little more than “makeshift belts and restraints by means of which man attempts 
to hold his disintegrating form together.” The impossibility of forming a solid foundation 
through culture is one that leaves the modern man at the mercy of grief: “grief, mankind’s most 
honest feeling, will never provide a manifesto, or a suggestion for reshaping the world, or a 
doctrine or prophesy.”300 Lange claims that Heidegger’s image of existence defined by 
Geworfenheit, “thrownness” (in that we are thrown into the world with no inherent sense of 
purpose), makes political action completely futile:  
How could anyone who is propelled out of the void into this world, having to accept the 
void itself as a foundation and work it off like some kind of guilt, be impressed by party 
programmes or any other kind of politically motivated promises of help?... “Existence 
means being held out into nothingness”-- no nationalist slogan or yearning for some long 
lost völkisch identity can stand up to this decision.”301 
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The split (often found just as much within New Right individuals themselves as between them) 
between feelgood culture and cultural pessimism mirrors a much deeper contradiction. The New 
Right is a movement within postmodernity that laments the alienating modern and postmodern 
modes of life—technology, globalization, the chaotic postmodern Lebensgefühl (feeling towards 
life). Because of this, they have a difficulty locating the source of the problem itself. Krebs, 
Günter Rohrmoser, and other believers in a natural, instinctive German culture attack 
multiculturalism as a result of the Nazi guilt complex and the main threat to the rediscovery of a 
German cultural identity based on what Nietzsche called “eternalizing forces,” a spirituality that 
proclaims an absolute truth.302 In particular they incriminate the United States for imposing 
liberal individualist multiculturalism onto Germany (supposedly with the help of figures such as 
Theodor Adorno), which Germany would have resisted were it not so preoccupied with its own 
guilt to form a specifically German modernity.303  
Strauss, Lange, and the younger wave of the New Right represented by the essay 
collection Wir 89er, believe that the problem is endemic to modernity itself rather than an 
external conspiracy. 304 Modernity is in their eyes a “creative destruction” that calls all norms of 
behavior into question, giving greater freedom to the individual but resulting in “isolation, 
indifference towards others, and selfishness”—postmodernity, as the questioning of modernity 
itself, further exacerbates the problem.305 Without a clear hierarchy of values or “signposts and 
cultural landmarks to which we can turn for guidance and reassurance”306, liberalism and social 
democracy (as products of modernity) created a world without myth, heroism, or transcendence-- 
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categories for which humans have an innate desire to sacrifice themselves, according to Simone 
Satzger.307 The philosopher Günter Figal, whom Woods situates on the fringes of the New Right, 
believes that Nietzsche was the first to recognize the nature of modernity as an order without a 
fixed foundation. Rather, modernity’s foundation is a belief in change itself, which it calls 
progress. Nietzsche called this a “sovereign becoming”-- a becoming which presents itself as 
universal and treats each Will equally to the other Wills with which it struggles-- and denounced 
it as “hostile to life, an agent of the dissolution and destruction of man, a secret path to 
nothingness.”308 Progress is an illusion, as it reduces the eternal struggle of Wills to a narrative of 
change from “bad” to “good”.309  
 The New Right’s response to the Leitkultur debate has been disorganized because of this 
split over modernity; some believe that a general Leitkultur would serve the purpose of 
containing foreign culture so it does not contaminate German purity. Others believe that 
Leitkultur should not be a point of political mobilization. Strauss, for instance, believes that the 
concept should be confined to a secret cultural elite that is aware of and lives according to the 
memory of an unbroken lineage of German tradition going back through Wagner to the middle 
ages (which is currently obstructed by the inconvenient memory of the Nazis).310 This elite 
would ostensibly guide Germany in a more spiritual than political sense. Yet if “German culture” 
must be guided and defined by a conscious elite, what is really organic about it? Would this elite 
not be tastemakers like any other art critics, but entrusted with some secret (presumably state-
sponsored) power to impose their ideals on what is actually “organically” produced? 
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 Regardless of the New Right’s disagreements on a diagnosis for Germany’s ills, at its 
core it more or less agrees on a dichotomy at the basis of life: one chooses either a spirit which 
strives for mastery over all aspects of existence, or a “commitment to reason which knows no 
community, only isolation.”311 Its interest in this, somewhat ironically, comes from the 
description of fascism offered by the prominent liberal historian Zeev Sternhell. Though some 
New Right figures such as Armin Mohler have attempted to claim Sternhell as one of their own 
because of his critiques of the Enlightenment-- he suggests that fascism exposed real problems of 
the Enlightenment, that its optimism is premature and unconvincing-- Sternhell has since made 
explicit remarks warning against a resurgence of fascism in the current day, in which he sees 
many of the same “symptoms of decay” which foreshadowed fascism’s birth. He implores 
democracies not to abandon Enlightenment ideals though they may not be justifiable on the self-
evident level claimed by strict rationalists.312  
 For the New Right, however, Sternhell’s criticisms often lead it to the answer of a second 
fascism. Karlheinz Weißmann and Mohler take Sternhell’s characterization of fascism in France, 
a project which “never got beyond the theoretical stage” and so was “spared those unavoidable 
compromises with the official ideologies of regimes which always distort it,” as a starting point 
for a revisionism of the Third Reich: ‘Nazism wasn’t real fascism.’313 In having to constantly 
contend with the memory of the Nazis, the German New Right has adopted a number of 
strategies to relativize the Nazi period, explain where it went wrong (as opposed to the parts of it 
which were not so bad), or emphasize the elements of conservative Germany that opposed or 
distanced themselves from the regime.  
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 In 1995 Weißmann wrote The Way into the Abyss, claiming that Nazi Germany was no 
worse, in either intention or action, than its enemies; he does not ignore the Holocaust in the 
book, but spends just as much space discussing sports in the Third Reich and the comfortable 
quality of life of the average German citizen under Hitler’s dictatorship. As to the Holocaust, he 
points to Sherman’s march to the sea in the American Civil War and the British rule of South 
Africa as examples of the normality of war crimes, implying an equivalency to the mass 
concentration and murder of minorities that Germans perpetrated in the 1930s and 40s. He 
further indicts the Western Allies for their reluctance to support the July 1944 assassination plot, 
claiming that their failure to kill Hitler “completely discredits them.”314 Recalling his interview 
with Weißmann, Jacob Heilbrunn says the gist of Weißmann’s focus on the aforementioned 
point was that “it was not so much ordinary Germans who were at fault during World War II as 
the Allies.”315 In fact, Weißmann claims, blaming Germans legitimized a war of annihilation 
against the German people in the form of civilian bombing (practiced by both sides and initiated 
by the Germans), called rather heavy-handedly a “holocaust” by New Right author Wolfgang 
Venohr.316 Günter Rohrmoser focuses instead on relativizing the theoretical aspect of Nazism, 
absolving Germany of responsibility because, he claims, modern racism was invented by the 
French and implemented as policy by British imperialism, and finds Hitler’s Social Darwinism to 
be an invention of the ancient Greeks.317 One wonders, given Rohrmoser’s interpretation, 
whether the Germans of the 1930s had any agency at all.  
 The New Right has also employed a strategy of idolizing the military of Nazi Germany 
(the Wehrmacht)-- both its individual soldiers and as an institution-- as heroic and separated 
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from the Holocaust in an attempt to find some element of the Nazi period as deserving of 
admiration. This is known as the “clean Wehrmacht myth,” widely dismissed by historians 
because of the military’s well-documented complicity in the Holocaust.318 Interestingly, the 
Western Allies whom the New Right accuses of imposing an eternal guilt on the German people 
actually had a hand in creating the myth; in its efforts to justify the rearmament of West 
Germany, it supported a “Memorandum on the Formation of a German contingent for the 
Defense of Western Europe within the framework of an International Fighting Force” which 
called for them to “stop the ‘defamation’ of the German soldier and ‘rehabilitate’ him by means 
of a public declaration.”319 President Eisenhower supplied the public declaration, claiming that 
there was “a real difference between the regular German soldier and officer and Hitler and his 
criminal group.”320 This has since been discredited beyond dispute by records detailing the 
Commissar Order, participation in the Holocaust, and “anti-partisan” warfare which targeted and 
massacred civilians.321 Nevertheless, much of the New Right considers the Wehrmacht to have 
spared Germany from Communism, and figures such as Günter Rohrmoser extol the Wehrmacht 
as “the German institution that offered the strongest resistance to the spirit of Nazism” as in the 
July 20th plot among Wehrmacht elites to assassinate Hitler. 322 Though Rainer Zitelmann admits 
that the plotters would be considered extreme right by today’s standards, others are more 
interested in them symbolically--as an attempt to save Germany’s honor in the eyes of the world 
-- than in the “corporative” fascist state which they planned as a replacement should the attempt 
succeed. Harald Holz in Criticon openly admits this preference for what the plotters represented 
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(over what they really were) when he calls for an annual “Day of National Honor” on the 
anniversary of the event.323  
 When relativization and apologism are insufficient to dislodge the obstacle that the Nazi 
period represents for a “normal” national consciousness, New Right authors turn to the 
movement which it sees as its spiritus rector: the Conservative Revolution. The New Right’s 
hopes to find certainty in a non-Nazi conservative lineage still fails with this movement-- not 
only was much of the Conservative Revolution itself uncertain (as discussed in relation to 
Jünger), but much of it was also not even non-Nazi. Nevertheless, New Right authors have 
looked to rhetoric borrowed from postwar writings of leftists, from Thomas Mann to the 
communist Alexander Abusch, who asserted that Germany was not synonymous with its dark 
period of fascism and emphasized the presence of an “Other Germany” which opposed Nazism 
from the start. While Mann and others intended this “Other Germany” to mean the left and anti-
fascist liberals, which were clearly politically and philosophically opposed to the Nazis, the New 
Right attempts to present the Conservative Revolution in the same way.324  
 While the Conservative Revolution had its own difficulties setting out a clear purpose, it 
can be characterized by the general interests which the New Right shares with it: a desire for 
“rootedness” and a search for “bonds, wholeness and unity that [replaces] the search for 
freedom.”325 Edgar Julius Jung, a proponent of the Conservative Revolution, defined the 
“Conservative Revolutionary principle” as a belief that the foundation of all communities is a 
metaphysical unity, and that conservatism is the recognition that those absolute values must be 
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preserved.326 Mohler goes on to interpret the interwar movement as the theory and Nazism as the 
practice, but asks whether the theory could have been applied differently.327 Mohler and others 
tend to emphasize the writers who distanced themselves and even clashed with the Nazis-- which 
certainly happened to no small extent-- but in doing so they also overlook the nuances in the 
writers’ relationships with the regime, which were often extremely ambivalent.  
Oswald Spengler, for instance, author of the influential texts The Decline of the West and 
“Prussianism and Socialism,” distanced himself from the Reich as time went on. His 1933 book 
Years of Decision, dubbed the “first fundamental critique of National Socialism” by Günter 
Rohrmoser, criticized the Nazi political vision as lacking clarity and a sense of reality. Spengler 
called National Socialism “the organisation of the unemployed by the workshy,” but as Woods 
points out, the work contains no philosophical objections to Nazism itself. In fact, his work was 
received with enthusiasm by many Nazis, who were confused as to his retreat from the 
movement. His strong opposition to the use of moral considerations in politics remained at the 
core of his worldview through the Nazi years, despite his calling Hitler “too stupid.”328 Similarly, 
Ernst Jünger distanced himself from the Nazis beginning in 1926 but continued to believe that 
society would be saved by a “new elite which would combine primitive man’s will with the 
technical expertise required by the modern warrior.”329 Albrecht Erich Günther, Wilhelm Stapel, 
and Werner Best all swore allegiance to the regime-- Best even joined the SS and became a chief 
in the Gestapo.330 Edgar Jung, though he was later executed in the Night of the Long Knives, 
took credit for “paving the way for the German people to vote for National Socialist candidates” 
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through the Conservative Revolution’s intellectual influence. Friedrich Hielscher, the subject of 
one of Weißmann’s studies, supposedly formed a “resistance group” to undermine Nazism from 
within. Weißmann himself notes, however, that one of the members of Hielscher’s group 
oversaw medical experiments on the prisoners of the Neuengamme Concentration Camp. Despite 
Hielscher’s defense of his compatriot in the Nuremberg trials, he was convicted and executed for 
crimes against humanity. Weißmann also cites historians who cast doubt on the credibility of 
Hielscher’s actual resistance.331 
 Though some New Right authors note the contradictions within their predecessors, their 
fascination in these figures remains-- as Holz admitted about the July plotters-- more for the 
tradition that they could be held to represent rather than the historical reality that they do 
represent.332 Relativizing the Nazi period while retroactively distancing the Conservative 
Revolution from it are what allow Armin Mohler to regard the Conservative Revolutionaries as 
the “healthy Trotskyites” compared to Hitler’s “travesty” (making a comparison to Stalin).333 It 
also allowed him to proudly declare “I am a fascist” by making a distinction between fascism’s 
historical reality and the “fascist style.”334 While Mohler sits on the more extreme side by openly 
considering himself a fascist, the German New Right as a whole attempts to find an alternative 
German history through the strategies discussed above. 335 
 Pierre Krebs, founder of the Thule Seminar, believes that the New Right aim of 
reclaiming an organic German identity had its lucky break with reunification, claiming that the 
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reintegration of the East is prompting a reconnection with the “essence of what is German.”336 
The nation, as the natural modern political community, has a “specific pathos” which the New 
Right believes cannot be replaced by any other form of community, and “satisfies the human 
need for clarity.” 337  Germans as a Volk are held together by a shared wish to survive and 
prevail, given meaning by their knowledge of past sacrifices made for their community and a 
willingness to sacrifice for its future.338 Henning Eichberg sees the present as the prime moment 
to regain this. The fall of the Soviet Union removed the communist enemy from the traditional 
right and the systemic alternative to capitalism from leftists, and even the neoliberal 
proclamation of the “end of history” is now giving way to the “fears of a clash of civilizations”. 
He claims that both traditional right and left are now drifting without any sense of direction, and 
“even if there are no intact values on offer, at least the paradoxical formula of the Conservative 
Revolution can provide a philosophical context.”339  
 The unification of East and West Germany into one state, the New Right claims, 
eliminated Germany’s duty to choose between being Eastern (characterized either by spirituality 
or Marxism) and being Western (functionality or capitalism).340 Reunification is the chance to 
become a third way Mitteleuropa (Middle Europe).341 They see Germany as closer to the Third 
World as a “colonized people,” with the narrative and education imposed on it by the US as a 
“second Versailles” of demanded “moral reparations.”342 The way forward, Eichberg claims, is 
to decolonize the minds of the German people from their guilt, protecting peace by becoming a 
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unified nation that can simultaneously have its own sovereignty and balance the forces of East 
and West.343 The New Right strategically capitalized on the left’s popular anti-Americanism 
(Krebs hoped to “send the Dallas thugs and Ronald Reagan back to their cow pastures”) as well 
as programmatic populism (some called for a tax on the rich to fund reunification). The tactic 
paid off, as the political parties tuning into the New Right’s message took their opportunity in the 
90s to bring Schönhuber’s talking point into the mainstream: “we want to become a self-
confident people again.”344 This “political-intellectual spectrum” shift allowed the New Right to 
stimulate debate over the continuity of German values.345 Was the German orientation with 
Western democracy a genuine “intellectual reorientation” of values, as Habermas claims, 
“grounded in convictions and guided by principles,” or was it the imposition of American 
cultural hegemony onto a people whose true spirit lies elsewhere?346 
 The New Right nevertheless remains cautious toward optimistic nationalism. Even 
Benoist, who once believed in the ultimate supremacy of the “fatherland,” has recognized since 
the fall of the Berlin Wall that identity is dynamic, and a return to an idealized past is simply a 
naive nationalism of the traditional right. He claims that 1989 “marked the start of the 
postmodern era, in which all political remains of Modernity have been rendered obsolete.”347 
The bureaucratic nation-state has become too big to actually address the needs of its citizens and 
globalization has made it too small to deal with global threats like terrorism, the climate, and the 
heavily intertwined world economy. Benoist notices that globalization heightens the individual’s 
perceived need for identity, but “I am a German” no longer has a natural, absolute foundation-- 
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everything is thrown into question by postmodernity. In this sense, reunification actually had the 
effect of stimulating more internal debate within the New Right, as more self-critical voices have 
arisen to challenge the optimism of many of the older New Right figures. Wir 89er, the younger 
branch of the intellectual New Right, seems intent on quashing and demystifying any hope for a 
conservative future: 
All attempts by the New Right to create a national identity are bound to fail because the 
nation exists only as a myth-- it is a vague feeling: no particular borders can construct the 
nation (just think of the Germans outside Germany), nor can culture… and genetic 
differences can be ruled out from the start… since not even a myth of the nation still 
exists, the concept today is defined by a vacuum. Anyone who still talks about the nation 
these days is talking about a historical phenomenon that has had its day.348 
As Strauss claimed in his 1993 essay “Anschwellender Bocksgesang” (Swelling He-Goat song), 
the “right wing imagination is not to do with promises of a better life but with loss.”349 Other 
quite arresting self-criticisms have also emerged. Writing in Criticon, Gunnar Sohn attacks 
conservatives for hoping for a one-dimensional “natural or historical community,” which, 
because of its claim to universal validity, discounts individual freedom and restraints on state 
power in favor of vague anticipations of a totalizing “community of the mind” which renders 
those concepts unnecessary.350 One could hardly find a more postmodernist scorn of 
universalism, even on the left.  
 With no fixed points on which to build a satisfying identity, then, what can a nation 
actually be? Many in the New Right look to the Conservative Revolution for a model. Some 
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figures in that movement also deliberately distanced themselves from traditional conservatism. 
Edgar Jung claimed in 1933 that true conservatives are not “intent on stopping the wheel of 
history” but on finding new paths; others decried conservative “restorationism” that tried to 
ignore rather than make use of the present and its characteristics, from technology to the modern 
city to the industrialized proletariat. Heimo Schwilk compares Ernst Jünger’s decentered, 
alienated soldier, reduced to a “nameless ‘worker-soldier’” at the mercy of industrial warfare, to 
the mechanized, specialized individual who is subject to globalization. Both attempt to elevate 
the nation-state to reclaim an identity for themselves.351 But whereas the Conservative 
Revolution responded to the alienation of modernity with a (sometimes cynical) attempt to find a 
redeeming universal truth underneath, that option is not even available to the New Right. For 
Armin Mohler, postmodernism injected new imagination into stale German conservatism, 
freeing politics from “one-dimensional” universals such as those of liberalism, Christianity, and 
Marxism. Postmodernism allowed pluralism to exist and justify itself-- uncoupling the particular 
(Das Besondere) from the need to be described as part of a universal scheme (Das Allgemeine). 
In the face of an “infinite chaos,” an “immense jungle of reality,” Mohler contends that we 
should turn our attention to the particular, the “lucid” experience of life itself.352 Nominally, this 
applies to all peoples, and the “right to difference” embodies this call for the “recognition and the 
cultivation of [a people’s] special existence and particularity” that makes a national identity.353  
The New Right claims that this has nothing to do with racism or xenophobia. 
Ethnopluralism is but a variation of the postmodern image of diversity, in which particular 
subjectivities are separated in order to let them keep their particularity.354 Universal human 
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equality is the “greatest possible intolerance,” intolerant of diversity, originality, and 
particularity. Humans can only develop, Mohler claims, in the hierarchies of their own cultural 
groups.355 Incompatibility between “particularities” is responsible for the social ills of 
multicultural societies. Mohler, the attempted SS-man, even claims that he pities refugees, for 
whom living in an alien culture might not “make up for the murder, from which [they] 
escaped.”356 As we have already discussed, however, the same “cultural incompatibility” 
narrative is an increasingly prevalent explanation for the failures of multiculturalism across the 
political spectrum in Germany. 
The postmodern focus on cultural subjectivity and the metapolitics of cultural hegemony 
lends itself well to the fascist “style” with which Mohler identifies. Though the political wing of 
the New Right often goes out of its way to express support for democracy, it is not referring to 
the liberal representative democracy of most of Europe.357 Instead of a democracy built on the 
Enlightenment principles of universal equality and multiculturalism, the New Right’s democracy 
would be based on the organic unity of a Volk. Taking the local-style participatory democracy 
advocated by much of the post-1968 left, the New Right claims that this could only function 
where everyone is united by language and culture; social democracy has more difficulty 
operating in the tumult of a diverse and demographically-shifting society because common 
consensus can be more difficult to reach.358 
One should closely scrutinize the underlying message conveyed by these sentiments. This 
ethnocentric social democracy is, according to the New Right, supposed to come about not 
through public debate and pluralist consensus-building but through an imposed cultural power 
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which supposedly represents all Germans so naturally that rational debate is not needed, and so 
to question power would be unnatural. Every true German, because of their shared spirit, would 
agree on the terms of such a society-- this a democracy, but an imagined democracy in which 
everyone already agrees on most questions. Any German who does not agree is not a true 
German, and there is absolutely no space there for the millions of migrants and cultural 
minorities who have been a part of Germany for decades. What happens to them, practically 
once “ethnopluralist democracy” achieves its hegemony? Are they removed, an act which would 
require force and a humanitarian disaster? And what about the insight of the more pessimistic 
New Right authors, who see ethno-cultural identity as little more than contrived “belts and 
restraints”? Mohler responds to this last question in Liberalenbeschimpfung (Liberal Abuse): 
As far as fascism is concerned the relationship to concepts is instrumental, indirect and 
supplementary. What is of primary concern is the commitment to a gesture, a rhythm, in 
brief: to a ‘style’’. Certainly this style can express itself in words-- fascism is not silent; 
on the contrary, it loves words, but they are not there to establish logical connections. 
Rather, they set a particular tone, create an atmosphere, and evoke associations. In 
summary one can say that fascists can easily come to terms with theoretical 
contradictions. Their communication takes place in a more direct way-- through 
‘style.’359 
In other words, the bloodless yet “culturally assertive and ‘clean’ of migrants” society for which 
he advocates may indeed not make any sense. But it does not have to, in his view; ideas are “a 
mobilizing force which [are] not meant to be analyzed.”360 
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 One can interpret Mohler’s characterization of fascism as an attempted synthesis of the 
naive nationalism and resigned pessimism which plays out within much of the German New 
Right, though many of its members actually deeply struggle with theoretical contradictions and 
would disagree with the fascist label. For political parties associated with the New Right, 
Mohler’s metapolitics are satisfying enough. But for figures such as Strauss and the writers of 
Wir 89er, this style is not capable of providing meaning. Strauss has his own hypothetical 
solution, the “remythologization” of language to provide symbolic reference points, but accepts 
this as a lost cause. Similarly, Franco Volpi actually argues against the “reactivation” of myths 
because that carries the risk of reawakening “irrationalism, anarchy, and chaos.”361 Woods 
claims that the New Right’s nationalism must be seen as the product of a process, characterized 
by the relationship between the desire for fixed points and the knowledge that there are none. 
“Given this process,” Woods says, “there can be no simple nationalist commitment, only a 
complex and reflective one which must by its very reflectiveness undermine the wish for values 
beyond question.”362 To give in to Jünger’s temptation of elevating nationalism to an absolute 
value in the face of nihilism-- to be what Nietzsche called an “active nihilist”-- is to remain 
captive to ungrounded and obsolete values which threaten order more than they sustain or 
reconstitute it. Günter Figal writes, “nihilism is, according to Nietzsche, a ‘pathological 
transitional condition’ in which one cannot actually live but in which one nevertheless tries to do 
so.” One knows and remains forever aware of the empty space left by the demystification of 
absolute values-- they are always in view, but only in memory-- and this leaves one with a choice 
to become either an “active” or a “passive” nihilist. A passive nihilist gives in to 
meaninglessness, forced to regard all values as equal and action as pointless. The active nihilist, 
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on the other hand, chooses by his own will to follow certain values. Figal finds this choice 
unconvincing for the same reasons found in Jünger, against the universalizing potential of 
Mohler’s “style.” One can only give oneself to nationalism in a tentative sense; it is a process of 
dealing with the futility of attempts to reconstruct the nation, and realizing that this project is 
always undermined from within. The memory of values which are no longer viable makes the 
process of the intellectual New Right, as Strauss claimed, bound up more in grief than hope-- it 
can only grieve the past, not rebuild it. 363 
Yet the potential this “process” holds for the more political wing of the New Right is 
immense. It is not constrained by the pessimism of Strauss and Wir 89er, and consequently 
reflective process is converted into metapolitical style. In theory, the two are very similar; both 
notice and accept the philosophical disintegration brought on by postmodernism. But while 
reflective process grudgingly accepts postmodernity as the death of a dream, metapolitical style 
instrumentalizes postmodernism with the intent of realizing absolute truths underneath. Its 
(mis)understanding of postmodern relativism means roughly: concrete identity x cannot be 
judged by the standards of concrete identity y-- rather than there being no fixed points, the 
political New Right’s relativism asserts multiple independent but culturally-specific fixed points. 
Only between these points is everything relative. Its argument against individualism, the left-
liberal celebration of relativism, is claiming that it actually represents a universalism-- each 
individual is an “atom” but above all of them is a vague universal image of “humanity.”364  
Reflective process laments the “loss of world orientation”-- the collapse of faith in a 
“recognizable meaning of human life,” believing that this disintegration renders all political 
action pointless. One can only find solace in nostalgia, Strauss's "profound remembrance," and 
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grieve for the inevitable death of nation and values. In other words, Strauss and the pessimists 
seem genuinely bothered by the lack of political possibilities based on reason-- failing to find the 
“will to believe in something,” it can only become a pale shadow of this: more “the will to will 
than the will itself.”365 Mohler and Krebs, on the other hand, employ this as a strength; if one’s 
movement is not bound to reason, vagueness can be a strategy, devaluing rational discussion and 
avoiding the kind of clarity that risks alienating allies. While Strauss accepts but feels uneasy 
about the breakdown which has accompanied postmodernity, Mohler fully and ruthlessly 
embraces fluid postmodernist politics.  
The philosophical and political wings of the New Right are split close to same fault line 
that characterizes debates within postmodernism in general-- one can find a similar split on the 
left, for instance, between the postmaterial politics of the Greens and the thought of sociologist 
and philosopher Zygmunt Bauman. Bauman argues that there are two basic directions in which 
one can take postmodernism:  
...a postmodern conceptualization of life can either maintain itself as a corrective force, 
looking back upon the past “as a movement in a direction unlikely to be followed, as 
perhaps even an aberration, the pursuit of a false track, a historical error now to be 
rectified”… or it can tune itself into the postmodern Lebensgefühl, not only accepting the 
emergence of a chaotic, fragmented world, but enjoying the demise and loss of certainty 
and finite authority, rejoicing in the decentering impulses and indeterminacy 
characteristic of the postmodern age, “a life in the presence of an unlimited quantity of 
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competing forms of life, unable to prove their claims to be grounded in anything more 
solid and binding than their own historically shaped conventions.”366 
Mohler’s “fascist style” and Nietzsche’s eternally struggling Wills are affirmed by the latter 
conception of postmodernism, though not through individualism, which would seem to be the 
simplest manifestation of the infinite “competing forms of life.” Rather, the optimists of the New 
Right intend to use “chaos and fragmentation” to elevate the authoritarian state to absolute power 
while also making this absolutist ethnostate embody the “form of life” competing against all 
others-- not individual others, but collective cultural ones. Chaos and fragmentation are not 
regrettable effects of postmodernity-- they are the nature of the world, and must be used to create 
the ethnic (völkisch) order which is the only natural refuge from chaos.  
 The pessimists do not fit with Bauman’s second category, but they also fall somewhat 
short of the first. Postmodernity as a “corrective force” seems to more closely describe the 
thought of figures such as Habermas, with his “constitutional patriotism” based on pride in 
principles over tradition (though Habermas does not associate with postmodernism, as neither 
does Bauman, who prefers to speak of “liquid modernity.”)367 Yet the philosophical New Right 
still sees the short historical period of the nation-state as an “aberration,” a myth which was once 
comforting but can no longer hold up to reality. What they lack is the optimism that this 
realization can generate something better; that would seem to be exclusive to the left by 
definition. They are unable to access the “unambiguous experience of life” because it would 
require, as Jünger believed, the “sacrifice of the intellect”-- they are not willing to take Mohler’s 
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idealistic leap of faith into politics.368 Their response is process rather than unchanging position, 
though this process is more reflective than reflexive-- preoccupied with the loss of a past rather 
than in using its lessons to create a future-- though it often ultimately arms the political wing 
when taken without its self-critical pessimism.  
 Without such crippling doubt, the political New Right (which has had influence on 
parties from the Republikaner in the 90s to the AfD today) has the confidence to define their own 
version of European postmodernity. 369 As we have seen, the optimists and pessimists disagree on 
the source of contemporary problems, identifying them either as impositions from East and West 
“Vodka-Cola imperialism” or as endemic to postmodernity itself. 370 While the postmodern, 
postmaterialist Left created the idea of the “right to difference” with the meaning that immigrants 
had a right to retain their own culture, the political wing of the New Right believes that each 
culture has its own relative modernity-- they laud the Iranian Revolution for instance, as the Shia 
Muslim world’s version of emancipation.371 For this reason, this side of the New Right is not as 
anti-European as it is anti-EU. Its objection to the EU is that the EU is an economic union, 
creating economic identity, rather than a cultural union creating cultural identity. “In the 
Mitteleuropa conception, Spektorowski claims, “the ethnic federation of peoples is not 
necessarily anti-capitalist, but posits ethno-cultural over economic priorities. Only a strong 
cultural unity may serve as protection against globalization.”372 To achieve this, the political 
New Right combines the concepts of local participatory democracy and anti-Americanism one 
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usually finds on the left with right wing chauvinist social and cultural ideals.373 As Michael 
O’Meara puts it, the New Right  
is prepared to ally with a “modernity” faithful to Europe’s daring spirit—that is, to a 
modernity that frees Europeans from what is dead in their culture. At the same time, 
though, it rejects everything seeking growth not in Europe’s expansive spirit, but in its 
negation—specifically in the functional—and ethnocidal—culture fostered by liberal 
market societies.374 
Interesting to note is that O’Meara considers himself a postmodernist; this is taken from a book 
titled “New Culture New Right: Anti-Liberalism in Postmodern Europe. Yet here he refers to 
establishing a modernity. This speaks to the fundamental contradiction within the New Right’s 
project—using the relativist, cynical, postmodernist worldview to assert absolute, fixed points 
with the confidence of modernity. In any case, Benoist believes that O’Meara’s “expansive 
spirit” indicates a conceptualization of a united Europe as more of an “empire” than a nation, as 
an empire “is not primarily a territory but essentially an idea or a principle. The political order is 
determined … by a spiritual … idea.”375  
 The ideas of protecting a non-material “spiritual idea” and opposing the functionalizing 
ideology of neoliberalism actually unite the political New Right with the New Left-inspired 
politics of the Greens-- in more of a philosophical than programmatic sense, but this too holds 
political potential for the right wing’s metapolitics. As the political New Right represents the 
right-wing celebration of the chaos of postmodernity, the Greens embody the left-wing 
counterpart of the dichotomy described by Betz. Like the New Right, the New Left began as an 
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opposition to the penetration of functionalist “economic rationality” into more and more spheres 
of life, “redefining [social, political, etc.] relations in terms of consumption” and 
“bureaucratizing the conditions of life.” “What is at stake,” Habermas warned, “is the symbolic 
reproduction of the life-world itself.” 376 However, the Greens and the New Left as a whole 
adopted “individual autonomy” and “self creation” as its challenge to deterritorialization, a 
choice which Betz asserts was “highly compatible” with exactly the same alienating 
postmodernity it attempted to counteract. Individualism only accelerated the commodification of 
“lifestyles… based on immediate gratification, fantasy, novelty, play, hedonism, and 
consumption and affluence”.377 
 How does this relate to the politics of the New Right? Betz claims that the New Left, 
though glorifying the fragmentation engendered by postmodernity, misunderstands 
postmodernism-- in the end, it is still seduced by the Enlightenment promise of “full 
emancipation.”378 The New Right does this as well-- the absolute nation-state simply takes the 
place of individualism in their schema-- but individualism fails to satisfy the demand for social 
belonging, while the ethnostate simply promises an updated  “social democratic 
[re]understanding of the fatherland.”379 In relation to the Greens in particular, this has even 
allowed the radical right to co-opt ecology into its programs, with the usual chauvinistic spin that 
ascribes the problem to the “other” and accordingly creates the collective identity lacking in 
individualism. 
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Fears of overpopulation and overburdened infrastructure were easily picked up on as 
early as the 1970s, as New Right figures such as Eichberg attempted to lay claim to the nascent 
Green movement. Virtually all were expelled from or left the Party, but continued to push their 
own right-wing ecology.380 From comparing environmental pollution to ethnic pollution to 
claiming that only a uniform, native Volk had the spiritual connection to a land which is required 
to be good stewards, the New Right was able to absorb an issue that already had wide appeal, 
and synthesize it with the mobilizing force of xenophobia. 381 The Green Party’s share of the vote 
has levelled out to approximately between 7% and 10% since 1994; the AfD already has 30 more 
seats in the Bundestag than the Greens, and as the far right continues to take popular issues and 
combine them with simple narratives and vague promises, it could continue gaining political 
power. The AfD did not steal many votes from the Greens in 2017 (1.4%), as the Greens strongly 
holds members of the more educated, well-off top two thirds of the “two thirds society.” 
However, the incorporation of green politics into the AfD’s politics makes it yet another weapon 
in its arsenal, and another problem which can be blamed on the catch-all issue of immigration. 
This is exactly the intent of the right wing’s metapolitics; to undermine the legitimacy of all 
other solutions, using the concreteness of real programs as a weakness, and inserting their own 
ambiguous “style” in order to “push the boundaries of what is considered permissible in German 
political discourse.”382 
While the New Right-- even its more zealously political members-- understands the 
contemporary world as a postmodern one (for better or worse), its strategies and promises hold a 
strong appeal for the sections of society most aggravated by the turn to the postmaterial politics 
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of social justice, environmentalism, and culture.383 The losers of modernization, the underclass of 
undereducated and unemployed mostly young men, and the typical Green voter are two sides of 
the same Zweidrittelgesellschaft (two-thirds society) created by the acceleration of technology 
and the coinciding increased specialization of labor. While those who have had the opportunities 
to keep up with these processes have the luxury of engaging in postmaterial politics-- the 
socially, economically, and geographically mobile employees in social and cultural services such 
as education and journalism-- there are also those who do not have their material needs satisfied 
or even find them threatened. These Deklassierte (underprivileged) can feel more represented by 
far right parties that promise to recapture a lost standard of living by excluding wealth and 
opportunities to outsiders. 384 The political New Right intentionally and systematically 
appropriated the leftist concept of cultural revolution, fusing it with the Conservative 
Revolution’s image of a “separate” right wing past from Nazism, attempting to provide new right 
wing parties and movements such as the AfD and Pegida with a “clean slate” with which to push 
the right wing worldview without the burdens of the Nazi past.    
This chapter has discussed the ideological philosophy of the New Right, a surprisingly 
diverse collection of intellectuals, and their relationship to postmodernism and postmodernity. 
But how does the political New Right’s chosen strategy of metapolitics, carried out at varying 
levels from internet chatrooms to international coalitions of nationalists, actually play out? How 
has it simultaneously provided a basis for new right wing action while also having succeeded in 
pulling established parties rightwards? The next chapter is concerned with the processes of 
communication, legitimization, and radicalization sought by extremist groups and how the new 
far right utilizes means such as the internet to creep closer to cultural hegemony. 
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Chapter Four: The Internet and Meme Warfare 
 The New Right’s metapolitical focus first inspired the factions of the “old” right which it 
avoids, such as the neo-Nazi Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD), as it coincided 
with the necessity to circumvent established means of cultivating political power.385 In its 2002 
party manifesto, the NPD introduced what it called a “3-pillar approach” for broadening its scope 
of action in the wake of the prohibition of multiple other far right groups by the federal 
government. The pillars, “fighting for the minds, fighting for the streets, and fighting for the 
voters,” were intended to begin a new strategic era for the far right which had up until then never 
won more than a few regional seats.386 Wary of the Office for Constitutional Protection’s 
oversight and infiltration of any centralized political organization, both the NPD and the more 
radical free-floating neo-Nazi groups began to systematically adopt the more metapolitical style 
advocated by intellectuals in the previous decades-- partially for practical reasons, as that style 
lends itself well to decentralized and horizontal activism that is much more difficult to spy on or 
outlaw.  
First advocated in the 1980s and pioneered in the 1990s, the tactic of developing right 
wing extremist subcultures, “organizations without organization,”387 made them “invulnerable to 
state repression.”388 Groups known as “freie Kameradschaften” (free fellowships) or “freie 
Nationalisten” (free nationalists) began to form on the local and regional levels, organizing 
themselves loosely but communicating with one another through “info-telephones”-- which 
when called simply play a voicemail of news, protest details, and the numbers of other info-
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telephones; magazines, informal networks of friends, and increasingly group websites and social 
media.389 These “groupuscules” are united by the common but vague goal of increasing the 
general presence of right wing extremism in Germany-- in effect, to normalize it and thereby 
desensitize Germans from the shock that most still feel when confronted with open National 
Socialists. Across this disorganized, multiplicitous landscape, groups are able to employ a wide 
variety of tactics to influence mainstream conservatism, intimidate opponents, and create 
emotionally charged senses of identity and camaraderie for their members. Instrumental to all of 
this is the use of symbols, rituals, fashion style, and behavioral expectations to bridge the gap 
between subculture and political engagement: 
Style and symbol—that is: clothes (or single pieces of garment like boots, belt, parts of 
uniforms), colour, habitus, the way of speaking (or single keywords) as well as 
aestheticized signs as expressive symbols for opinions and behaviors—signal the public 
which tendency an individual or a group belongs to. (…) At the same time style and 
symbol refer to existing or desired lines of tradition that are implored and occupied for 
the present.390 
While this “aestheticization of politics” is nothing new to right wing extremism (Walter 
Benjamin used this phrase to describe the Nazis in 1935), the rise of internet communication has 
become central to the contemporary far right’s strategies in a number of ways-- in the words of 
the American white supremacist David Duke, “internet proficiency is as important to our cause 
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as was learning to use a sword in the Middle Ages or a long rifle in the American Revolution.”391 
The Internet has not awoken the silent majority that many on the right wing had hoped for, but it 
has enabled the expansion of nationalist and pan-nationalist radical networks while “simplifying 
the coordination and diffusion of tactics and ideas.”392 In fact, the German security service has 
itself declared that “the internet has become the most important medium of communication for 
right wing extremists,” and admitted in 2010 that it has significant difficulties with neutralizing 
online hate networks given their fast movement, ease of regeneration, and hosting in foreign 
domains (such as the U.S., Russia, and Singapore) where the German government has no 
jurisdiction. 393 
 Given the innate suspicion and hostility faced by right wing extremists and radicals in the 
German context, right wing groups have had to be stealthier and smarter than their counterparts 
in Russia or France. Strategically choosing issues like the Dresden bombing and Wehrmacht 
memorials and campaigning on anti-crime, anti-capitalism, anti-war, pro-environment, and even 
pro-animal rights platforms rather than on explicit National Socialist nostalgia, the new far right 
has been adept at co-opting the issues and symbols that were once considered the domain of the 
left.394 Combined with a wide diversity of tactics, from traditional street demonstrations to music 
festivals to cyberattacks to mimicking news and academic websites, the far right has crafted its 
own opportunities to assert a presence (even an acceptance) in German society that would once 
have been unacceptable. It has also engendered the formation of what one scholar has called an 
                                               
391 Duke, David, My Awakening. (LA: Free Speech Press, 1998.) quoted in Sabine Von Mering and Timothy Wyman 
McCarty, Right-Wing Radicalism Today: Perspectives from Europe and the US, Routledge Studies in Extremism 
and Democracy (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2013), 7.  
392 Ibid., 6–7. 
393 Michael Whine, “Trans-European Trends in Right-Wing Extremism,” in Mapping The Extreme Right in 
Contemporary Europe, ed. Andrea Mammone, Emmanuel Godin, and Brian Jenkins, Routledge Studies in 
Extremism and Democracy ; 16 (London ; New York: Routledge, 2012), 322. 
394 Virchow, “The Groupuscularization of Neo-Nazism in Germany,” 66; Virchow, “Performance, Emotion, and 
Ideology,” 152. 
119 
 
Erlebniswelt Rechtsextremismus, a “right-wing extremist life-world” -- a subcultural network 
that encourages radicalization and, from the inside, appears to be a public sphere of its own, 
allowing (internal) debate, the selling of products, the identification of groups to be excluded, 
and the setting of behavioral standards. 395 This chapter will focus on the online component of the 
far right community, which mirrors many of the same processes of identity formation, 
legitimization, and assertion that occur in “real-world” interactions. 
 The role of technological evolution in effecting real-world progress is subject to debate. 
Some, Walter Benjamin as an example, argued that technological progress inherently spurs 
social progress. Others, such as Theodor Adorno, emphasized the potential for the same 
innovation to more quickly benefit regressive ideologies such as fascism. Simpson and Druxes 
meet them halfway, declaring “media technologies alone have no political agency: constituents 
from any point on the political spectrum can empower themselves and expand their virtual 
sphere of influence.”396 What we do know is that the internet has completely changed the 
epistemic landscape of communication as a whole; knowledge is produced, disseminated, and 
apprehended by individuals in a radically different way, and its potential implications for the 
future of politics and democracy are immense.397 This is especially true of “Web 2.0,” describing 
the interactive changes that have taken place as social media hubs replaced individual websites 
as most people’s primary means of navigating the internet. The difficulty of sifting through fact 
and fiction in a bottomless ocean of fast-paced, fragmented information, Peter Dahlgren claims, 
has fundamentally shifted the individual’s relationship to knowledge. It is easier than ever to 
integrate affirming information into our personal paradigms and ignore information that 
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challenges us. Even our awareness that we cannot trust streams of information can reinforce this 
problem-- skepticism is turned into cynicism by the dislodging of “cognitive certainty,” as 
incredulity often becomes part of confirmation bias. Cynicism does not prevent us from finding 
communities that immediately appeal to our own views and subsequently appear legitimate to us. 
However, it is easy to then only apply our skepticism (“you can’t believe everything on the 
internet”) to facts and narratives that contradict our preexisting worldview. Social media and 
self-isolating internet subgroups intensify this effect through doing the filtering work for us, with 
algorithms or collective narratives that preclude exposure to information that is incompatible 
with our worldviews. The overall result is the “erosion of memory, empathy, sensibility (that is, 
a fundamental transformation of our subjectivity), and on the other hand, a decreasing capacity to 
impact in an efficacious manner on this new world.”398  
It is questionable whether these developments really do constitute a “fundamental 
transformation of our subjectivity.”399 Dahlgren lends himself to the “post-truth” narrative, that 
“objective facts” have become “less influential in shaping public opinion than emotional 
appeals.”400 The term itself begs the question: when was the “truth” era? When were people more 
motivated by reason than subjective appeals? When was “fake news” not a regular fixture of the 
public sphere (tabloids, yellow journalism, etc.), and when was politics defined by agreement on 
what “the truth” even is? Whether this truly marks a different direction for human behavior or 
has merely exaggerated our natural cognitive processes is not important for the subject of this 
chapter, but it is clear that the tendency of the internet to favor Balkanization is extremely 
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beneficial to the far right (as to any other group seeking homogeneity of thought, or even not 
actively seeking diversity).  
Domonkos Sik has a similar understanding of the epistemic dimensions of the internet, 
one that does not assume the rational individual to have been the center of politics before the 
internet, but notes the enhanced ease of dogmatic communication. Writing about the Hungarian 
far right, Sik notices the similarities between the patterns of its online behavior and Habermas’s 
concept of the “imitated public sphere”-- a community that mimics all of the aspects of a normal 
deliberative public sphere but is in reality only based on “ritualized communicative acts” that 
reinforce the cohesion of the in-group and hostility to other groups. In other words, radical online 
communities mimic free, open debate as if they are a pluralistic democratic society but are in 
actuality only fostering conversation in order to homogenize and radicalize the community. 
Ideally, the medium of communication is the “free debate of equal partners,” which realizes its 
potential to be a rational tool that “fulfills its democratic function, provides a space for creating 
legitimate norms, and for experiencing freedom and mutual understanding.” The public sphere is 
supposed to be a “mediator between the everyday lifeworld and the administrative or economic 
systems.”401 
The internet functions in a way that impedes this kind of communication, however. 
Groups no longer rely on mutual understanding of the world but instead on having 
“connectedness to the same network of information,” making information less like input into a 
system of knowledge and more like a continuous stream of stimuli that replaces “reflexive and 
communicative practices with the unconscious, real time following of the streams of 
                                               
401 Domonkos Sik, “The Imitated Public Sphere: The Case of Hungary’s Far Right,” in Digital Media Strategies of 
the Far Right in Europe and the United States, ed. Patricia Anne Simpson and Helga Druxes (Lanham, Maryland: 
Lexington Books, 2015), 146. 
122 
 
information.” 402 Politics thus becomes characterized more by dogmatic and strategic uses of 
information than by debate. Groups are incentivized to produce whatever sensational, eye-
catching, and emotionally-charged “facts” and propaganda that best influence and control the 
relevant streams of information, and this privileges the radicals who are willing to do so. For the 
far right, this largely takes the form of negative rituals, emphasizing and sometimes inventing 
narratives of being oppressed by mainstream society (for instance in relation to “authoritarian 
political correctness”) and by constructing caricatures of enemies to be mocked and hated 
(backwards Islamic “hordes”, purple-haired genderfluid feminists, etc.).403 In this sense, the 
internet was exactly the kind of space the far right needed-- these tactics have existed for far 
longer than the internet, but the characteristics of the internet as a medium much more closely fit 
the needs of radical ideologies, especially those which set their sights on disaffected individuals, 
than they have benefitted democracy.404 
While Sik’s analysis is centered on frustrations in Hungary, many of the same qualities 
apply to the post-communist East German states, where an astounding 77% of German far right 
protest Facebook pages are hosted, according to one study.405 He outlines a number of specific 
qualities of Hungarian society that make it prime ground for the far right, but his examples 
directly correspond to the same predicaments which we have discussed in regard to East 
Germany: an ideological heritage of intolerance, economic disadvantages, prejudice towards 
minorities, distrust of democratic institutions, and feelings of being unrepresented (known 
simply in German as Politikverdrossenheit, “political disenchantment”). The only element that 
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was missing for a right wing resurgence, Sik claims, was a “communicative space, where they 
could organize their specific collective identity, independently from the dominant central 
parties.”406 If anything, this is more relevant to the German far right. Hungarian ultranationalists 
simply did not have the resources to spread their message before the internet, while online spaces 
have allowed a once-underground, explicitly illegal movement to communicate freely and openly 
and circumvent constitutional law, which bans neo-Nazi hate speech. 
The imitated public sphere is also produced in a positive and constructive way, through 
“building up fraudulent virtual resumes via cheap and accessible Internet publicity, which in turn 
allow them to enter into publishing contracts with unsuspecting publishers, award each other 
prestigious prizes, make themselves into public figures, and generally mislead the public.”407 
Fringe political groups have always had their own circles of “intellectuals,” newspapers, and so 
on, but the internet has opened up more space for these circles to mainstream themselves, 
exerting a rightward pressure on established politics.408 Following the lead of the New Right 
magazine Criticon and the Thule Seminar, founded by Pierre Krebs in 1980 as somewhat of a 
“think tank” to “provide the cultural foundations for political initiatives” (named after the 
organization which cradled the early Nazi Party), the New Right assembled a number of new 
projects while they regrouped at the turn of the millennium.409 The two most important 
organizations, both founded in 2000, were the Institut für Staatspolitik (Institute for State 
Politics, IfS) and the Bibliothek des Konservatismus (Library of Conservatism). Their names 
were strategically chosen, as Institut is a label almost exclusively used by universities but is not a 
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legally protected term, and naturally a library immediately makes one think of wisdom and 
intellectual integrity. Both “institutions” have offices in Berlin.410 
The IfS, headed by Karlheinz Weißmann and Götz Kubitschek, publishes the newspaper 
Sezession as well as conducting “summer and winter academies… and publishing the most 
important lectures held there in the form of essays and brochures.”411 The Bibliothek des 
Konservatismus, whose creation was led by the former head of Criticon, aimed at eventually 
“setting up a conservative think tank with various types of events, perhaps even with an academy 
or a higher-education offshoot,” is now interlocked with magazine Junge Freiheit with both 
being headed by Dieter Stein. 412 While officially meant to be separate institutions, members and 
leaders of each regularly participate in one another’s events and write for each other’s journals-- 
Kubitschek has been chief commentator in the “Security and Military” section in Junge 
Freiheit.413 To an unsuspecting visitor, the formal nomenclature and the “variety” of opinions 
could easily be misleading. Indeed, the purpose of these initiatives was to enhance the ease of 
creating the illusion of a large and well-established political movement even when it is quite 
small in reality. With the internet, one can costlessly propagate as many forums, organizations, 
and news sites as one has the capacity to run, and multiple sources can be run by the same person 
or few people.414 
During the 2010 Thilo Sarrazin controversy, the right wing’s imitated public sphere 
pretended to present a lively debate within itself. IfS published a “pseudo-academic study” called 
“The Case of Sarrazin” while the “pseudo-scientific” news website Lifegen.de (subtitled “Living 
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facts for life sciences”) also weighed in on the controversy with shameless plugs of the site 
owners’ blatantly chauvinist book “Worst Case,” making no reference to the fact that it is written 
by the same people who most likely wrote the anonymous article.415 Another publication, made 
by a privately-funded “think tank” and claiming to be the 15th volume in a series of scientific 
analyses by a nameless team of experts, uses proper citations and an academic style to examine 
the Sarrazin case, depicting him as a hero of truth against a conspiratorial political correctness 
agenda. Druxes explains: 
Like the book by Sarrazin himself, these publications purport to be well-researched, and 
present spurious evidence for their claims. They quote “experts” in a format that 
simulates “balanced” debate, instrumentalizing bona fide publications and embedding 
these in a welter of pseudo-scientific propaganda that is suffused by an apocalyptic tone. 
Clever visual design choices and veiled rhetoric that carefully skirts the hate speech laws 
professionalize, modernize, and mainstream their hate messages.416 
By citing anything from mainstream newspapers like the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung to 
tabloids such as Bild and Welt to their own sister publications (IfS quoted Junge Freiheit as a 
source in its analysis of the Sarrazin controversy, for instance), the far right is able to mimic 
intellectual and political legitimacy until it is granted to them. It does not stop there, however. 
Sezession and Junge Freiheit have both created and then awarded one another (as well as 
Kubitschek’s wife) the “Gerhard-Löwenthal prize” for journalism. Gerhard Löwenthal was a 
deceased TV journalist and concentration camp survivor whose widow was tricked into letting 
these journals re-publish her husband’s memoir and attach the proceeds to the prize. They have 
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since given the award to unsuspecting actual academics, some of whom have accepted it and 
therefore been photographed at and unintentionally legitimized the ceremonies of Junge Freiheit 
and IfS.417 
 The effect of these strategies is twofold. From the inside, the far right looks to be much 
more of a coherent, populous community than it really is, and from the outside the “institutes” 
and “academic journals” are unwittingly allowed to influence the mainstream. Their abilities to 
do so are also compounded by the particular connective structure of the German far right’s 
online network. Manuela Caiani and Linda Parenti’s comparative study of radical right internet 
networks in six countries finds a number of qualities of the German network that makes it adept 
at communication and mobilizing its constituents.418 Focusing more on the “old web” than on 
social media, they analyze the far right’s webpages and the interconnectivity of them. These 
inter-page networks, they note, can serve a variety of purposes: fostering real world action, 
allowing nearly costless dissemination of information, facilitating exchanges of resources 
(including funding) and information, crowdsourcing leadership and coordination, and 
encouraging parallel, simultaneous actions both domestically and across borders.419 However, 
different countries’ right wing communities actually differ in their digital architectures, giving 
them a variety of advantages and disadvantages. 
 Caiani and Parent note that the internet has been especially beneficial for German 
extremists because of the limited space available to them in real life. The web was the prime 
space to form “more modern and complex extreme right coalitions.”420 Along with France, 
Germany had a stronger online far right than Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United 
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States, in terms of being cohesive and homogenous.421 Each web page of a far right wing 
organization, referred to as a “node,” has on average 5.6 links to other nodes, the highest of the 
six countries, making the German network the densest. The distance between right wing 
organizations is also the shortest of the countries analyzed-- there are only 2.4 nodes on average 
between them, meaning that one who uses one of these websites is going to find it easier to find 
more like it without being exposed to anything outside the right wing bubble. Not only are they 
close and dense, however. They are also extremely active. Germany also has the highest degree 
of interconnectedness between political parties, which are more highly visible and more in the 
center of the network than in the other countries, and other organizations. The NPD has strong 
links to its youth organization for instance, and the youth organization is a quick conduit of 
information from much more radical sites.  
What they find overall is that the German network resembles a star: highly centralized, in 
which “fast and efficient diffusion of communication and information among the various actors 
is guaranteed,” but the most peripheral actors have more difficulty influencing the system as a 
whole. This centralization does not prevent determined radicals from doing so, however. 
Subcultural youth groups are the most popular in the German network than in any of the others, 
and have a role as “very important ‘brokers’” between political parties and more fringe sites.422 
This helps German organizations form four well-defined blocks with “strong and reciprocal 
exchanges between all blocks,” comprised of a political parties and movements block, a block of 
other political movements and “revisionist groups,” a third block made up of subcultural 
organizations, and finally, the weakest block, the neo-Nazis. “In instrumental terms,” Caiani and 
Parenti clarify, “this extensive web of contacts between blocks is useful to increase the flow of 
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information, allocate responsibility and increase the flexibility of collective action.”423 While 
neo-Nazi sites outnumber those of political movements and subcultural organizations, they are 
not very powerful.424 This star structure particularly enhances the general tendency of the 
internet to encourage consensus seeking, and extremist groups are privileged. The web is 
“boundless, difficult to be controlled, in a state of continuous change” and “is the ideal place for 
those at the boundaries between legal politics and illegal activities.”425 In the German context, 
being illegal has made the online extremist community more close-knit: “cohesive, centralized, 
and apparently equipped with resources” that make them a greater danger to democracy.426 
It is not difficult to imagine how the “more dynamic Internet platforms”427 like Facebook 
and YouTube ease all of the functions for which the radical right uses the internet, especially 
increasing visibility. A more recent study by Schelter and Kunegis finds a host of primarily 
local- and issue-based Facebook pages e.g. “No to the [refugee] shelter in Köpenick,” that not 
only connect frustrated people but also openly advertise right wing organizations. Analyzing 
over 1 million interactions by more than 200,000 users across 136 pages, they find low 
cooperation between cities (low correlation between geographical distance and number of shared 
users), a surprisingly low incidence of “co-likes” (meaning that the users vary wildly aside from 
agreeing on these political issues) and a strong affiliation with the AfD. Another study with an 
even wider scope (11 million interactions, 1 million users, but across the established political 
party pages) finds a strong overlap between the AfD and the NPD on one side and the CDU on 
the other, making the AfD an effective bridge between dissatisfied ex-conservative voters and 
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the extreme right.428 Mainstream centrist Facebook users who come across the AfD are likely to 
find comments from and links to the extreme right, facilitating direct contact between traditional 
conservatism and neo-Nazis. This opens the potential for easy radicalization, as former CDU 
voters participate in a community where much more radical opinions are expressed and 
normalized, and extremist news and propaganda images offer to confirm their latent prejudices. 
Likewise, users from the extreme right have a destigmatized platform on which to communicate 
compared to the NPD’s Facebook page or forums.429 This supports the claim that the AfD 
functions as a “missing link” that filled the longstanding chasm between the mainstream and 
extreme right in German politics.430 
The AfD also has the highest number of followers on Facebook of any of the major 
parties at approximately 433,000 as of August 2018.431 Though this number is likely higher 
because it is a newer party which was built on the internet since the outset, it is significantly 
more than the next party, Die Linke (264,000), followed by CDU (207,000), SPD (201,000), the 
Greens (193,000), and FDP (163,000). Interestingly, the Bavarian CSU, somewhat of a little 
sister party to the ruling party (but one which has recently attempted to move the CDU 
rightwards), has more likes than the CDU itself at 216,000. 432 This data supports Caiani and 
Parenti’s central claim, and highlights its implications for political power in the 21st century: 
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digital media indeed led to a new logic of ‘connective action’ where communication 
becomes a prominent part of the organizational structure, giving birth to new types of 
mobilized actors based on personalized content sharing across media networks… In these 
new forms of mobilization high levels of organizational resources are no longer required 
for the development of action, nor the formation of a collective identity.433 
The Identitarian Movement (IB) and Pegida (an acronym for Patriotic Europeans Against the 
Islamification of the West, though often written as a normal word) are perfect examples of 
movements that have seemed to emerge almost spontaneously out of these new forms of political 
organization, making skillful use of the internet as a medium and the pre-existing network’s 
resources. While the AfD represents a more traditional attitude towards parliamentary political 
gains, the former two groups closely resemble the metapolitical style outlined by New Right 
intellectuals.  
The IB, after emerging  on Facebook in 2012 as the German chapter of the pan-European 
group Generation Identity (GI), has primarily mobilized its members for dramatic public 
spectacles-- in 2016 members climbed the Brandenburg Gate and hung a banner reading “secure 
borders, secure future,”434 and in 2017 Generation Identity raised over $178,000 for the “Defend 
Europe” project, chartering a ship and crew in the Mediterranean with the intent of finding boats 
of refugees/immigrants and reporting them to the Libyan coast guard. This enterprise ran into a 
number of rather amusing setbacks-- on its way to the Mediterranean, port inspectors in Cyprus 
found that 20 of the “professional crew” hired by the Identitarians were actually Sri Lankan 
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migrants with counterfeit identification, who had paid smugglers $12,000 each to get to Europe 
via the ship, renamed “C-Star” and carrying a banner reading “NO WAY-- YOU WILL NOT 
MAKE EUROPE HOME.” Identitarian Activist Alexander Schelyer was subsequently arrested 
on charges “related to human trafficking.” After finally reaching its target area, C-star attempted 
to harass a Doctors without Borders ship over radio; the ship promptly blew them off with a 
“thank you for your information.” The Identitarians were then blocked from refueling by 
Tunisian fishermen who blocked the refueling channel with their boats, holding “no racists” 
signs. Finally, less than two weeks after starting its mission, the Maritime Rescue Coordination 
Centre in Rome-- one of the same organizations that picks up migrant boats-- received an 
emergency distress call from the C-star, which had broken down and needed rescue. It then 
retracted the distress call but made no new progress in the following week. The mission was then 
declared an “undisputed success” by Sellner and disbanded.435 
Despite this rather embarrassing example, Generation Identity is still rather internet-
savvy. Its “actions,” as it calls them, rarely involve more than a few people, but they are high 
profile and easily appropriate the image of an exciting, revolutionary movement-- their videos 
feature exciting music and cinematography that one would find in an action film.436 The vast 
majority of their presence is actually only on the internet, however-- their real world actions 
seem to be secondary, only serving the purpose of creating material for their (quite sleek and 
modern) website. At least one study has raised the question of whether the IB should even be 
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considered a social movement in the traditional sense at all, or if it is a completely new type of 
movement: an internet phenomenon:437 
The internet facilitates the simulation of continuous protest activity with little expenditure 
that is maintained supra-regionally, even transnationally and internationally networked, 
so that a discrepancy arises between the real “on the street” actions that are often carried 
out with no more than a dozen activists, and the virtual echo that these actions illicit due 
to viral proliferation on the internet. 438 
Consequently, the Identitarian Movement is able to communicate political messages through a 
primarily aesthetic mode rather than an explicitly political one. This allows it to appear as if it 
does not have any connection to the right wing despite standing for the same “misanthropic 
ideology” (“menschenverachtende Ideologie”) as its allies. The writers “plead” that the 
Identitarian Movement is recognized as a “special transnational phenomenon” that cannot be 
underestimated, “because precisely the first signs of an institutionalization and arrangement of a 
new social movement are becoming clear… it carries the name of a movement, but isn’t one-- 
but it could nevertheless become one.”439 Modeled somewhat after Greenpeace, the guerilla 
environmentalist activist group, the Identitarian Movement attempts to connect itself to the past 
with its Lambda symbol, supposedly carried by the Spartans in their defense against Persia at 
Thermopylae in 480 BC. Yet these “wolves in skinny jeans” also make skilled use of postmodern 
media and cooperate increasingly closely with other national groups, from the French chapter of 
GI to the American alt-right.440 
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 Pegida, though it has been largely confined to large cities and a national focus rather than 
a pan-European organization or orientation, has somewhat of an opposite real world presence. It 
amasses thousands of people on the streets rather routinely, even pulling together 25,000 people 
in January of 2015.441 Camus and Lebourg claim that “the organization’s postmodernity is 
clear”:442 it uses social networks to garner attention and participants from its rallies, in which 
both educated middle class and radical far right protesters chant a combination of anti-immigrant 
slogans and easily recognized slogans from the 1989 demonstrations that brought down the 
Berlin Wall-- “We don’t want any Asylum seeking pigs!”443 with “All clear for the turnaround! 
[Klar zur Wende!]”444 and “We are the people! [Wir sind das Volk!].”445 It displays particular 
enmity for the mainstream media, calling it the fourth arm of the state, and multiple journalists 
who examined Pegida’s overlap with extremist, neo-Nazi level discourses have had their homes 
attacked.446 Despite constant claims from its spokespeople that it is not a racist organization, its 
web pages are strewn with the worst examples of violent and anti-intellectual rhetoric.447 Druxes 
claims that these qualities make Pegida best classified as an “antipolitical” movement-- it 
eschews a coherent political program in favor of a much more slippery, fluid general collective 
anger (easily manipulated by radicals), disregarding the free press (removing an “objective 
external corrective”), in turn justifying a feedback loop of animosity that can and has led to 
violence against immigrants and politicians.448 It is a form of political action defined by 
antagonism, “moral outrage and rebellion” to everything, that seeks out the disorganized, direct 
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participatory “democracy” of internet organizing as an alternative to liberal democracy.449 Pegida 
has exerted a “magnetic attraction” on the AfD. A study by Karsten Grabow finds that it is a 
“beneficial bridgehead into… lower middle class” strata, transporting hard anti-Islam lines from 
extremists to the AfD while providing opportunities for political connection to alienated 
individuals. 450 
The two most prominent New Right media outlets of today, Sezession and Junge 
Freiheit, actively play a supporting role for the activism of the IB and Pegida as well as the AfD. 
For instance, Götz Kubitschek’s journal Sezession regularly publishes pieces from Martin 
Sellner, the leader of the Identitarian Movement of Austria.451 Both magazines have given full 
page interviews to Pegida founder Lutz Bachmann. Junge Freiheit has great hopes for Pegida to: 
form a kind of pre-political space; not identical, but similar to the AfD support base. A 
gathering place for those who no longer feel represented or understood by the established 
parties; a kind of German “Tea Party,” which could very well gain political influence 
through its agenda setting.452 
These platforms do not limit themselves to explicit metapolitics, however, opting instead to use 
every tool in their arsenal. Having “offered itself as an unofficial mouthpiece of the AfD,” Junge 
Freiheit “regularly publishes full-page interviews with AfD officeholders, alongside guest 
articles and the party’s advertisements.453 Though the party began as an old-fashioned “bring 
back the Deutschmark” party led by conservative Eurosceptic economists, the New Right has 
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watched the AfD’s growth with interest, eager for its potential as a “portent for major changes, 
one that is as necessary as it was predictable.”454 Blaue Narzisse, founded in the recently-
infamous city of Chemnitz (where violent far right protests erupted in late August 2018), speaks 
meanwhile to those who are not yet in the movement, operating on the internet as a “gateway 
institution” to extremism aimed at young people who may stumble into the trap.455 Right wing 
news is thus able to report on right wing demonstrations and politics, the participants and voters 
of which are likely to read the coverage of right wing news sites over the mainstream 
Lügenpresse (lying press) -- and out of this circle emerges a symbiotic, self-feeding relationship 
between misleading information and outraged action while maintaining the illusion of a fully-
fledged (mini-) public sphere.456 This can persuade “even the most ardent extremist that he is not 
alone, that his views are not, in fact, extreme at all.”457 
 Not only has the internet opened up new potentials for the practical mobilization and 
dissemination of information, but it has also aided the formation of an “Erlebniswelt 
Rechtsextremismus” (right wing extremist lifeworld) through the creation of reference points 
around which group identities form.458 The internet’s implicit tendency towards separation 
narrows the horizons of possible thought, the limits of which are then consolidated by a process 
of identity formation. The production of collective identity is a much-studied topic in regard to 
the far right, as rituals, symbols, entertainment media, and even consumer products have been 
central to its appeal--this was as true for the Nazi Party as it is for today’s far right:  
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The aesthetic character of (historical) fascism has been widely underlined, stressing the 
power of its discourse, including the nonlinguistic forms (rituals, myths, and images), as 
an essential element in the formation of the regime’s self-identity, the construction of its 
goals and ends and, in sum, the making of its success… indeed, as it has been argued, 
more than mere means of political legitimation, rituals, myths, cults, and speeches are 
fundamental to the construction of power, its specific physiognomy, its political vision.459 
The intent is to “sacralize politics” into a mode that promises to assert order against chaos, to 
conquer alienation and uncertainty.460 The internet has greatly expanded the opportunities for the 
modern far right to do the same, both to present itself in offline spaces as well as to create online 
ones, appearing as a movement with a coherent, all-encompassing Weltanschauung (worldview) 
that demands fanaticism and obedience. The internet’s capacity for immediate access to such a 
community, complete with symbols, rituals, entertainment media, and even consumer products 
energizes “‘places of congregation’, providing an instant sense of community in an increasingly 
disconnected, disjointed world.”461 
 Though it was originally an invention of the working class and Jamaican immigrants in 
Great Britain, skinhead subculture became an important recruiting tool for the far right, 
especially in 1990s Germany.462 Producing its own subgenre of hard rock, “White Power 
music,”-- based on heavy metal and oi punk, appropriating its mosh pit dancing and aggressive, 
frustrated lyrical styles-- its music festivals organized by the NPD and neo-Nazi groupuscules 
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have played “a prominent role in recruiting, holding, and activating followers.”463 Over time 
skinhead culture provided “a unifying ideology, a common language, and a perfect example of 
globalization.”464 The last point refers to the transformation of skinhead culture into a 
multimillion-Euro industry across Europe as clothing brands such as Lonsdale, Pit Bull, and 
Thor Steinar have recognized their status as signifiers for far right subculture and pander to it 
with neo-Nazi and Norse symbols.465 Commercialization has not only created “an economic 
incentive for the continuation and exploitation of skinhead and racist culture,” but also aided the 
internationalization of the subculture, “creating international ties where there were none, and 
[inspiring] an ideological pan-Aryanism that has broken down the walls between racist 
groups.”466 It has solidified the sense of common identity that is often the appeal for skinhead 
culture to disaffected youth, as they search for a “mutual understanding of the world.”467 
 Skinhead culture has declined in importance for the far right, however, as its associations 
with violence, drugs, and general blockheadedness (even the hardcore neo-Nazi movement views 
skinheads as mostly “useful idiots”) have made it counterproductive for winning a perception of 
public legitimacy.468 As the far right has asserted a more mainstream internet presence it has 
changed its aesthetics in a number of ways, taking to a much more laid-back image of its 
movement. Once again appropriating from the left, “Gangsta-style”469 clothing such as “baggy 
trousers, hoodies with logos of far‐right bands or political slogans, baseball caps and skate shoes 
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have replaced bomber jackets and combat boots,”470 permitting a much more “autonomous-
alternative culture.”471 One ex-”Autonomous Nationalist” explains, “we wanted to have a 
modern and cool dress in everyday life – just as any other youth. And we just wanted to sell our 
ideology through saying that you can be a Nazi, but do not have to dress like a skinhead.”472  
The music scene has also evolved to reflect changing tastes. Pegida has featured open 
neo-Nazi rap artist “MaKss Damage,” who has produced songs with names such as “88 lines” 
(88 referring to HH, Heil Hitler) and an album titled “2033” (20th of April, Hitler’s birthday, and 
1933, the year he came to power), well-known neo-Nazi codes.473 The Junge Nationalisten, the 
NPD’s youth wing, also has downloadable “hate rock” and xenophobic rap music on its 
website.474 As ex-leader of the British National Party Nick Griffin said, “people will listen to a 
song over and over again and… take all the words in a way you’d be very lucky to get one in one 
hundred [people] to come and listen to a speech.”475 
 Alongside music, consumer products like T-shirts, books, magazines, posters, stickers, 
and calendars are popular opportunities for individuals to express their allegiances in public (as 
well as raising money for their causes)-- 51.7% of websites in Caiani and Parenti’s study had 
merchandise pages.476 One website, phalanx.europa.com, linked to by other right wing sites, sells 
a variety of products, including shirts with “edgy,” often offensive material. To list a few: a shirt 
with “MEGA-- Make Europe Great Again;” one with “Deus Vult,” (“God wills it”), a motto of 
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the crusades; “Schmiss happens,” a reference to the traditional dueling scars still inflicted and 
worn as a badge of honor by (primarily right-wing) fraternity students;  “Lampedusa Coast 
Guard,” a reference to an island in the Mediterranean that has become a hotspot for migrant 
boats and the site of two shipwrecks claiming the lives of at least 393 men, women, and children; 
and an assortment of Lambda logos and Sparta references, the symbols of the Identitarian 
Movement.477 
 Perhaps the strangest manifestation of the new far right’s aesthetics, however, are its 
online mascots. “AfD-chan,” (-chan being an endearing suffix in Japanese culture), an anime-
style cartoon girl representing the movement, is commonly found on the anonymous forum 
website “4chan,” (known as “one of the darkest corners of the Web”)478 as well as having “her” 
own accounts on Facebook and Twitter and a constant presence on Reddit’s subcommunity 
/r/dieAlternative.479 Usually sporting blue hair and drawn by any number of unknown internet 
artists, she appears in images with her friends, other far right mascots such as Pepe the Frog 
(claimed by Richard Spencer, top neo-Nazi in the United States who popularized the term “alt-
right”) and “Putsch-chan,” who symbolizes anti-democratic German militarism: 
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Bottom right images say “Everything will be ok,” “Election-Champagne 2017” on the bottle and “Vote for the 
AfD”480 
It is interesting to note the composition of the “/pol/, Politically Incorrect” 4chan forums in 
which AfD-chan features. While the majority of posts are marked with German and Austrian 
geotags, only about half of the comments are in German; the rest are in English, as the 
conversation is joined by posters from the United States, Finland, the UK, France, Switzerland, 
and Russia. The forum threads themselves are usually started as updates of the AfD’s status, 
followed by links to “meme dumps,” collections of memes for followers to spread; English- and 
German-language analyses of the current situation; motivational and self-improvement materials 
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(e.g. workout regimens); opportunities to get active in the AfD, IB, etc.; maps of supposed rapes 
and assaults by migrants; motivational tracts addressed to each of the three “strategic echelons” 
of the alt-right (“Facefaggers/Sturmpionier,” offline activists; “Shitposters/Bandenkampf,” 
online activists; and “The Homebase/Heimatfront,” inactive members); repeating tasks for the 
future; and finally links to “AfDwave/ Fashwave” YouTube videos, which combine fashionable 
vaporwave music and aesthetics with images, references, and sound bites of far right heroes from 
Nigel Farage to Julius Evola. There is no way to track the volume of traffic on 4chan, but one 
can approximate activity based on the YouTube views of the AfDwave videos, which receive 
about 10,000 views in the first month-- not a sizable portion of the AfD’s electorate, but a 
considerable number of active participants in this small subsection of the far right community.481 
After the main post, the 4chan forums devolve into post-ironic jokes about eugenics, 
immigrants, and the Holocaust alongside racist (especially Jewish) caricatures and dozens of 
images of Taylor Swift, for whom they seem to have an obsession as the ideal of “Aryan 
beauty.” Sometimes “drawthreads” are started, in which participants post images of AfD-chan 
alongside the entire “*chan” family, from “Putsch-chan” to “Rachel Purity”  to “Christ-chan” 
and even a 19th century symbol of German nationalism, “Deutscher Michel”: 
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Top right: Rachel Purity, mascot of SS worship, Putsch-chan, and Christ-chan, mascot of the traditional, subervient 
Christian wife. Top center: Rachel Purity. Top Right: AfD-chan attempting to wake up Deutscher Michel 
(representing German nationalism) with coffee.
482 
These mascots would be impossible to discuss without a mention of the implicit and often 
explicit sexualization that accompanies them-- some of the drawings of the figures are semi-
pornographic, and there are often requests in the forums for “Hentai” and “Rule 34s” (slang for 
pornography) of the different characters as well as comments such as “I want to sexually molest 
AfD-chan.”483 References to sexual violence are quite common on 4chan, and the community is 
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known for being overwhelmingly male. Anonymity and a webequitte (web etiquette) of hostility 
towards women-- as outlined by the “no girls on the internet” rule, in which anyone who 
identifies themselves as a woman is harassed, asked for “proof,” and dismissed as having useless 
opinions-- makes 4chan an identity-building space for redrawing masculinity without the 
constraints of what is now considered acceptable public behavior.  
Kristin Witte characterizes these patterns as the formation of a “manly gender habitus”-- 
the “staging” or “production” (Inszenierung) of masculinity.484 Focusing on right-wing 
propaganda videos produced by the Autonomous Nationalists, scattered across YouTube and 
other sites, she finds that most of the videos and accompanying forums are “exclusively male 
spaces” where females may be allowed physically (such as mouthpieces, wearing “modest 
clothing and long blonde hair”), but their function is to consolidate expectations of male 
behavior.485 Often embedded into discourses of “Volksgemeinschaft” (“People’s Community, a 
central term in the Nazi lexicon), these online spaces represent masculinity as being “bodily 
strong, young, courageous, aggressive, and comradely.”486 Sexuality is “construed as a duty of 
the Volksgemeinschaft,” assembled through racial identities.487 The communities (prominently 
“altermedia.de,” which was shut down in 2017) obsess themselves with defining the bounds of 
womanliness, fixated on women who have relations with non-Germans (or even too many 
German men) and, through this “slut discourse” (Schlampendiskurs), find reasons to claim the 
necessity for control over women’s sexuality.488 Non-German men are caricatured as libidinous 
(triebhaft) and connected to rape, with an explicit focus on Muslims because of their perceived 
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“primitive” attitudes towards women.489 One of the most morbid examples, found on a recent 
4chan AfD update, is a photograph of a naked female corpse, presumably raped, with the caption 
(originally in German): “At least she had the Grundgesetz” (the German constitution).490 This is 
somewhat ironic considering the aforementioned language of sexual domination used about the 
right wing’s anime mascots. 
 The more mainstream right wing internet presences rarely make references to the “purity” 
of German children or the racist and sexist imaginaries littering anonymous forums, similar to a 
pattern noticed by Caiani and Parenti on “Web 1.0”: organizations commonly have ‘clean’ sites 
on which their images are polished and disassociated from violence, but it only takes a few links 
to get from these to the real face of the movement.491 For instance, the Facebook and Twitter 
pages of AfD-chan are much more memes- and news-oriented, focusing on more relatable 
content: 
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Left: “German is the country of the Germans”/ “Where is that written??”/ “In the name. Germany.” This image 
evokes a stereotype of postmodern leftist identity politics: the overweight, colored-haired, androgynous feminist. 
Right: Björn Höcke, prominent AfD politician: “Angela Merkel is weakened. We can push her into a minority 
coalition!” /Merkel: “Germany needs a stable government. Think of your state-political responsibility!” / Martin 
Schulz, leader of the SPD in the 2017 election: “We could make people’s lives a little bit better” / Höcke: “At what 
cost? We will not survive four more years of the grand coalition. Then we won’t have any credibility left!” /Merkel: 
“Together we have the power to save Europe” /*SPD party convention votes to accept coalition talks* /Schulz: 
“What have I done?” /Merkel: “Be my vice chancellor, and learn to use the dark side of politics.” Star Wars is an 
extremely popular source for meme templates across the internet because it is an easily accessible cultural reference. 
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492 
Left: Merkel: “This is fine.” This is a redrawing of a popular meme featuring a dog in a burning house, whose “this 
is fine” is often used either as a personal statement about stress or the kind of political statement seen here. 
Right: This is an instance of the “distracted boyfriend meme” from 2017, in which Germany’s “girlfriend” Angela 
Merkel is upset because Germany is “checking out” Frauke Petry of the AfD. 
 
Though the American far right is generally more proficient at manipulating the virtual world than 
its European counterparts (the first interactive right wing website was created by the American 
group Stormfront in 1998, three years before Wikipedia), the German right seems to have 
learned substantially from the Americans, having planned a “meme jihad” in the weeks leading 
up to the 2017 Bundestag election. The composition of the “AfD General” reports also tend to be 
more bilingual and diverse today than they were even a year ago.493  
 Between active online/offline organizations and the disorganized world of social media 
and forums, radicalization can simultaneously occur in two different ways. On one hand, 
institutions that link to one another, forming a multi-noded “bridge” between mainstream 
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conservative groups and far right ones, directly organizing people who can exert pressure in 
either direction. On the other hand, we find a much more fluid “gray zone” in such anonymous 
forums that pulls people rightward through subculture rather than organizations by fostering 
certain kinds of communication and behavior in its aesthetics and rituals.494 These channels 
mutually assist one another as the right wing accumulates both indoctrinated radicals and 
defectors from the mainstream. 
 According to Caiani and Parenti’s comparative research, electoral success of far right 
wing parties is positively associated with the presence of an active online component. The ease 
and cheapness of spreading information, the anonymity, and the shifts in knowledge production 
as a whole have facilitated the connection of people who are disillusioned, angry, and hopeless, 
and far right groups have been ready to provide them with opportunities to find community and 
organize outlets for these feelings. It is yet to be seen whether these networks will solidify into 
longstanding political blocks, or if the transient nature of internet phenomena will make these 
communities fall apart and reconstitute in some other way as spontaneously as they emerged. 
Nevertheless, the internet’s potential as a medium for extremism cannot be underestimated.  
 It is also unclear what a solution to the negative impacts of the internet may look like. 
There have been many “crises of democracy” in history, and it is one of the inherent qualities of 
the proclamation of a “crisis” that it justifies interventions and consolidations of power that 
would have been unacceptable beforehand. If something must be done to counteract the 
internet’s inclination towards radical thought, whether the state or Facebook is trusted to carry it 
out, such regulation could carry with it the same danger for any thought that challenges the 
dominant narrative (or the narrative that whichever censor aims to impose). The internet has 
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opened up the way for the democratization of knowledge production. We are no longer subject to 
news only chosen and censored by governments and private companies. Like the invention of the 
printing press, it has exacerbated fears from elites that the common man cannot be trusted with 
such access to the means of knowledge production. At the same time, the internet’s workings are 
not neutral-- no technology is-- and far from creating a global “e-democracy,” it seems instead to 
have exposed the most chaotically sinister and perverse faces of human behavior. 495 While it is 
problematic to pathologize right-wing extremism as mental illness or abnormality-- as we have 
seen, it can be grounded on real philosophical principles-- we can nevertheless ask whether the 
people found in these dark corners might not have been drawn to them were they less alienated 
and “better” socialized to a healthier sexuality and to tolerant values. Perhaps the internet itself is 
not the problem to be regulated-- its form does privilege extremism, but it is also possible that 
fewer people would be drawn to it under different social/economic conditions than the ones 
discussed in the first two chapters. Whether, like the printing press, it could be turned into a tool 
that assists democracy rather than inducing chaos is yet to be seen. It has existed for only a few 
decades, younger than a significant part of the world’s population, and will likely transform 
immensely in another three, five, and ten decades. 
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Conclusion 
 The last three decades in the Western world have seen major transformations to life, 
thought, and knowledge itself that are far beyond any individual’s ability to influence. It seems 
an inevitability of the post-Cold War, post-9/11, digitally-integrated world that humanity would 
become subject to an altogether new kind of existence. As modernity gave rise to 
industrialization, mass culture, and mass politics, postmodernity has consolidated the 
individual’s alienation as a mere atom in the inescapable aggregate of relations between people, 
things, and ideas that we know as advanced Western society. Not only are we passive subjects of 
the global economy, but also increasingly unable to imagine alternatives from the machine of 
discourses, sign values, and commodification which structures our reality. As the Conservative 
Revolution and Nazism were among many attempts to come to terms with man’s reduction to a 
subject of mechanized economy, society, and warfare, the New Right and new far right pick up 
the task of preserving meaning in an interconnected age in which existential reference points 
seem to be disappearing completely. Escape from the domination of discursive regimes-- the 
“failure of multiculturalism,” or the wider turn to culture narratives-- is just as difficult as escape 
from domination by material forces.  
 The rise of far right extremism in Germany and its success in shifting power is a response 
to these developments, and just as Nazism turned the Conservative Revolution’s ideas into raw 
political power, movements such as the AfD and the Identitarian Movement recklessly attempt to 
reclaim certainty with the notion of the welfare chauvinist ethnostate. In this way it is not a truly 
radical alternative from the system in place. It simply seeks to reify the aspects of society that 
provide security, such as the social safety net and cultural identity, while removing all of the 
aspects that carry uncertainty-- democracy, globalization, progressivism—by ascribing them to 
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an “un-German” outsider. It opposes the pairing of capitalism with political liberalism, 
embracing its own forms of “market fundamentalism” and consumerism. Its promise of social 
security, consequently, is arrived at through inner cultural homogeneity rather than by 
consensus-driven political process like that of the 20th century social democracy.496 National 
Socialism conceived of the world similarly. It wanted all of the benefits of modernity without the 
anxiety, and its solution to redraw certainty was to force a dichotomy between insiders and 
outsiders.  
The contemporary radical right encompasses a wide range of tendencies, from the 
Identitarian Movement’s grandiose ethnostatism to the AfD’s anti-egalitarian capitalism. But 
though they may differ strongly in radicality, political organization, tactics, and specific 
platforms, their basic orientation is the same, based on a conception of the world as made up of 
distinct peoples which must be kept separate. Following out of this are “ethno-nationalist ideas, 
elevating the collective identity to the category of a fetish, the insistence of inequality as a 
fundamental ontological and axiological category, and the defense of a bellicose conception of 
existence” found across the far right. This leads a number of scholars to examine the similarities 
between the contemporary scene and fascism. Fascism has often been treated as a specific 
historical phenomenon, connected with militarism, mass mobilization, faith in a single leader, 
and the political styles of Hitler and Mussolini. In addition, “the accent put on socioeconomic 
factors, on the Communist threat, and on the fact that it was a particular response to an inter-war 
cultural crisis” in the common characterization of fascism “left almost no space for treating 
fascism as a generic phenomenon that can reproduce itself under different historical and social 
conditions.”497 Treating fascism instead as an “ideological phenomenon more than a political 
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regime,” Stanley Payne, George Mosse, and Zeev Sternhell have argued, allows for a better 
understanding of the ways in which these movements emerge out of European culture as a part 
of it rather than as an interruption to it.498 
That fascism does not have to look like the Third Reich has been admitted by neo-fascists 
themselves, and it makes much more political sense from their perspective that it would not. 
Who would fall for the same overt tricks again, given how wary (and probably mocking) people 
today would be about the heavy-handed Nazi style of politics or a Hitler-style orator? Maurice 
Bardeche of the French New Right is conscious of this: “With another name, another face, and 
with nothing which betrays the projection from the past, with the form of a child we do not 
recognize and the head of a young Medusa, the Order of Sparta will be reborn.”499 That far right 
extremism today seeks its domination through “metapolitical, democratic, and legal means” 
should make it no less conspicuous-- once again, the far right attempts to “revise and supersede” 
leftist solutions with a paradigm of national chauvinism.500 It seeks to entrench the benefits of the 
universalist, progressive project-- welfare, universal healthcare, strong legal protections for 
citizens-- with an identity relativism that would make it exclusive to insiders of the community, 
in order to “save” it from the weaknesses of the open, pluralistic society that brought about this 
progress in the first place. Incidentally, it was this political and social openness which made such 
progress possible in the first place. In the 1930s the far right responded to the dreams of 
modernist leftism with a National Socialism-- mass mobilization, solidarity, unity, but asserting 
that it could only be realized on a national level, dependent on racial homogeneity. Today it 
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appeals to internet culture, identity politics, and alienation with the same promise that reasserting 
national homogeneity is the solution. 
This is what makes the new far right best characterized as a “reactionary 
postmodernism.” The AfD, Pegida, Identitarian Movement, and intellectual New Right all 
consider themselves in some way opposed to the characteristics of postmodernity. Yet they all 
willingly engage with postmodernity in their own ways, using its political and technological 
tools to its advantage and even conceptualizing itself using postmodern thought. The AfD 
presents itself as an alternative to the neoliberalism of the center left and right, but it does not 
oppose neoliberal capitalism on principle; its solution to the contradictions of the global 
economy is a simple one, to exclude the foreigner while yet continuing the SPD-CDU project of 
privatization. Pegida and the Identitarian Movement speak of traditional values and idealize a 
“mythical past,” but their methods are decidedly postmodern, using the internet for mass 
mobilization and/or creating dramatic spectacles, selling merchandise, and creating new age 
music videos.501 The intellectual New Right, though split between passivity and metapolitical 
activism, recognizes the western world as having entered a new stage that has either killed the 
myth of the German nation or finally enabled nationalism’s power to sublate every other aspect 
of life under culture. All of these are attempts to synthesize contradictions in contemporary 
society: “instinct and culture; rationality and irrationality; hypermodernism/postmodernism and 
tradition; ecology and technological development; nation and supranational community 
(Europe); the maximum sovereignty of the state and individual economic freedom; right and left; 
individual sacrifice and freedom and/or collective happiness.”502 In doing so it constitutes a 
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response not just to the political, economic, and existential questions of postmodernity but also to 
the process of questioning in the first place. It abhors uncertainty, and the fragmentation and 
increasing complexity of everything from the economy to knowledge itself brought on by 
postmodernity has spurred a resistance from those who find their livelihoods and identities most 
threatened by this disorganization.  
Nazism represented a “reactionary modernism,” a use of the tools and thought of 
modernity towards the end of reasserting a supposed organic unity of the Volk that would 
eliminate the insecurity of modernity. Similarly, the new far right is not so much of a negative 
“reaction” as it is often understood. Rather, though it has a reactionary agenda, it is a movement 
that very much celebrates the postmodern: the internet, identity politics, cultural relativism, 
metapolitics, and even in some ways the neoliberal economics which it mobilizes against. This 
last point is perhaps where it differs from the far right of the 1930s; removing the outsider does 
not seem to require a political revolution, replacing the existing system with something new. The 
existing democratic nation-state can remain largely the same in composition— it must simply be 
reoriented inwards, excluding outsiders from democratic rights and diminishing global trade’s 
role in the national economy. Though it may be a watering down from 20th century fascism, this 
conception still assumes that it can decouple all hitherto progress from the struggle which gave 
birth to it, ascribing its beneficial side to Germanness and anything undesirable to outsiders. This 
is rooted in the notion that human communities are not inherently full of contradictions, forces 
within them that create change, but instead represent some inherent inner life that unites (and 
supersedes) all of its individuals. When alienation and uncertainty seem to grow, the far right 
answer is to remove outsiders who do not share this inner life. The contemporary far right gives 
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this a banner of nominal equality with “cultural pluralism,” but the fundamental claim is the 
same: diversity is an artificial imposition on the “true nature” of Germany. 
What both the new and old far right fail to see is the absurdity of any hermetic notion of 
“a culture” in historical perspective. The Nazis believed that the German nation, as an aggregate 
of all the ethnic groups that integrated into it until that point, was as “German” as it could be and 
had to stay pure. One could have said the same thing at any point in history, between any one of 
the migrations or border changes that have occurred hundreds of times in Europe, and it has in 
fact been said every step of the way. The contemporary far right thinks that 2018 is the year in 
which it is finally clear who and what is German and who and what is not. What has changed is 
that more and more people are once again falling for this myth that identities do not change, or at 
least that throughout centuries of change there has always been some clear lineage of 
“Germanness.” As we have seen, the legitimization of this narrative and with it the political 
opportunities of the far right have largely been driven by the frictions and “de-solidarization” of 
society under neoliberalism, the language used to mediate and explain these changes, and the 
concomitant domination of public discourse by the politics of cultural identity. 503 
One can see a reflection of Conservative Revolution author Oswald Spengler’s The 
Decline of the West in this rejection of cultural fluidity.504 Culture, the “totality of the ways of 
being humankind” attached to a particular homeland, Spengler claims, has become civilization. 
Culture disintegrates in a community that has become too introspective, too focused on a 
rationality that undermines it from within.505 Many in the intellectual New Right reject any 
attempt to turn the clock back. To attempt to recover myths of identity, Baal Müller claims, is to 
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lend oneself straight to conspiracy theories about the “outsiders” responsible, whether Jews, 
leftists, or Muslims.506 Likewise, Franco Volpi warns that the reawakening of myths is a slippery 
slope to irrationalism and anarchy, defeating the purpose of any attempt to reclaim any sense of 
rootedness.507 Yet the politically ambitious flank of the New Right fully embraces these myths as 
points of mobilization, and their cooptation of concepts such as metapolitics was given its deus 
ex machina in the form of internet communication.  
We have seen how the workings of the globalized neoliberal economy and the mass 
movements of people and capital have produced anxieties in the strata of society that are often 
not the most vulnerable but have something significant to lose: job security, pensions, and their 
traditional places as the sole breadwinners of the family. While modernization has provided great 
benefit to much of society, it has left a significant outclassed element that does not have the 
education or mobility now needed to stay competitive in the job market. This has been especially 
pronounced in former East Germany, which has had to undergo a “double process of 
modernization” of both trying to catch up from its economic GDR-era asymmetries and 
simultaneously experiencing the West’s postmodern transformations in economics and politics. 
Meanwhile, established political parties have turned to a postmaterial politics to capture the votes 
of the advantaged and consequently left a significant portion of German society feeling 
unrepresented-- especially the SPD, which used to carry a much higher proportion of working 
class voters, who now most strongly support the AfD.508  
We have also seen how the language needed to justify the state-economy-borders 
relationship under neoliberalism, such as the management of migration and the preservation of 
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the social welfare system, picked up the postmodern discourses of cultural identity which then 
underscored conversations like the Leitkultur debate. Narratives such as the failure of 
multiculturalism justified a shift from diversity to assimilation as the goal of immigration, 
demanding the incorporation of “German values” by peoples deemed “culturally incompatible,” 
while retroactively explaining the 20th century welfare state as only having existed because of 
relative cultural homogeneity. The configuration and imposition of one-dimensional identity 
onto minorities stimulated a reflection within the majority population, reifying native identity as 
a contrast to outsiders. The crisis of security accompanying the declaration of the “war on 
terror,” with the urgency it carried, only raised the stakes and further emotionally charged 
debates revolving around headscarves and the limit of tolerance. The right-wing concept of 
ethnopluralism, a “heterogeneous world of homogenous communities” appeared compelling as 
an alternative to mediating the increasingly-decaying multicultural settlement. 509 
These developments prompt Michael Minkenberg and many other scholars to label right 
wing radicalism as a “normal pathology” of advanced societies. In other words, it arises among 
crises in the normal functioning of the society. When fast moving societies such as ours confront 
periods of accelerated change, the latent potential of fascism is activated and extremist political 
movements emerge to organize and channel this frustration. As we have seen, however, the 
contemporary far right cannot be seen solely as a political outsider that emerges against the 
workings of the mainstream and its discourses, as it has also germinated out of trends (such as 
the turn to culture) that began in the center or the left. Cas Mudde claims that this makes the far 
right better understood as a “pathological normalcy”-- a radicalization of mainstream views.510 
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The far right does not need to change people’s minds on foreigners-- 39% of Germans believe 
that foreigners come to Germany to exploit the social system (though it is worth noting that trust 
has somewhat recovered since 2015)-- it simply has to direct them towards immigration and 
away from socio-economic issues and exaggerate the stakes to stoke fear.511 Paul Hockenos 
points out that while anomie, economic crisis, and disorientation increase the far right’s allure, 
these are “catalysts that activate pre-existing prejudices.”512 This is why, as Kai Arzheimer and 
Elisabeth Carter claim, “the [right wing] extremist vote will not be curbed by simply looking 
after economic conditions.”513 It is also unlikely that the 20th century social democratic economy 
could even be viable within a globally-integrated economy.514 Pathological normalcy supports 
the conception of a reactionary postmodernism, in its emphasis on the ways in which 
contemporary right wing extremism grows out of a tendency deeply within German culture and 
the postmodern condition into which it has evolved. 
 Political repression, then, only responds to the symptom of the problem, “[exonerating] 
the political establishment for its softer versions of the same ideas, while attempting to keep 
embarrassing spectacles like vandalized Jewish cemeteries and the charred quarters of foreign 
refugees out of the international spotlight.”515 In addition, it justifies the use and expansion of the 
state security/surveillance apparatus which could be employed against any other challenge to the 
political establishment and encourage corruption.516 Statistically, what has seemed to impede the 
far right the most in Germany compared to France and other nations has been the presence of a 
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strong center-- close coalitions-- in which mainstream parties ostracize the far right, and the 
CDU/CSU have had a strong monopoly on conservative politics.517 At the same time, in their 
strategies for maintaining power, these mainstream parties have followed rhetoric rightwards, 
adopting what used to be much more right-of-center talking points (for instance, Merkel’s two 
proclamations of the death of multiculturalism). The German model of “Wehrhafte Demokratie” 
(defensive or militant democracy) has also in some ways unintentionally legitimized right wing 
populism. Despite historically impeding the growth of parties beyond the state level, its outright 
ban-threatening hostility to those on the right who do not feel represented by the CDU/CSU 
allows populists to claim that it is actually the mainstream that is undemocratic, and that it is the 
job of a popular metapolitical movement to restore democracy on its own terms.518 
 For obvious reasons, permissiveness is also not a successful response to right wing 
radicalism, which stands directly in opposition to democratic values regardless of whatever “free 
speech” slogans it strategically (and misleadingly) appropriates. Yet legal responses and state 
repression are often counter-productive. Mudde claims, then, that the most likely reason for 
Germany’s strength (or at least the delay) against right wing extremism is its historical memory 
of the Nazi period, which has made it more defensive to anything resembling fascism. It is 
important to note, however, that this memory is collectively sustained. It cannot be imposed by 
the state as a whip nor left to maintain itself. Germany’s past and present identity must be 
consciously and constantly reflected upon, and events such as the recent xenophobic riots in 
Chemnitz must be condemned on the streets in addition to the media. The metapolitical strategy 
utilized by the far right is one that fundamentally depends on subtly gaining acceptance in the 
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mainstream. It benefits the fringes when mass politics becomes trapped in discourses of crisis 
and cultural difference. Identifying where this is happening-- in the preoccupation with identity 
politics, for instance-- and attempting to break out of these limits of imagination is necessary to 
combatting the “war for minds” that the new far right wages. 
 The New Right is aware of this. While the more pessimistic strand begrudgingly accepts 
the disorientation and anxiety of a condition whose self-reflectiveness precludes the possibility 
of comforting reference points, a more militant political wing is willing to use postmodernism as 
a means to an end that promises the harmonization of society. Like the Conservative Revolution, 
an anti-modern movement that yet recognized itself as within modernity, the intellectuals of the 
New Right understand to varying extents the end of self-justified universals like national 
identity.519 For those who did not resign themselves to mourning, the program of metapolitical 
style that they co-opted from leftist postmodernists became their project, and internet 
communication came into being at the perfect moment-- right after unification, supposedly 
Germany’s chance to regain its national identity. With its highly participatory, disorganized, and 
anonymous system, extremists were given a second public sphere to toy with-- one which could 
not be so easily regulated by state authorities, and which made cultural media such as music, 
fashion, and memes into easily apprehensible, cheaply produced, and quickly distributable 
intermediaries for spreading political sentiments. It encouraged the consolidation of pockets of 
radicals within a star-shaped system that both 1) facilitated communication and mobilization and 
2) generated group identities with strong appeals to alienated individuals. 
 Postmodernity has entailed “an increasingly reflexive process of modernization and a 
new, self-critical posture towards modernity in which “cultural orientations, a sharpened sense of 
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crisis, the primacy of the ‘life world’,” and a focus on “education, language, and 
communication” dominate explanations of the relationships of individuals and collectives to the 
broader world.520 In this turn to examining subjectivity, it has supplanted materialist 
explanations, universalism, and universalist concepts such as “progress” with a relativism that 
mirrors the increasingly fragmented, fluid social and economic life brought on by globalization 
and the internet. Zygmunt Bauman claims, however, that the end of modernity’s “conviction of 
its superiority” and “its pretension to universal validity” does not necessarily signal the end of 
meaning.521 Rather, as Habermas insists, this self-critical attitude can be utilized for a forward-
thinking but cautious commitment to Enlightenment values (it is for this reason that Habermas 
actually rejects the term “postmodernism” as a whole, as he claims that “the critique of 
modernity has always been a part of philosophical modernity itself.”)522  
This is where the New Right figures such as Botho Strauss, who otherwise fully accept 
that we live in postmodernity, fall short. Preoccupied with the loss of old dreams, they are unable 
to imagine the redemption of the modern project. Unable to ground social belonging in an 
unquestionable authority such as the “narrative of the nation,” the New Right either gives up on 
meaning or attempts to impose it by force. 523 It takes Spengler’s ‘decay of civilization’ seriously, 
a narrative that implies that there is no way to find meaning or purpose in an existence which 
questions itself. Once this happens, and one can no longer be absolutely sure of one’s place in 
the universe, “authentic” life is no longer possible. Just as civilization did not fall apart after 
Spengler published his book (the closest thing to it was the fascism he inspired), Germany’s 
current “crisis of identity” is in many ways only a declaration of crisis-- which is not to say that 
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it should not be taken seriously, as the declaration of crisis can become the crisis, as when one 
yells “fire” in a theater. As Richard Löwenthal pointed out, however, it has long been a 
characteristic of Western civilization to be caught in a “loss of world orientation.” The “long-
term process of loss of meaning,” however, only signals the end of civilization to those who 
cannot live with an identity that is not fixed, but rather built on self-reflexiveness-- an identity 
that integrates change as a fundamental value of itself.  
In such an advanced world which has given rise to such advanced levels of alienation, the 
politics of identity is alluring to all individuals in the search for a sense of belonging. But identity 
can be, as Stuart Hall claimed, “a construction, a process never completed.” Identifying oneself 
as a part of something can always be “conditional, lodged in contingency” rather than an 
“unchanging ‘onenness’.” Zygmunt Bauman likewise claimed that postmodernity could be a 
“corrective force” for the projects of progress rather than the end of it.524 For instance if the 
power of identity is to be reclaimed from right and left identitarianism, Europe must find a 
conception of its own identity as one which “allows for individual life forms while securing 
social cohesion and giving rise to a responsible, autonomous organization of one’s own life.”525 
The current postmodern left fulfills the first criteria but, trapped in its relativism, is inadequate to 
provide the grounds for common belonging on a level any higher than essentialized racial, 
sexual, or class groupings. The populist right, true to the form of right wing radicalism, meets 
neither of these needs in any real sense, but obscures this lack through its promises to elevate 
aesthetic and romantic notions of nation, masculinity, beauty, etc. above the realm of politics, 
rendering democracy and diversity unnecessary. The New Right is either unable to salvage any 
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optimism from the loss of myths in postmodernity, or instrumentalizes its chaos to subordinate 
human life to “higher” values; to accomplish Hitler’s dream that “the beautiful should reign over 
humans.”526 On the other hand, the postmodern left has “[tuned] itself into the postmodern 
Lebensgefühl [feeling of life], not only accepting the emergence of a chaotic, fragmentized 
world, but enjoying the demise and loss of certainty and finite authority, rejoicing in the 
decentering impulses and indeterminacy characteristic of the postmodern age,” celebrating 
individualism at the expense of social solidarity. 527   
Both are trapped within the same discursive bubble. Left and right are stuck with the 
same limited imagination in solving the problems of globalization. The anti-neoliberal left (e.g. 
the Greens or Die Linke), attempting to reclaim the 20th century welfare state, cannot but help 
relying on the construction of the nation-state as the locus of social democracy. This puts them at 
an inherent disadvantage in the current antagonistic political climate-- they need the discourses 
of “national identity” that are required to sustain the nation-state against deterritorialization. 
Though national identity can be conceived of differently, as based on principles rather than on 
shared ethnic ground, “nation” is an inherently geographical term, always bound up with the 
politics of borders. This is why democracy seems at such a standstill. Against the effects of 
globalization, the answers (right and left) are still to either expand democracy upwards, into 
supranational bodies like the EU, or to delegate it downwards towards a more local level. Both 
rely on a conception of nation, however, that seems unable to sustain itself without specifically-
regional identities that become increasingly obsolete as people become more mobile, moving 
from country to country for work, and as communication has less and less to do with geography. 
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But democracy could expand horizontally, through the workplace, across national lines just as 
fluidly as transnational corporations move. It would only be possible with an emphasis on human 
commonness rather than differences of identity, but it could provide an alternative solution to the 
frustrations on which the right capitalizes, providing a sense of identity based on values, as a 
process, rather than on inherent qualities. 
The discourses of “national identity” are much more easily manipulable for the right, 
which can openly declare who is German and who is not while the left must defend 
multiculturalism. But if the goal is to revive the national welfare state, why go to such great 
pains to make it a diverse one? Why not just aim for homogeneity, which supposedly precludes 
the difficulties of maintaining social solidarity in a multicultural, pluralistic society? On this 
stage, the left is always on the defensive. The reification of the nation state ultimately aids the 
right more than anyone else, especially with the predominant emphasis on identity politics. 
While the intent was to achieve recognition for minority identities and subjectivities, majority 
populations presented with politics limited to these social categories have responded with their 
own reassertions of national identity on the same terms.  
In this way, postmodern relativism was a catalyst for the new far right. It took the death 
of objective universals for granted, turning attention to the particular and the subjective. The turn 
to cultural identity allowed the assertion of fundamental, irreconcilable differences between 
cultures and the neglect of common ground. But restoring certainty in the grand narratives of 
modernity cannot be the aim of a viable new identity, if it is to avoid the pitfalls of the past. 
Alternatively, the end of certainty brought on by postmodernism should, as Baumann says, 
“maintain as a corrective force, looking upon the past ‘as a movement in a direction unlikely to 
be followed, as perhaps even an aberration, the pursuit of a false track, a historical error now to 
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be rectified.”528 The left praises atomization and the disintegration of universalism into infinite 
relativisms, while the right either consigns itself to history or inverts its pessimism into a violent 
but motivated cynicism.  
There is a possibility here, an unfilled category, that is left out in the postmodern left and 
right. This is a pessimistic left that thinks of history like Baumann’s “corrective force,” which 
does not blindly trumpet “progress” with a disdain for the past nor turn its relativism into 
exclusivity. As Adorno wrote of Spengler in 1950, “culture is not […] the life of collective souls 
in the process of unfolding themselves; rather, it arises in men’s struggle to acquire the means to 
reproduce themselves. Culture thus contains an element of resistance to blind necessity—the will 
to determine oneself on the basis of knowledge.” This struggle, the will to determine ourselves 
and our conditions based on knowledge, transcends national, cultural, and political divides. Its 
incarnations vary wildly from person to person and community to community, and they are often 
completely incompatible. Nevertheless, the struggle itself can be interpreted as the universal 
beneath the particular which, as Hegel argued, can only be fulfilled as far as a community 
acknowledges that all individuals seek recognition without having to deny it to another. The 
appeal of the new far right’s dream to impose a reactionary postmodernity on Germany stems 
from the failure of any other politics to recognize the real difficulties of hundreds of thousands of 
Germans, primarily young men and the working class, as valid. It is not enough to prove that the 
far right solution is illusory; its appeal remains so long as it can promise security for those who 
live with uncertainty. A real alternative must be conceived to the present mode of politics, which 
divides for the wrong reasons in its relativism. The values of democracy, justice, and 
fundamental equality, for instance, may not have access to the simple identities of nationalism or 
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ethnicity, but it is possible to provide certainty with malleable values rather than those “fixed” 
conceptions of collective belonging. They may not be universally justifiable in the way that the 
Enlightenment had hoped them to be, but they remain the best products of the faculty of human 
reason and for guarding human rights. Only by doubling down on these identities as a process 
rather than as essential qualities— and by asserting that a self-critical attitude towards these 
universalist projects can be included within this process— does democracy in Germany and the 
rest of the Western world have any chance of surviving the threat of the new far right. 
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